GHSA-R7WV-M72Q-8QJ8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-23 18:33 – Updated: 2026-07-14 15:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/tls: fix use-after-free in -EBUSY error path of tls_do_encryption
The -EBUSY handling in tls_do_encryption(), introduced by commit 859054147318 ("net: tls: handle backlogging of crypto requests"), has a use-after-free due to double cleanup of encrypt_pending and the scatterlist entry.
When crypto_aead_encrypt() returns -EBUSY, the request is enqueued to the cryptd backlog and the async callback tls_encrypt_done() will be invoked upon completion. That callback unconditionally restores the scatterlist entry (sge->offset, sge->length) and decrements ctx->encrypt_pending. However, if tls_encrypt_async_wait() returns an error, the synchronous error path in tls_do_encryption() performs the same cleanup again, double-decrementing encrypt_pending and double-restoring the scatterlist.
The double-decrement corrupts the encrypt_pending sentinel (initialized to 1), making tls_encrypt_async_wait() permanently skip the wait for pending async callbacks. A subsequent sendmsg can then free the tls_rec via bpf_exec_tx_verdict() while a cryptd callback is still pending, resulting in a use-after-free when the callback fires on the freed record.
Fix this by skipping the synchronous cleanup when the -EBUSY async wait returns an error, since the callback has already handled encrypt_pending and sge restoration.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-31533"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-416"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-23T18:16:26Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/tls: fix use-after-free in -EBUSY error path of tls_do_encryption\n\nThe -EBUSY handling in tls_do_encryption(), introduced by commit\n859054147318 (\"net: tls: handle backlogging of crypto requests\"), has\na use-after-free due to double cleanup of encrypt_pending and the\nscatterlist entry.\n\nWhen crypto_aead_encrypt() returns -EBUSY, the request is enqueued to\nthe cryptd backlog and the async callback tls_encrypt_done() will be\ninvoked upon completion. That callback unconditionally restores the\nscatterlist entry (sge-\u003eoffset, sge-\u003elength) and decrements\nctx-\u003eencrypt_pending. However, if tls_encrypt_async_wait() returns an\nerror, the synchronous error path in tls_do_encryption() performs the\nsame cleanup again, double-decrementing encrypt_pending and\ndouble-restoring the scatterlist.\n\nThe double-decrement corrupts the encrypt_pending sentinel (initialized\nto 1), making tls_encrypt_async_wait() permanently skip the wait for\npending async callbacks. A subsequent sendmsg can then free the\ntls_rec via bpf_exec_tx_verdict() while a cryptd callback is still\npending, resulting in a use-after-free when the callback fires on the\nfreed record.\n\nFix this by skipping the synchronous cleanup when the -EBUSY async\nwait returns an error, since the callback has already handled\nencrypt_pending and sge restoration.",
"id": "GHSA-r7wv-m72q-8qj8",
"modified": "2026-07-14T15:31:53Z",
"published": "2026-04-23T18:33:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31533"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-019113.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-082556.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/02f3ecadb23558bbe068e6504118f1b712d4ece0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0e43e0a3c94044acc74b8e0927c27972eb5a59e8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2694d408b0e595024e0fc1d64ff9db0358580f74"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/414fc5e5a5aff776c150f1b86770e0a25a35df3a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5d70eb25b41e9b010828cd12818b06a0c3b04412"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a9b8b18364fffce4c451e6f6fd218fa4ab646705"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/aa9facde6c5005205874c37db3fd25799d741baf"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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