GHSA-R4HX-MHRP-XF73

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-17 12:31 – Updated: 2026-07-17 12:31
VLAI
Details

Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to inflate the fee-payer's gas cost per payment by a large multiplier, degrading the sponsor's operating margin.

When the mpp Elixir library is configured as fee payer (fee_payer: true), MPP.Tempo.Transaction.cosign_fee_payer/3 re-signs the client-supplied base fields of the 0x76 AASigned envelope verbatim, including the EIP-2930 access list, without validating its length or contents. EIP-2930 access list entries incur intrinsic gas (~2,400 gas per address, plus 1,900 gas per storage key) charged before any opcode executes, regardless of whether the listed addresses are ever touched. A malicious client submits a valid transferWithMemo call alongside a large number of fabricated access-list entries. The server co-signs and broadcasts the transaction. The intended transfer executes normally, but the fee-payer wallet pays a large multiple of the expected gas cost with no corresponding on-chain work.

At the maintainer's default of 137 access-list entries (fitting within Bandit's 10,000-byte per-header-field limit) and 100 Gwei max_fee_per_gas, per-payment gas cost rises from ~51,287 to ~380,087 gas, a 7.4x multiplier. Sustained abuse destroys the sponsor's operating margin on low-cost payments and, over time, drains the fee-payer wallet.

This issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.6.0.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-59694"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1284"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-17T11:17:13Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to inflate the fee-payer\u0027s gas cost per payment by a large multiplier, degrading the sponsor\u0027s operating margin.\n\nWhen the mpp Elixir library is configured as fee payer (fee_payer: true), MPP.Tempo.Transaction.cosign_fee_payer/3 re-signs the client-supplied base fields of the 0x76 AASigned envelope verbatim, including the EIP-2930 access list, without validating its length or contents. EIP-2930 access list entries incur intrinsic gas (~2,400 gas per address, plus 1,900 gas per storage key) charged before any opcode executes, regardless of whether the listed addresses are ever touched. A malicious client submits a valid transferWithMemo call alongside a large number of fabricated access-list entries. The server co-signs and broadcasts the transaction. The intended transfer executes normally, but the fee-payer wallet pays a large multiple of the expected gas cost with no corresponding on-chain work.\n\nAt the maintainer\u0027s default of 137 access-list entries (fitting within Bandit\u0027s 10,000-byte per-header-field limit) and 100 Gwei max_fee_per_gas, per-payment gas cost rises from ~51,287 to ~380,087 gas, a 7.4x multiplier. Sustained abuse destroys the sponsor\u0027s operating margin on low-cost payments and, over time, drains the fee-payer wallet.\n\nThis issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.6.0.",
  "id": "GHSA-r4hx-mhrp-xf73",
  "modified": "2026-07-17T12:31:29Z",
  "published": "2026-07-17T12:31:29Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/security/advisories/GHSA-qpxh-ff8m-c62v"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59694"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/commit/5d6338e2334084c5f2a78cfcca474830733ed7e8"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-59694.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-59694"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}



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