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GHSA-RH54-VRWC-232G

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-11 21:31 – Updated: 2026-09-13 09:32
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

nfsd: cap decoded POSIX ACL count to bound sort cost

nfsd4_decode_posixacl() reads a u32 entry count off the wire and passes it straight to posix_acl_alloc() and sort_pacl_range(). The latter is an O(n^2) bubble sort, so a client-chosen count drives unbounded CPU in the server's compound processing path.

nfsd4_decode_posixacl()
  xdr_stream_decode_u32(&count)       /* uncapped u32 */
  posix_acl_alloc(count, GFP_KERNEL)
  sort_pacl_range(*acl, 0, count - 1) /* O(n^2) bubble sort */

The encoder side in the same file already rejects ACLs whose a_count exceeds NFS_ACL_MAX_ENTRIES, but the decoder introduced in commit 5fc51dfc2eb1 ("NFSD: Add support for XDR decoding POSIX draft ACLs") omitted the symmetric check.

Fix by rejecting a wire count greater than NFS_ACL_MAX_ENTRIES with nfserr_inval, before any allocation, so the sort is bounded by NFS_ACL_MAX_ENTRIES^2 comparisons.

While we're in here, also fix the nfserr_resource return if posix_acl_alloc() fails. That's not a legal error code for v4.1+. Change it to return nfserr_jukebox as that's more appropriate for memory allocation failures.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-89695"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-11T20:19:56Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnfsd: cap decoded POSIX ACL count to bound sort cost\n\nnfsd4_decode_posixacl() reads a u32 entry count off the wire and passes\nit straight to posix_acl_alloc() and sort_pacl_range(). The latter is\nan O(n^2) bubble sort, so a client-chosen count drives unbounded CPU in\nthe server\u0027s compound processing path.\n\n    nfsd4_decode_posixacl()\n      xdr_stream_decode_u32(\u0026count)       /* uncapped u32 */\n      posix_acl_alloc(count, GFP_KERNEL)\n      sort_pacl_range(*acl, 0, count - 1) /* O(n^2) bubble sort */\n\nThe encoder side in the same file already rejects ACLs whose a_count\nexceeds NFS_ACL_MAX_ENTRIES, but the decoder introduced in commit\n5fc51dfc2eb1 (\"NFSD: Add support for XDR decoding POSIX draft ACLs\")\nomitted the symmetric check.\n\nFix by rejecting a wire count greater than NFS_ACL_MAX_ENTRIES with\nnfserr_inval, before any allocation, so the sort is bounded by\nNFS_ACL_MAX_ENTRIES^2 comparisons.\n\nWhile we\u0027re in here, also fix the nfserr_resource return if\nposix_acl_alloc() fails. That\u0027s not a legal error code for v4.1+. Change\nit to return nfserr_jukebox as that\u0027s more appropriate for memory\nallocation failures.",
  "id": "GHSA-rh54-vrwc-232g",
  "modified": "2026-09-13T09:32:27Z",
  "published": "2026-09-11T21:31:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-89695"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4bc1108e876153a2dd6d874052b99182c3603135"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ea14d71d6ecb925673761bcf79f781f7dc9042cc"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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