GHSA-R33C-HMHM-VC95
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-11 21:31 – Updated: 2026-09-14 15:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/ntfs3: bound page_lcns[] index by the log record
The copy_lcns loop and the redo shorten loop index page_lcns[] at j + i, where i runs up to the log record's lcns_follow. That count is checked only against the record's own length, not the target entry, so check_dp_table() (which validates the entry's lcns_follow) does not cover it: the copy_lcns entry may even be freshly allocated after that check, and find_dp() bounds j but not i. A crafted record thus overflows page_lcns[] of an otherwise valid entry.
Add dp_range_ok() and reject, before each loop, any record whose run does not fit the entry. These are the only two page_lcns[] accesses indexed by the record rather than the entry, so together with the entry validation every access is now bounded.
[almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com: original patch contained changes to the problem already handled, applied partly]
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-89615"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-11T20:19:46Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nfs/ntfs3: bound page_lcns[] index by the log record\n\nThe copy_lcns loop and the redo shorten loop index page_lcns[] at j + i,\nwhere i runs up to the log record\u0027s lcns_follow. That count is checked only\nagainst the record\u0027s own length, not the target entry, so check_dp_table()\n(which validates the entry\u0027s lcns_follow) does not cover it: the copy_lcns\nentry may even be freshly allocated after that check, and find_dp() bounds j\nbut not i. A crafted record thus overflows page_lcns[] of an otherwise valid\nentry.\n\nAdd dp_range_ok() and reject, before each loop, any record whose run does\nnot fit the entry. These are the only two page_lcns[] accesses indexed by\nthe record rather than the entry, so together with the entry validation\nevery access is now bounded.\n\n[almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com: original patch contained changes to the problem already handled, applied partly]",
"id": "GHSA-r33c-hmhm-vc95",
"modified": "2026-09-14T15:32:31Z",
"published": "2026-09-11T21:31:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-89615"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1135ebc225996b3ac1a295652b19a0a706737a6c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/31fdd11f75da9823500168cecb07aa45130915a3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/61ca8cbbf68f77f25b699ed4358bd232f94ed43b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6f7b9dbdc1b7520206abce0049bdd143eb536e75"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7ccb94901f38a062034b56b43c774050b113758f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bb742d1030864c0fe140666f639428ba4e90b2ca"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f4c1bc6d7331f344ffcea93c2a37badcbe15baa6"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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