GHSA-V25G-MVWR-F5FP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-09 23:47 – Updated: 2026-09-09 23:47Description
Before 1.22, if the Basic Auth (htpasswd) middleware was not configured, all incoming HTTP headers were blindly forwarded to the webhook script execution environment as shell variables. While the Basic Auth middleware correctly strips the authentication header (X-WebAuthn-User) from the incoming request before conditionally re-injecting it on successful authentication, disabling Basic Auth left the system vulnerable if deployed behind an unhardened reverse proxy.
Impact
If an upstream reverse proxy is not properly hardened to strip client-provided authentication headers, an attacker could manually supply these headers (e.g., X-WebAuthn-User). A webhook script relying on this forwarded header for privilege elevation or identity verification could therefore be exploited to bypass security controls and impersonate other users.
Mitigation
The WHD_ALLOWED_UPSTREAM_HEADERS configuration setting has been introduced to enforce a strict allowlist of HTTP headers that can be converted into shell variables.
Additionally, the default behavior has been changed to adhere to the principle of least privilege. It is no longer * (allow all). The default allowed headers are now restricted to standard operational headers:
Accept,Content-Type,Content-Length,User-Agent,X-Forwarded-For
Administrators relying on upstream authentication proxies must explicitly add their authentication headers (e.g., WHD_ALLOWED_UPSTREAM_HEADERS="Accept,Content-Type,Content-Length,User-Agent,X-Forwarded-For,x-webauthn-user") to ensure they are passed to the scripts securely.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/ncarlier/webhookd"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.22.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-59157"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-290",
"CWE-807"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-09T23:47:03Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Description\nBefore 1.22, if the Basic Auth (`htpasswd`) middleware was not configured, all incoming HTTP headers were blindly forwarded to the webhook script execution environment as shell variables. While the Basic Auth middleware correctly strips the authentication header (`X-WebAuthn-User`) from the incoming request before conditionally re-injecting it on successful authentication, disabling Basic Auth left the system vulnerable if deployed behind an unhardened reverse proxy.\n\n## Impact\nIf an upstream reverse proxy is not properly hardened to strip client-provided authentication headers, an attacker could manually supply these headers (e.g., `X-WebAuthn-User`). A webhook script relying on this forwarded header for privilege elevation or identity verification could therefore be exploited to bypass security controls and impersonate other users.\n\n## Mitigation\nThe `WHD_ALLOWED_UPSTREAM_HEADERS` configuration setting has been introduced to enforce a strict allowlist of HTTP headers that can be converted into shell variables. \n\nAdditionally, the default behavior has been changed to adhere to the principle of least privilege. It is no longer `*` (allow all). The default allowed headers are now restricted to standard operational headers:\n`Accept,Content-Type,Content-Length,User-Agent,X-Forwarded-For`\n\nAdministrators relying on upstream authentication proxies must explicitly add their authentication headers (e.g., `WHD_ALLOWED_UPSTREAM_HEADERS=\"Accept,Content-Type,Content-Length,User-Agent,X-Forwarded-For,x-webauthn-user\"`) to ensure they are passed to the scripts securely.",
"id": "GHSA-v25g-mvwr-f5fp",
"modified": "2026-09-09T23:47:03Z",
"published": "2026-09-09T23:47:03Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ncarlier/webhookd/security/advisories/GHSA-v25g-mvwr-f5fp"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/ncarlier/webhookd"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ncarlier/webhookd/releases/tag/v1.22.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "webhookd: Unrestricted HTTP Header to Shell Variable Injection"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.