GHSA-QWQC-28W3-FWW6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2019-08-23 21:42 – Updated: 2021-08-17 22:06
VLAI?
Summary
Message Signature Bypass in openpgp
Details

Versions of openpgp prior to 4.2.0 are vulnerable to Message Signature Bypass. The package fails to verify that a message signature is of type text. This allows an attacker to to construct a message with a signature type that only verifies subpackets without additional input (such as standalone or timestamp). For example, an attacker that captures a standalone signature packet from a victim can construct arbitrary signed messages that would be verified correctly.

Recommendation

Upgrade to version 4.2.0 or later. If you are upgrading from a version <4.0.0 it is highly recommended to read the High-Level API Changes section of the openpgp 4.0.0 release: https://github.com/openpgpjs/openpgpjs/releases/tag/v4.0.0

Severity ?
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.1.2"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openpgp"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.2.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2019-9153"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-347"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2019-08-23T21:40:54Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Versions of `openpgp` prior to 4.2.0 are vulnerable to Message Signature Bypass. The package fails to verify that a message signature is of type `text`. This allows an attacker to to construct a message with a signature type that only verifies subpackets without additional input (such as `standalone` or `timestamp`). For example, an attacker that captures a `standalone` signature packet from a victim can construct arbitrary signed messages that would be verified correctly.\n\n\n## Recommendation\n\nUpgrade to version 4.2.0 or later.\nIf you are upgrading from a version \u003c4.0.0 it is highly recommended to read the `High-Level API Changes` section of the `openpgp` 4.0.0 release: https://github.com/openpgpjs/openpgpjs/releases/tag/v4.0.0",
  "id": "GHSA-qwqc-28w3-fww6",
  "modified": "2021-08-17T22:06:12Z",
  "published": "2019-08-23T21:42:20Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-9153"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openpgpjs/openpgpjs/pull/797/commits/327d3e5392a6f59a4270569d200c7f7a2bfc4cbc"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openpgpjs/openpgpjs/pull/816"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openpgpjs/openpgpjs/releases/tag/v4.2.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://sec-consult.com/en/blog/advisories/multiple-vulnerabilities-in-openpgp-js"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JS-OPENPGP-460248"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/BSI/Publications/Studies/Mailvelope_Extensions/Mailvelope_Extensions_pdf.html#download=1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.npmjs.com/advisories/1160"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/154191/OpenPGP.js-4.2.0-Signature-Bypass-Invalid-Curve-Attack.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Message Signature Bypass in openpgp"
}


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