GHSA-RWHF-69PJ-M4JV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-28 12:30 – Updated: 2026-07-30 06:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: nfc: nci: Add parameter validation for packet data
Syzbot reported an uninitialized value bug in nci_init_req, which was introduced by commit 5aca7966d2a7 ("Merge tag 'perf-tools-fixes-for-v6.17-2025-09-16' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/perf/perf-tools").
This bug arises due to very limited and poor input validation
that was done at nic_valid_size(). This validation only
validates the skb->len (directly reflects size provided at the
userspace interface) with the length provided in the buffer
itself (interpreted as NCI_HEADER). This leads to the processing
of memory content at the address assuming the correct layout
per what opcode requires there. This leads to the accesses to
buffer of skb_buff->data which is not assigned anything yet.
Following the same silent drop of packets of invalid sizes at
nic_valid_size(), add validation of the data in the respective
handlers and return error values in case of failure. Release
the skb if error values are returned from handlers in
nci_nft_packet and effectively do a silent drop
Possible TODO: because we silently drop the packets, the
call to nci_request will be waiting for completion of request
and will face timeouts. These timeouts can get excessively logged
in the dmesg. A proper handling of them may require to export
nci_request_cancel (or propagate error handling from the
nft packets handlers).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-40043"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-10-28T12:15:38Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: nfc: nci: Add parameter validation for packet data\n\nSyzbot reported an uninitialized value bug in nci_init_req, which was\nintroduced by commit 5aca7966d2a7 (\"Merge tag\n\u0027perf-tools-fixes-for-v6.17-2025-09-16\u0027 of\ngit://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/perf/perf-tools\").\n\nThis bug arises due to very limited and poor input validation\nthat was done at nic_valid_size(). This validation only\nvalidates the skb-\u003elen (directly reflects size provided at the\nuserspace interface) with the length provided in the buffer\nitself (interpreted as NCI_HEADER). This leads to the processing\nof memory content at the address assuming the correct layout\nper what opcode requires there. This leads to the accesses to\nbuffer of `skb_buff-\u003edata` which is not assigned anything yet.\n\nFollowing the same silent drop of packets of invalid sizes at\n`nic_valid_size()`, add validation of the data in the respective\nhandlers and return error values in case of failure. Release\nthe skb if error values are returned from handlers in\n`nci_nft_packet` and effectively do a silent drop\n\nPossible TODO: because we silently drop the packets, the\ncall to `nci_request` will be waiting for completion of request\nand will face timeouts. These timeouts can get excessively logged\nin the dmesg. A proper handling of them may require to export\n`nci_request_cancel` (or propagate error handling from the\nnft packets handlers).",
"id": "GHSA-rwhf-69pj-m4jv",
"modified": "2026-07-30T06:32:12Z",
"published": "2025-10-28T12:30:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40043"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0ba68bea1e356f466ad29449938bea12f5f3711f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/74837bca0748763a77f77db47a0bdbe63b347628"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8fcc7315a10a84264e55bb65ede10f0af20a983f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9c328f54741bd5465ca1dc717c84c04242fac2e1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bfdda0123dde406dbff62e7e9136037e97998a15"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c395d1e548cc68e84584ffa2e3ca9796a78bf7b9"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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