GHSA-R4CC-8GXC-2CXH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-01 15:35 – Updated: 2026-07-01 15:35
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

fhandle: fix UAF due to unlocked ->mnt_ns read in may_decode_fh()

may_decode_fh() accesses mount::mnt_ns without holding any locks; that means the mount can concurrently be unmounted, and the mnt_namespace can concurrently be freed after an RCU grace period.

This race can happens as follows, assuming that the mount point was created by open_tree(..., OPEN_TREE_CLONE):

thread 1 thread 2 RCU __do_sys_open_by_handle_at do_handle_open handle_to_path may_decode_fh is_mounted [mount::mnt_ns access] [mount::mnt_ns access] __do_sys_close fput_close_sync __fput dissolve_on_fput umount_tree class_namespace_excl_destructor namespace_unlock free_mnt_ns mnt_ns_tree_remove call_rcu(mnt_ns_release_rcu) mnt_ns_release_rcu mnt_ns_release kfree [mnt_namespace::user_ns access] UAF

Fix it by taking rcu_read_lock() around the mount::mnt_ns access, like in __prepend_path(). Additionally, document the semantics of mount::mnt_ns, and use WRITE_ONCE() for writers that can race with lockless readers.

This bug is unreachable unless one of the following is set:

  • CONFIG_PREEMPTION
  • CONFIG_RCU_STRICT_GRACE_PERIOD

because it requires an RCU grace period to happen during a syscall without an explicit preemption.

This doesn't seem to have interesting security impact; worst-case, it could leak the result of an integer comparison to userspace (from the level check in cap_capable()), cause an endless loop, or crash the kernel by dereferencing an invalid address.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-53341"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-01T14:16:42Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nfhandle: fix UAF due to unlocked -\u003emnt_ns read in may_decode_fh()\n\nmay_decode_fh() accesses mount::mnt_ns without holding any locks; that\nmeans the mount can concurrently be unmounted, and the mnt_namespace can\nconcurrently be freed after an RCU grace period.\n\nThis race can happens as follows, assuming that the mount point was\ncreated by open_tree(..., OPEN_TREE_CLONE):\n\nthread 1            thread 2            RCU\n                    __do_sys_open_by_handle_at\n                      do_handle_open\n                        handle_to_path\n                          may_decode_fh\n                            is_mounted\n                              [mount::mnt_ns access]\n                            [mount::mnt_ns access]\n__do_sys_close\n  fput_close_sync\n    __fput\n      dissolve_on_fput\n        umount_tree\n        class_namespace_excl_destructor\n          namespace_unlock\n            free_mnt_ns\n              mnt_ns_tree_remove\n                call_rcu(mnt_ns_release_rcu)\n                                        mnt_ns_release_rcu\n                                          mnt_ns_release\n                                            kfree\n                            [mnt_namespace::user_ns access] **UAF**\n\nFix it by taking rcu_read_lock() around the mount::mnt_ns access, like\nin __prepend_path().\nAdditionally, document the semantics of mount::mnt_ns, and use WRITE_ONCE()\nfor writers that can race with lockless readers.\n\nThis bug is unreachable unless one of the following is set:\n\n - CONFIG_PREEMPTION\n - CONFIG_RCU_STRICT_GRACE_PERIOD\n\nbecause it requires an RCU grace period to happen during a syscall without\nan explicit preemption.\n\nThis doesn\u0027t seem to have interesting security impact; worst-case, it could\nleak the result of an integer comparison to userspace (from the level\ncheck in cap_capable()), cause an endless loop, or crash the kernel by\ndereferencing an invalid address.",
  "id": "GHSA-r4cc-8gxc-2cxh",
  "modified": "2026-07-01T15:35:19Z",
  "published": "2026-07-01T15:35:19Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53341"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/32138633e51e6db59e474765cf93268c92b42888"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/40ab6644b99685755f740b872c00ef40d9aa870e"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a8ed2c29fcfdac78db96c9da4e659c8a513f2a94"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}


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