GHSA-R3HJ-RG3J-262C

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-03 18:30 – Updated: 2026-08-03 21:31
VLAI
Details

XML::Sig versions from 0.29 before 0.72 for Perl allow signature verification bypass because verify returns true when every signature was skipped before any cryptographic check.

verify in lib/XML/Sig.pm counts the //dsig:Signature elements into $numsigs and iterates over them, but two paths reach next before any digest or key check runs: a SignedInfo/Reference/@URI that resolves to no element while $numsigs is greater than 1, and, when id_attr is set, a reference that does not match the requested ID. The loop records nothing about what it checked, so when every signature takes one of those paths control reaches the unconditional return 1 that ends verify. Two Signature elements whose Reference URI names an ID that no element carries is enough, as is one such element combined with id_attr.

Any caller that passes untrusted XML to verify can receive a true return for a document in which no digest and no signature value was checked; a cert or cert_text trust anchor does not change this, because no key check runs. Versions up to 0.28 use an XML::XPath based verify that has no such skip and are not affected.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-18568"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-347"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-03T16:16:28Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "XML::Sig versions from 0.29 before 0.72 for Perl allow signature verification bypass because verify returns true when every signature was skipped before any cryptographic check.\n\nverify in lib/XML/Sig.pm counts the `//dsig:Signature` elements into `$numsigs` and iterates over them, but two paths reach `next` before any digest or key check runs: a `SignedInfo/Reference/@URI` that resolves to no element while `$numsigs` is greater than 1, and, when `id_attr` is set, a reference that does not match the requested ID. The loop records nothing about what it checked, so when every signature takes one of those paths control reaches the unconditional `return 1` that ends verify. Two `Signature` elements whose Reference URI names an ID that no element carries is enough, as is one such element combined with `id_attr`.\n\nAny caller that passes untrusted XML to verify can receive a true return for a document in which no digest and no signature value was checked; a `cert` or `cert_text` trust anchor does not change this, because no key check runs. Versions up to 0.28 use an XML::XPath based verify that has no such skip and are not affected.",
  "id": "GHSA-r3hj-rg3j-262c",
  "modified": "2026-08-03T21:31:35Z",
  "published": "2026-08-03T18:30:46Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-18568"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/perl-net-saml2/perl-XML-Sig/commit/ef22cfed1ac0f29b316d17eb79cf6480e03ae16a.patch"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://metacpan.org/release/TIMLEGGE/XML-Sig-0.72/changes"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-40934"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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