ghsa-rfvx-8c45-w4c7
Vulnerability from github
Published
2024-02-27 21:31
Modified
2024-11-01 18:31
Severity ?
5.5 (Medium) - CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

riscv/kprobe: fix kernel panic when invoking sys_read traced by kprobe

The execution of sys_read end up hitting a BUG_ON() in __find_get_block after installing kprobe at sys_read, the BUG message like the following:

[ 65.708663] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 65.709987] kernel BUG at fs/buffer.c:1251! [ 65.711283] Kernel BUG [#1] [ 65.712032] Modules linked in: [ 65.712925] CPU: 0 PID: 51 Comm: sh Not tainted 5.12.0-rc4 #1 [ 65.714407] Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT) [ 65.715696] epc : __find_get_block+0x218/0x2c8 [ 65.716835] ra : __getblk_gfp+0x1c/0x4a [ 65.717831] epc : ffffffe00019f11e ra : ffffffe00019f56a sp : ffffffe002437930 [ 65.719553] gp : ffffffe000f06030 tp : ffffffe0015abc00 t0 : ffffffe00191e038 [ 65.721290] t1 : ffffffe00191e038 t2 : 000000000000000a s0 : ffffffe002437960 [ 65.723051] s1 : ffffffe00160ad00 a0 : ffffffe00160ad00 a1 : 000000000000012a [ 65.724772] a2 : 0000000000000400 a3 : 0000000000000008 a4 : 0000000000000040 [ 65.726545] a5 : 0000000000000000 a6 : ffffffe00191e000 a7 : 0000000000000000 [ 65.728308] s2 : 000000000000012a s3 : 0000000000000400 s4 : 0000000000000008 [ 65.730049] s5 : 000000000000006c s6 : ffffffe00240f800 s7 : ffffffe000f080a8 [ 65.731802] s8 : 0000000000000001 s9 : 000000000000012a s10: 0000000000000008 [ 65.733516] s11: 0000000000000008 t3 : 00000000000003ff t4 : 000000000000000f [ 65.734434] t5 : 00000000000003ff t6 : 0000000000040000 [ 65.734613] status: 0000000000000100 badaddr: 0000000000000000 cause: 0000000000000003 [ 65.734901] Call Trace: [ 65.735076] [] __find_get_block+0x218/0x2c8 [ 65.735417] [] __ext4_get_inode_loc+0xb2/0x2f6 [ 65.735618] [] ext4_get_inode_loc+0x3a/0x8a [ 65.735802] [] ext4_reserve_inode_write+0x2e/0x8c [ 65.735999] [] __ext4_mark_inode_dirty+0x4c/0x18e [ 65.736208] [] ext4_dirty_inode+0x46/0x66 [ 65.736387] [] __mark_inode_dirty+0x12c/0x3da [ 65.736576] [] touch_atime+0x146/0x150 [ 65.736748] [] filemap_read+0x234/0x246 [ 65.736920] [] generic_file_read_iter+0xc0/0x114 [ 65.737114] [] ext4_file_read_iter+0x42/0xea [ 65.737310] [] new_sync_read+0xe2/0x15a [ 65.737483] [] vfs_read+0xca/0xf2 [ 65.737641] [] ksys_read+0x5e/0xc8 [ 65.737816] [] sys_read+0xe/0x16 [ 65.737973] [] ret_from_syscall+0x0/0x2 [ 65.738858] ---[ end trace fe93f985456c935d ]---

A simple reproducer looks like: echo 'p:myprobe sys_read fd=%a0 buf=%a1 count=%a2' > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/kprobe_events echo 1 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/kprobes/myprobe/enable cat /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace

Here's what happens to hit that BUG_ON():

1) After installing kprobe at entry of sys_read, the first instruction is replaced by 'ebreak' instruction on riscv64 platform.

2) Once kernel reach the 'ebreak' instruction at the entry of sys_read, it trap into the riscv breakpoint handler, where it do something to setup for coming single-step of origin instruction, including backup the 'sstatus' in pt_regs, followed by disable interrupt during single stepping via clear 'SIE' bit of 'sstatus' in pt_regs.

3) Then kernel restore to the instruction slot contains two instructions, one is original instruction at entry of sys_read, the other is 'ebreak'. Here it trigger a 'Instruction page fault' exception (value at 'scause' is '0xc'), if PF is not filled into PageTabe for that slot yet.

4) Again kernel trap into page fault exception handler, where it choose different policy according to the state of running kprobe. Because afte 2) the state is KPROBE_HIT_SS, so kernel reset the current kp ---truncated---

Show details on source website

To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-46957"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-02-27T19:04:06Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nriscv/kprobe: fix kernel panic when invoking sys_read traced by kprobe\n\nThe execution of sys_read end up hitting a BUG_ON() in __find_get_block\nafter installing kprobe at sys_read, the BUG message like the following:\n\n[   65.708663] ------------[ cut here ]------------\n[   65.709987] kernel BUG at fs/buffer.c:1251!\n[   65.711283] Kernel BUG [#1]\n[   65.712032] Modules linked in:\n[   65.712925] CPU: 0 PID: 51 Comm: sh Not tainted 5.12.0-rc4 #1\n[   65.714407] Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT)\n[   65.715696] epc : __find_get_block+0x218/0x2c8\n[   65.716835]  ra : __getblk_gfp+0x1c/0x4a\n[   65.717831] epc : ffffffe00019f11e ra : ffffffe00019f56a sp : ffffffe002437930\n[   65.719553]  gp : ffffffe000f06030 tp : ffffffe0015abc00 t0 : ffffffe00191e038\n[   65.721290]  t1 : ffffffe00191e038 t2 : 000000000000000a s0 : ffffffe002437960\n[   65.723051]  s1 : ffffffe00160ad00 a0 : ffffffe00160ad00 a1 : 000000000000012a\n[   65.724772]  a2 : 0000000000000400 a3 : 0000000000000008 a4 : 0000000000000040\n[   65.726545]  a5 : 0000000000000000 a6 : ffffffe00191e000 a7 : 0000000000000000\n[   65.728308]  s2 : 000000000000012a s3 : 0000000000000400 s4 : 0000000000000008\n[   65.730049]  s5 : 000000000000006c s6 : ffffffe00240f800 s7 : ffffffe000f080a8\n[   65.731802]  s8 : 0000000000000001 s9 : 000000000000012a s10: 0000000000000008\n[   65.733516]  s11: 0000000000000008 t3 : 00000000000003ff t4 : 000000000000000f\n[   65.734434]  t5 : 00000000000003ff t6 : 0000000000040000\n[   65.734613] status: 0000000000000100 badaddr: 0000000000000000 cause: 0000000000000003\n[   65.734901] Call Trace:\n[   65.735076] [\u003cffffffe00019f11e\u003e] __find_get_block+0x218/0x2c8\n[   65.735417] [\u003cffffffe00020017a\u003e] __ext4_get_inode_loc+0xb2/0x2f6\n[   65.735618] [\u003cffffffe000201b6c\u003e] ext4_get_inode_loc+0x3a/0x8a\n[   65.735802] [\u003cffffffe000203380\u003e] ext4_reserve_inode_write+0x2e/0x8c\n[   65.735999] [\u003cffffffe00020357a\u003e] __ext4_mark_inode_dirty+0x4c/0x18e\n[   65.736208] [\u003cffffffe000206bb0\u003e] ext4_dirty_inode+0x46/0x66\n[   65.736387] [\u003cffffffe000192914\u003e] __mark_inode_dirty+0x12c/0x3da\n[   65.736576] [\u003cffffffe000180dd2\u003e] touch_atime+0x146/0x150\n[   65.736748] [\u003cffffffe00010d762\u003e] filemap_read+0x234/0x246\n[   65.736920] [\u003cffffffe00010d834\u003e] generic_file_read_iter+0xc0/0x114\n[   65.737114] [\u003cffffffe0001f5d7a\u003e] ext4_file_read_iter+0x42/0xea\n[   65.737310] [\u003cffffffe000163f2c\u003e] new_sync_read+0xe2/0x15a\n[   65.737483] [\u003cffffffe000165814\u003e] vfs_read+0xca/0xf2\n[   65.737641] [\u003cffffffe000165bae\u003e] ksys_read+0x5e/0xc8\n[   65.737816] [\u003cffffffe000165c26\u003e] sys_read+0xe/0x16\n[   65.737973] [\u003cffffffe000003972\u003e] ret_from_syscall+0x0/0x2\n[   65.738858] ---[ end trace fe93f985456c935d ]---\n\nA simple reproducer looks like:\n\techo \u0027p:myprobe sys_read fd=%a0 buf=%a1 count=%a2\u0027 \u003e /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/kprobe_events\n\techo 1 \u003e /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/kprobes/myprobe/enable\n\tcat /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace\n\nHere\u0027s what happens to hit that BUG_ON():\n\n1) After installing kprobe at entry of sys_read, the first instruction\n   is replaced by \u0027ebreak\u0027 instruction on riscv64 platform.\n\n2) Once kernel reach the \u0027ebreak\u0027 instruction at the entry of sys_read,\n   it trap into the riscv breakpoint handler, where it do something to\n   setup for coming single-step of origin instruction, including backup\n   the \u0027sstatus\u0027 in pt_regs, followed by disable interrupt during single\n   stepping via clear \u0027SIE\u0027 bit of \u0027sstatus\u0027 in pt_regs.\n\n3) Then kernel restore to the instruction slot contains two instructions,\n   one is original instruction at entry of sys_read, the other is \u0027ebreak\u0027.\n   Here it trigger a \u0027Instruction page fault\u0027 exception (value at \u0027scause\u0027\n   is \u00270xc\u0027), if PF is not filled into PageTabe for that slot yet.\n\n4) Again kernel trap into page fault exception handler, where it choose\n   different policy according to the state of running kprobe. Because\n   afte 2) the state is KPROBE_HIT_SS, so kernel reset the current kp\n---truncated---",
  "id": "GHSA-rfvx-8c45-w4c7",
  "modified": "2024-11-01T18:31:24Z",
  "published": "2024-02-27T21:31:27Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-46957"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b1ebaa0e1318494a7637099a26add50509e37964"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fd0f06590d35c99f98d12c7984897ec4201a6263"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}


Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.




  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
  • Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
  • Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
  • Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.