GHSA-QQMP-WF37-98F9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-05 22:52 – Updated: 2026-10-05 22:52Impact
Multiple @opentelemetry/instrumentation-* packages recorded the database connection username as the db.user
span attribute on every instrumented database operation. This attribute was emitted unconditionally — it was
not gated by enhancedDatabaseReporting or any other opt-in flag, and it was the default behaviour for
all users of the affected packages until the patched releases shipped on 2026-07-23.
The attribute is forwarded to every configured observability backend (Jaeger, Zipkin, Datadog, OTLP collectors, etc.). Depending on the database account naming convention in use, the exported value may reveal:
- Internal service account names that disclose architecture topology.
- Role-encoded usernames (e.g.
admin_readwrite,app_readonly_prod) useful for privilege inference. - Database account naming patterns useful for credential enumeration.
Affected packages (all are vulnerable from the first published version through the version listed below):
| Package | Vulnerable range | Patched version |
|---|---|---|
@opentelemetry/instrumentation-cassandra-driver |
< 0.66.0 |
0.66.0 |
@opentelemetry/instrumentation-knex |
< 0.65.0 |
0.65.0 |
@opentelemetry/instrumentation-mongoose |
< 0.67.0 |
0.67.0 |
@opentelemetry/instrumentation-mysql |
< 0.67.0 |
0.67.0 |
@opentelemetry/instrumentation-mysql2 |
< 0.67.0 |
0.67.0 |
@opentelemetry/instrumentation-oracledb |
< 0.46.0 |
0.46.0 |
@opentelemetry/instrumentation-pg |
< 0.73.0 |
0.73.0 |
@opentelemetry/instrumentation-tedious |
< 0.40.0 |
0.40.0 |
Patches
Fixed in the coordinated release on 2026-07-23 via feat!: only emit stable http, network and database attributes (#3585).
Upgrade to the patched version listed in the table above for each instrumentation package in use.
Workarounds
No configuration-level workaround exists in the affected versions: the db.user attribute cannot be
suppressed without patching. As a partial mitigation, a custom SpanProcessor can be used to strip db.user from spans before they leave the process:
// Example: drop db.user in a custom SpanProcessor
class StripDbUserProcessor implements SpanProcessor {
onStart(span: Span) {
span.setAttribute('db.user', null);
}
onEnd() {}
shutdown() { return Promise.resolve(); }
forceFlush() { return Promise.resolve(); }
}
Users who control the downstream collector can also filter the attribute at the collector pipeline level.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@opentelemetry/instrumentation-cassandra-driver"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.66.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@opentelemetry/instrumentation-tedious"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.40.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@opentelemetry/instrumentation-oracledb"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.46.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@opentelemetry/instrumentation-mongoose"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.67.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@opentelemetry/instrumentation-mysql"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.67.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@opentelemetry/instrumentation-knex"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.65.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@opentelemetry/instrumentation-mysql2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.67.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@opentelemetry/instrumentation-pg"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.73.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-104872"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-532"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-05T22:52:44Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-02T20:17:01Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nMultiple `@opentelemetry/instrumentation-*` packages recorded the database connection username as the `db.user`\nspan attribute on every instrumented database operation. This attribute was emitted unconditionally \u2014 it was\nnot gated by `enhancedDatabaseReporting` or any other opt-in flag, and it was the **default** behaviour for\nall users of the affected packages until the patched releases shipped on 2026-07-23.\n\nThe attribute is forwarded to every configured observability backend (Jaeger, Zipkin, Datadog, OTLP\ncollectors, etc.). Depending on the database account naming convention in use, the exported value may\nreveal:\n\n- Internal service account names that disclose architecture topology.\n- Role-encoded usernames (e.g. `admin_readwrite`, `app_readonly_prod`) useful for privilege inference.\n- Database account naming patterns useful for credential enumeration.\n\nAffected packages (all are vulnerable from the first published version through the version listed below):\n\n| Package | Vulnerable range | Patched version |\n|---------|-----------------|-----------------|\n| `@opentelemetry/instrumentation-cassandra-driver` | `\u003c 0.66.0` | `0.66.0` |\n| `@opentelemetry/instrumentation-knex` | `\u003c 0.65.0` | `0.65.0` |\n| `@opentelemetry/instrumentation-mongoose` | `\u003c 0.67.0` | `0.67.0` |\n| `@opentelemetry/instrumentation-mysql` | `\u003c 0.67.0` | `0.67.0` |\n| `@opentelemetry/instrumentation-mysql2` | `\u003c 0.67.0` | `0.67.0` |\n| `@opentelemetry/instrumentation-oracledb` | `\u003c 0.46.0` | `0.46.0` |\n| `@opentelemetry/instrumentation-pg` | `\u003c 0.73.0` | `0.73.0` |\n| `@opentelemetry/instrumentation-tedious` | `\u003c 0.40.0` | `0.40.0` |\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in the coordinated release on 2026-07-23 via\n[feat!: only emit stable http, network and database attributes (#3585)](https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-js-contrib/pull/3585).\n\nUpgrade to the patched version listed in the table above for each instrumentation package in use.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nNo configuration-level workaround exists in the affected versions: the `db.user` attribute cannot be\nsuppressed without patching. As a partial mitigation, a custom `SpanProcessor` can be used to strip `db.user` from spans before they leave the process:\n\n```ts\n// Example: drop db.user in a custom SpanProcessor\nclass StripDbUserProcessor implements SpanProcessor {\n onStart(span: Span) {\n span.setAttribute(\u0027db.user\u0027, null);\n }\n onEnd() {}\n shutdown() { return Promise.resolve(); }\n forceFlush() { return Promise.resolve(); }\n}\n```\n\nUsers who control the downstream collector can also filter the attribute at the collector pipeline level.",
"id": "GHSA-qqmp-wf37-98f9",
"modified": "2026-10-05T22:52:44Z",
"published": "2026-10-05T22:52:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-js-contrib/security/advisories/GHSA-qqmp-wf37-98f9"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-104872"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-js-contrib/pull/3585"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-js-contrib/commit/27e172a9e0d549559056ccd58f27d13467454156"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-js-contrib/commit/5b7dd0e102e940d653e04b08b5a1b721a8271037"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-js-contrib"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Multiple @opentelemetry/instrumentation-* packages expose database username via unconditional db.user span attribute"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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