GHSA-R2R3-FM28-9G3H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-21 15:31 – Updated: 2024-12-30 21:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: x86: Fix stack-out-of-bounds memory access from ioapic_write_indirect()
KASAN reports the following issue:
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in kvm_make_vcpus_request_mask+0x174/0x440 [kvm] Read of size 8 at addr ffffc9001364f638 by task qemu-kvm/4798
CPU: 0 PID: 4798 Comm: qemu-kvm Tainted: G X --------- --- Hardware name: AMD Corporation DAYTONA_X/DAYTONA_X, BIOS RYM0081C 07/13/2020 Call Trace: dump_stack+0xa5/0xe6 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x18/0x130 ? kvm_make_vcpus_request_mask+0x174/0x440 [kvm] __kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x114 ? kvm_make_vcpus_request_mask+0x174/0x440 [kvm] kasan_report+0x38/0x50 kasan_check_range+0xf5/0x1d0 kvm_make_vcpus_request_mask+0x174/0x440 [kvm] kvm_make_scan_ioapic_request_mask+0x84/0xc0 [kvm] ? kvm_arch_exit+0x110/0x110 [kvm] ? sched_clock+0x5/0x10 ioapic_write_indirect+0x59f/0x9e0 [kvm] ? static_obj+0xc0/0xc0 ? __lock_acquired+0x1d2/0x8c0 ? kvm_ioapic_eoi_inject_work+0x120/0x120 [kvm]
The problem appears to be that 'vcpu_bitmap' is allocated as a single long on stack and it should really be KVM_MAX_VCPUS long. We also seem to clear the lower 16 bits of it with bitmap_zero() for no particular reason (my guess would be that 'bitmap' and 'vcpu_bitmap' variables in kvm_bitmap_or_dest_vcpus() caused the confusion: while the later is indeed 16-bit long, the later should accommodate all possible vCPUs).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-47390"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-125"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-05-21T15:15:24Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nKVM: x86: Fix stack-out-of-bounds memory access from ioapic_write_indirect()\n\nKASAN reports the following issue:\n\n BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in kvm_make_vcpus_request_mask+0x174/0x440 [kvm]\n Read of size 8 at addr ffffc9001364f638 by task qemu-kvm/4798\n\n CPU: 0 PID: 4798 Comm: qemu-kvm Tainted: G X --------- ---\n Hardware name: AMD Corporation DAYTONA_X/DAYTONA_X, BIOS RYM0081C 07/13/2020\n Call Trace:\n dump_stack+0xa5/0xe6\n print_address_description.constprop.0+0x18/0x130\n ? kvm_make_vcpus_request_mask+0x174/0x440 [kvm]\n __kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x114\n ? kvm_make_vcpus_request_mask+0x174/0x440 [kvm]\n kasan_report+0x38/0x50\n kasan_check_range+0xf5/0x1d0\n kvm_make_vcpus_request_mask+0x174/0x440 [kvm]\n kvm_make_scan_ioapic_request_mask+0x84/0xc0 [kvm]\n ? kvm_arch_exit+0x110/0x110 [kvm]\n ? sched_clock+0x5/0x10\n ioapic_write_indirect+0x59f/0x9e0 [kvm]\n ? static_obj+0xc0/0xc0\n ? __lock_acquired+0x1d2/0x8c0\n ? kvm_ioapic_eoi_inject_work+0x120/0x120 [kvm]\n\nThe problem appears to be that \u0027vcpu_bitmap\u0027 is allocated as a single long\non stack and it should really be KVM_MAX_VCPUS long. We also seem to clear\nthe lower 16 bits of it with bitmap_zero() for no particular reason (my\nguess would be that \u0027bitmap\u0027 and \u0027vcpu_bitmap\u0027 variables in\nkvm_bitmap_or_dest_vcpus() caused the confusion: while the later is indeed\n16-bit long, the later should accommodate all possible vCPUs).",
"id": "GHSA-r2r3-fm28-9g3h",
"modified": "2024-12-30T21:30:46Z",
"published": "2024-05-21T15:31:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-47390"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2f9b68f57c6278c322793a06063181deded0ad69"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/99a9e9b80f19fc63be005a33d76211dd23114792"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bebabb76ad9acca8858e0371e102fb60d708e25b"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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