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GHSA-RW2C-8RFQ-GWFV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-22 17:38 – Updated: 2026-05-08 21:47
VLAI
Summary
Daptin: SQL injection via unvalidated goqu.L() calls in aggregate API
Details

Summary

The /aggregate/:typename endpoint accepted column and group query parameters that were passed verbatim to goqu.L() — a raw SQL literal expression builder — without any validation. This bypassed all parameterization and allowed authenticated users with any valid session to inject arbitrary SQL expressions.

Impact

An authenticated low-privilege user could: - Extract data from any table via subquery: (SELECT group_concat(email) FROM user_account) as leak - Disclose database internals: sqlite_version(), (SELECT sql FROM sqlite_master) - Exfiltrate cross-table data via correlated subqueries

The vulnerability was confirmed locally; user_account.email values were extracted via a crafted column parameter by a non-admin user.

Root Cause

goqu.L(userInput) in server/resource/resource_aggregate.go inserted user-supplied query parameters directly into the SQL string with no validation.

Fix (v0.11.4)

All goqu.L() calls on user-controlled input were eliminated and replaced with: - Structural expression parsing supporting all documented API forms - Schema-based column validation (column names checked against entity schema via TableInfo().GetColumnByName()) - Exact-match allowlist for aggregate functions (count, sum, avg, min, max, first, last) and scalar functions (date, strftime, upper, lower, etc.) - Safe goqu constructors (goqu.I(), goqu.SUM(), goqu.Func()) for all generated expressions - allowedTables scope enforcement: qualified column refs (table.col) validated against root entity + explicitly joined tables only

Two additional DoS bugs were fixed in the same commit: uuid.MustParse panic on malformed UUID input and an index-out-of-range panic in ToOrderedExpressionArray on empty sort expressions.

Credits

Reported by @VashuVats.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/daptin/daptin"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.11.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-41422"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-89"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-22T17:38:02Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-07T15:16:06Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe `/aggregate/:typename` endpoint accepted `column` and `group` query parameters that were passed verbatim to `goqu.L()` \u2014 a raw SQL literal expression builder \u2014 without any validation. This bypassed all parameterization and allowed authenticated users with any valid session to inject arbitrary SQL expressions.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn authenticated low-privilege user could:\n- Extract data from any table via subquery: `(SELECT group_concat(email) FROM user_account) as leak`\n- Disclose database internals: `sqlite_version()`, `(SELECT sql FROM sqlite_master)`\n- Exfiltrate cross-table data via correlated subqueries\n\nThe vulnerability was confirmed locally; `user_account.email` values were extracted via a crafted `column` parameter by a non-admin user.\n\n## Root Cause\n\n`goqu.L(userInput)` in `server/resource/resource_aggregate.go` inserted user-supplied query parameters directly into the SQL string with no validation.\n\n## Fix (v0.11.4)\n\nAll `goqu.L()` calls on user-controlled input were eliminated and replaced with:\n- Structural expression parsing supporting all documented API forms\n- Schema-based column validation (column names checked against entity schema via `TableInfo().GetColumnByName()`)\n- Exact-match allowlist for aggregate functions (`count`, `sum`, `avg`, `min`, `max`, `first`, `last`) and scalar functions (`date`, `strftime`, `upper`, `lower`, etc.)\n- Safe goqu constructors (`goqu.I()`, `goqu.SUM()`, `goqu.Func()`) for all generated expressions\n- `allowedTables` scope enforcement: qualified column refs (`table.col`) validated against root entity + explicitly joined tables only\n\nTwo additional DoS bugs were fixed in the same commit: `uuid.MustParse` panic on malformed UUID input and an index-out-of-range panic in `ToOrderedExpressionArray` on empty sort expressions.\n\n## Credits\n\nReported by @VashuVats.",
  "id": "GHSA-rw2c-8rfq-gwfv",
  "modified": "2026-05-08T21:47:30Z",
  "published": "2026-04-22T17:38:02Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/daptin/daptin/security/advisories/GHSA-rw2c-8rfq-gwfv"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41422"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/daptin/daptin"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/daptin/daptin/releases/tag/v0.11.4"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Daptin: SQL injection via unvalidated goqu.L() calls in aggregate API"
}



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