GHSA-R4CC-8GXC-2CXH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-01 15:35 – Updated: 2026-07-01 15:35In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fhandle: fix UAF due to unlocked ->mnt_ns read in may_decode_fh()
may_decode_fh() accesses mount::mnt_ns without holding any locks; that means the mount can concurrently be unmounted, and the mnt_namespace can concurrently be freed after an RCU grace period.
This race can happens as follows, assuming that the mount point was created by open_tree(..., OPEN_TREE_CLONE):
thread 1 thread 2 RCU __do_sys_open_by_handle_at do_handle_open handle_to_path may_decode_fh is_mounted [mount::mnt_ns access] [mount::mnt_ns access] __do_sys_close fput_close_sync __fput dissolve_on_fput umount_tree class_namespace_excl_destructor namespace_unlock free_mnt_ns mnt_ns_tree_remove call_rcu(mnt_ns_release_rcu) mnt_ns_release_rcu mnt_ns_release kfree [mnt_namespace::user_ns access] UAF
Fix it by taking rcu_read_lock() around the mount::mnt_ns access, like in __prepend_path(). Additionally, document the semantics of mount::mnt_ns, and use WRITE_ONCE() for writers that can race with lockless readers.
This bug is unreachable unless one of the following is set:
- CONFIG_PREEMPTION
- CONFIG_RCU_STRICT_GRACE_PERIOD
because it requires an RCU grace period to happen during a syscall without an explicit preemption.
This doesn't seem to have interesting security impact; worst-case, it could leak the result of an integer comparison to userspace (from the level check in cap_capable()), cause an endless loop, or crash the kernel by dereferencing an invalid address.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-53341"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-01T14:16:42Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nfhandle: fix UAF due to unlocked -\u003emnt_ns read in may_decode_fh()\n\nmay_decode_fh() accesses mount::mnt_ns without holding any locks; that\nmeans the mount can concurrently be unmounted, and the mnt_namespace can\nconcurrently be freed after an RCU grace period.\n\nThis race can happens as follows, assuming that the mount point was\ncreated by open_tree(..., OPEN_TREE_CLONE):\n\nthread 1 thread 2 RCU\n __do_sys_open_by_handle_at\n do_handle_open\n handle_to_path\n may_decode_fh\n is_mounted\n [mount::mnt_ns access]\n [mount::mnt_ns access]\n__do_sys_close\n fput_close_sync\n __fput\n dissolve_on_fput\n umount_tree\n class_namespace_excl_destructor\n namespace_unlock\n free_mnt_ns\n mnt_ns_tree_remove\n call_rcu(mnt_ns_release_rcu)\n mnt_ns_release_rcu\n mnt_ns_release\n kfree\n [mnt_namespace::user_ns access] **UAF**\n\nFix it by taking rcu_read_lock() around the mount::mnt_ns access, like\nin __prepend_path().\nAdditionally, document the semantics of mount::mnt_ns, and use WRITE_ONCE()\nfor writers that can race with lockless readers.\n\nThis bug is unreachable unless one of the following is set:\n\n - CONFIG_PREEMPTION\n - CONFIG_RCU_STRICT_GRACE_PERIOD\n\nbecause it requires an RCU grace period to happen during a syscall without\nan explicit preemption.\n\nThis doesn\u0027t seem to have interesting security impact; worst-case, it could\nleak the result of an integer comparison to userspace (from the level\ncheck in cap_capable()), cause an endless loop, or crash the kernel by\ndereferencing an invalid address.",
"id": "GHSA-r4cc-8gxc-2cxh",
"modified": "2026-07-01T15:35:19Z",
"published": "2026-07-01T15:35:19Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53341"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/32138633e51e6db59e474765cf93268c92b42888"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/40ab6644b99685755f740b872c00ef40d9aa870e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a8ed2c29fcfdac78db96c9da4e659c8a513f2a94"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Sightings
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|---|
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