GHSA-R35M-5R25-V2FX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-14 18:30 – Updated: 2026-03-18 18:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ceph: fix NULL pointer dereference in ceph_mds_auth_match()
The CephFS kernel client has regression starting from 6.18-rc1. We have issue in ceph_mds_auth_match() if fs_name == NULL:
const char fs_name = mdsc->fsc->mount_options->mds_namespace;
...
if (auth->match.fs_name && strcmp(auth->match.fs_name, fs_name)) {
/ fsname mismatch, try next one */
return 0;
}
Patrick Donnelly suggested that: In summary, we should definitely start
decoding fs_name from the MDSMap and do strict authorizations checks
against it. Note that the -o mds_namespace=foo should only be used for
selecting the file system to mount and nothing else. It's possible
no mds_namespace is specified but the kernel will mount the only
file system that exists which may have name "foo".
This patch reworks ceph_mdsmap_decode() and namespace_equals() with the goal of supporting the suggested concept. Now struct ceph_mdsmap contains m_fs_name field that receives copy of extracted FS name by ceph_extract_encoded_string(). For the case of "old" CephFS file systems, it is used "cephfs" name.
[ idryomov: replace redundant %*pE with %s in ceph_mdsmap_decode(), get rid of a series of strlen() calls in ceph_namespace_match(), drop changes to namespace_equals() body to avoid treating empty mds_namespace as equal, drop changes to ceph_mdsc_handle_fsmap() as namespace_equals() isn't an equivalent substitution there ]
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-23189"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-476"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-14T17:15:56Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nceph: fix NULL pointer dereference in ceph_mds_auth_match()\n\nThe CephFS kernel client has regression starting from 6.18-rc1.\nWe have issue in ceph_mds_auth_match() if fs_name == NULL:\n\n const char fs_name = mdsc-\u003efsc-\u003emount_options-\u003emds_namespace;\n ...\n if (auth-\u003ematch.fs_name \u0026\u0026 strcmp(auth-\u003ematch.fs_name, fs_name)) {\n / fsname mismatch, try next one */\n return 0;\n }\n\nPatrick Donnelly suggested that: In summary, we should definitely start\ndecoding `fs_name` from the MDSMap and do strict authorizations checks\nagainst it. Note that the `-o mds_namespace=foo` should only be used for\nselecting the file system to mount and nothing else. It\u0027s possible\nno mds_namespace is specified but the kernel will mount the only\nfile system that exists which may have name \"foo\".\n\nThis patch reworks ceph_mdsmap_decode() and namespace_equals() with\nthe goal of supporting the suggested concept. Now struct ceph_mdsmap\ncontains m_fs_name field that receives copy of extracted FS name\nby ceph_extract_encoded_string(). For the case of \"old\" CephFS file\nsystems, it is used \"cephfs\" name.\n\n[ idryomov: replace redundant %*pE with %s in ceph_mdsmap_decode(),\n get rid of a series of strlen() calls in ceph_namespace_match(),\n drop changes to namespace_equals() body to avoid treating empty\n mds_namespace as equal, drop changes to ceph_mdsc_handle_fsmap()\n as namespace_equals() isn\u0027t an equivalent substitution there ]",
"id": "GHSA-r35m-5r25-v2fx",
"modified": "2026-03-18T18:31:11Z",
"published": "2026-02-14T18:30:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23189"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/57b36ffc8881dd455d875f85c105901974af2130"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7987cce375ac8ce98e170a77aa2399f2cf6eb99f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c6f8326f26bd20d648d9a55afd68148d1b6afe28"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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