GHSA-QXMR-QXH6-2CC9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-12-07 22:01 – Updated: 2021-12-08 19:29Impact
Denial of service vulnerability that could be exploited during a guest checkout. The regular expression used to validate a guest order's email was subject to exponential backtracking through a fragment like a.a..
Before the patch, it can be reproduced in the console like this:
irb(main)> Spree::EmailValidator::EMAIL_REGEXP.match "a@a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.@"
processing time: 54.293660s
=> nil
To reproduce in the browser, fill in the "Customer Email" field with that fake email address during a guest checkout. Before that, you should open the browser dev tools and change the type attribute for that field from email to text. After entering a fake address and pressing the "Save & Continue" button, the browser will take a long term to perform the request before showing an error message for the invalid address. Eventually, making the email string even longer could lead to the exhaustion of server resources.
Patches
Versions 3.1.4, 3.0.4, and 2.11.13 have been patched to use a different regular expression.
There's an improbable chance that some orders in your system end up having associated an email address that is no longer valid. We've added a task to check precisely that:
bin/rails solidus:check_orders_with_invalid_email
The above will print information for every affected order if any.
Workarounds
If a prompt upgrade is not an option, please, add the following to config/application.rb:
config.after_initialize do
Spree::EmailValidator.send(:remove_const, :EMAIL_REGEXP)
Spree::EmailValidator::EMAIL_REGEXP = URI::MailTo::EMAIL_REGEXP
end
References
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ReDoS
- https://snyk.io/blog/redos-and-catastrophic-backtracking/
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue or a discussion in Solidus. * Email us at security@solidus.io * Contact the core team on Slack
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "solidus_core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.11.13"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "solidus_core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.0.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "solidus_core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.1.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.1.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-43805"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1333"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-12-07T20:58:37Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2021-12-07T18:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\nDenial of service vulnerability that could be exploited during a guest checkout. The regular expression used to validate a guest order\u0027s email was subject to exponential backtracking through a fragment like `a.a.`.\n\nBefore the patch, it can be reproduced in the console like this:\n\n```ruby\nirb(main)\u003e Spree::EmailValidator::EMAIL_REGEXP.match \"a@a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.@\"\nprocessing time: 54.293660s\n=\u003e nil\n```\n\nTo reproduce in the browser, fill in the \"Customer Email\" field with that fake email address during a guest checkout. Before that, you should open the browser dev tools and change the `type` attribute for that field from `email` to `text`. After entering a fake address and pressing the \"Save \u0026 Continue\" button, the browser will take a long term to perform the request before showing an error message for the invalid address. Eventually, making the email string even longer could lead to the exhaustion of server resources.\n\n\n### Patches\nVersions 3.1.4, 3.0.4, and 2.11.13 have been patched to use a different regular expression.\n\nThere\u0027s an improbable chance that some orders in your system end up having associated an email address that is no longer valid. We\u0027ve added a task to check precisely that:\n\n```bash\nbin/rails solidus:check_orders_with_invalid_email\n```\n\nThe above will print information for every affected order if any.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf a prompt upgrade is not an option, please, add the following to `config/application.rb`:\n\n```ruby\nconfig.after_initialize do\n Spree::EmailValidator.send(:remove_const, :EMAIL_REGEXP)\n Spree::EmailValidator::EMAIL_REGEXP = URI::MailTo::EMAIL_REGEXP\nend\n```\n\n### References\n\n- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ReDoS\n- https://snyk.io/blog/redos-and-catastrophic-backtracking/\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n* Open an [issue](https://github.com/solidusio/solidus/issues) or a [discussion](https://github.com/solidusio/solidus/discussions) in Solidus.\n* Email us at [security@solidus.io](mailto:security@soliidus.io)\n* Contact the core team on [Slack](http://slack.solidus.io/)\n",
"id": "GHSA-qxmr-qxh6-2cc9",
"modified": "2021-12-08T19:29:13Z",
"published": "2021-12-07T22:01:47Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/solidusio/solidus/security/advisories/GHSA-qxmr-qxh6-2cc9"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-43805"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/solidusio/solidus/commit/6be174c955fad84017ca67589c676526bc5ade71"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/solidusio/solidus/commit/9867153e01e3c3b898cdbcedd7b43375ea922401"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/solidus_core/CVE-2021-43805.yml"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/solidusio/solidus"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "ReDos vulnerability on guest checkout email validation"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.