GHSA-R75F-5X8P-QVMC

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-24 16:17 – Updated: 2026-05-12 13:27
VLAI
Summary
LiteLLM has SQL Injection in Proxy API key verification
Details

Impact

A database query used during proxy API key checks mixed the caller-supplied key value into the query text instead of passing it as a separate parameter. An unauthenticated attacker could send a specially crafted Authorization header to any LLM API route (for example POST /chat/completions) and reach this query through the proxy's error-handling path.

An attacker could read data from the proxy's database and may be able to modify it, leading to unauthorised access to the proxy and the credentials it manages.

Patches

Fixed in 1.83.7. The caller-supplied value is now always passed to the database as a separate parameter. Upgrade to 1.83.7 or later.

Workarounds

If upgrading is not immediately possible, set disable_error_logs: true under general_settings. This removes the path through which unauthenticated input reaches the vulnerable query.

References

Discovery Credit: Tencent YunDing Security Lab

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "litellm"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.81.16"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.83.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-42208"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-89"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-24T16:17:07Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-08T04:16:19Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nA database query used during proxy API key checks mixed the caller-supplied key value into the query text instead of passing it as a separate parameter. An unauthenticated attacker could send a specially crafted `Authorization` header to any LLM API route (for example `POST /chat/completions`) and reach this query through the proxy\u0027s error-handling path.\n\nAn attacker could read data from the proxy\u0027s database and may be able to modify it, leading to unauthorised access to the proxy and the credentials it manages.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in **`1.83.7`**. The caller-supplied value is now always passed to the database as a separate parameter. Upgrade to `1.83.7` or later.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf upgrading is not immediately possible, set `disable_error_logs: true` under `general_settings`. This removes the path through which unauthenticated input reaches the vulnerable query.\n\n### References\n\n- Patched release: [`v1.83.7-stable`](https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm/releases/tag/v1.83.7-stable)\n\n**Discovery Credit**: Tencent YunDing Security Lab",
  "id": "GHSA-r75f-5x8p-qvmc",
  "modified": "2026-05-12T13:27:11Z",
  "published": "2026-04-24T16:17:07Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm/security/advisories/GHSA-r75f-5x8p-qvmc"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42208"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm/releases/tag/v1.83.7-stable"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-42208"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "LiteLLM has SQL Injection in Proxy API key verification"
}


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