GHSA-R3MW-X3XP-FJPR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-17 18:32 – Updated: 2026-09-17 18:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dmaengine: xilinx_dma: Fix CPU stall in xilinx_dma_poll_timeout
Currently when calling xilinx_dma_poll_timeout with delay_us=0 and a condition that is never fulfilled, the CPU busy-waits for prolonged time and the timeout triggers only with a massive delay causing a CPU stall.
This happens due to a huge underestimation of wall clock time in poll_timeout_us_atomic. Commit 7349a69cf312 ("iopoll: Do not use timekeeping in read_poll_timeout_atomic()") changed the behavior to no longer use ktime_get at the expense of underestimation of wall clock time which appears to be very large for delay_us=0. Instead of timing out after approximately XILINX_DMA_LOOP_COUNT microseconds, the timeout takes XILINX_DMA_LOOP_COUNT * 1000 * (time that the overhead of the for loop in poll_timeout_us_atomic takes) which is in the range of several minutes for XILINX_DMA_LOOP_COUNT=1000000. Fix this by using a non-zero value for delay_us. Use delay_us=10 to keep the delay in the hot path of starting DMA transfers minimal but still avoid CPU stalls in case of unexpected hardware failures.
One-off measurement with delay_us=0 causes the cpu to busy wait around 7 minutes in the timeout case. After applying this patch with delay_us=10 the measured timeout was 1053428 microseconds which is roughly equivalent to the expected 1000000 microseconds specified in XILINX_DMA_LOOP_COUNT.
Add a constant XILINX_DMA_POLL_DELAY_US for delay_us value.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-93168"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-17T17:18:12Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndmaengine: xilinx_dma: Fix CPU stall in xilinx_dma_poll_timeout\n\nCurrently when calling xilinx_dma_poll_timeout with delay_us=0 and a\ncondition that is never fulfilled, the CPU busy-waits for prolonged time\nand the timeout triggers only with a massive delay causing a CPU stall.\n\nThis happens due to a huge underestimation of wall clock time in\npoll_timeout_us_atomic. Commit 7349a69cf312 (\"iopoll: Do not use\ntimekeeping in read_poll_timeout_atomic()\") changed the behavior to no\nlonger use ktime_get at the expense of underestimation of wall clock\ntime which appears to be very large for delay_us=0. Instead of timing\nout after approximately XILINX_DMA_LOOP_COUNT microseconds, the timeout\ntakes XILINX_DMA_LOOP_COUNT * 1000 * (time that the overhead of the for\nloop in poll_timeout_us_atomic takes) which is in the range of several\nminutes for XILINX_DMA_LOOP_COUNT=1000000. Fix this by using a non-zero\nvalue for delay_us. Use delay_us=10 to keep the delay in the hot path of\nstarting DMA transfers minimal but still avoid CPU stalls in case of\nunexpected hardware failures.\n\nOne-off measurement with delay_us=0 causes the cpu to busy wait around 7\nminutes in the timeout case. After applying this patch with delay_us=10\nthe measured timeout was 1053428 microseconds which is roughly\nequivalent to the expected 1000000 microseconds specified in\nXILINX_DMA_LOOP_COUNT.\n\nAdd a constant XILINX_DMA_POLL_DELAY_US for delay_us value.",
"id": "GHSA-r3mw-x3xp-fjpr",
"modified": "2026-09-17T18:32:12Z",
"published": "2026-09-17T18:32:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-93168"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8b5654d317277e6e505c23f8fa7e415237fefc7f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/aa99c4d1d63bbc26a5fc4c667d89b2595743c19d"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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