GHSA-QP94-VR9V-VP96
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-17 18:32 – Updated: 2026-09-17 18:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
clk: qcom: gdsc: tear down per-domain genpds in gdsc_unregister()
gdsc_unregister() removes the OF provider entry and tears down the parent/subdomain wiring, but never calls pm_genpd_remove() on the individual generic_pm_domain structures registered by gdsc_init():
void gdsc_unregister(struct gdsc_desc *desc)
{
struct device *dev = desc->dev;
size_t num = desc->num;
gdsc_pm_subdomain_remove(desc, num);
of_genpd_del_provider(dev->of_node);
}
That leaves dangling entries on the global gpd_list. After a provider unbind/rebind cycle (deferred-probe replay during early boot, real module unload of a clk driver that owns GDSCs, or an OF-overlay tear- down) the next gdsc_init() will end up trying to re-register a name that is still in the list and pm_genpd_init() returns -EEXIST.
While we are here, flip the order so the consumer-facing OF provider entry is the first thing removed -- otherwise a fresh of_genpd_get_from_provider() call racing with the teardown could attach to a domain that is mid-removal.
Iterate the scs[] array and pm_genpd_remove() each registered domain after the subdomain links are torn down. The regulators stay devm- managed (devm_regulator_get_optional() in gdsc_register()), so the release happens automatically when the underlying device is unbound; just the genpd accounting needs to be undone explicitly.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-93145"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-17T17:18:09Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nclk: qcom: gdsc: tear down per-domain genpds in gdsc_unregister()\n\ngdsc_unregister() removes the OF provider entry and tears down the\nparent/subdomain wiring, but never calls pm_genpd_remove() on the\nindividual generic_pm_domain structures registered by gdsc_init():\n\n\tvoid gdsc_unregister(struct gdsc_desc *desc)\n\t{\n\t\tstruct device *dev = desc-\u003edev;\n\t\tsize_t num = desc-\u003enum;\n\n\t\tgdsc_pm_subdomain_remove(desc, num);\n\t\tof_genpd_del_provider(dev-\u003eof_node);\n\t}\n\nThat leaves dangling entries on the global gpd_list. After a provider\nunbind/rebind cycle (deferred-probe replay during early boot, real\nmodule unload of a clk driver that owns GDSCs, or an OF-overlay tear-\ndown) the next gdsc_init() will end up trying to re-register a name\nthat is still in the list and pm_genpd_init() returns -EEXIST.\n\nWhile we are here, flip the order so the consumer-facing OF provider\nentry is the first thing removed -- otherwise a fresh\nof_genpd_get_from_provider() call racing with the teardown could\nattach to a domain that is mid-removal.\n\nIterate the scs[] array and pm_genpd_remove() each registered domain\nafter the subdomain links are torn down. The regulators stay devm-\nmanaged (devm_regulator_get_optional() in gdsc_register()), so the\nrelease happens automatically when the underlying device is unbound;\njust the genpd accounting needs to be undone explicitly.",
"id": "GHSA-qp94-vr9v-vp96",
"modified": "2026-09-17T18:32:12Z",
"published": "2026-09-17T18:32:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-93145"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0f4733f5fc6b6b62750619f30c18730922a1dbdb"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/40bd77fa2857ccfa77b885b77d44cea406f24a4c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/418d2f0a32b2a9ceb656a88aa9139408a9b7b517"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6333cbf7e86df9797b342ce64ae7d32ba46d8d10"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6b9228a43963bcd4db92deb467375345132c29b3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/86b23609d5e17a770d03037e53c6a443e742a6e6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cfe16d993c578f6b17e0171a8dfd68f6fdfcfb24"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f60f495858379dc70e87c6898d761a9db98739ff"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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