GHSA-V3F4-W7R7-V3HM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-19 21:43 – Updated: 2026-06-19 21:43Impact
Uni-CLI versions before 0.225.2 exposed the legacy JSON-RPC-over-HTTP MCP transport on loopback without validating browser Origin headers before routing requests. A malicious web page could send a CORS simple POST request, such as text/plain, to the local /mcp endpoint and deliver a JSON-RPC body to the dispatcher. If the user had started the local MCP HTTP transport, that page could drive tools/call requests against the user's local Uni-CLI server.
The Streamable HTTP transport already enforced this browser-to-localhost boundary. The legacy stateless HTTP path did not, so the two HTTP transports had drifted. This issue is about the browser-to-localhost boundary; it does not change Uni-CLI's local-code-execution trust model.
Patches
Version 0.225.2 fixes the issue by moving the Origin policy into a shared guard and applying it before routing in both HTTP transports. Non-loopback browser Origins are rejected with HTTP 403 before health, OAuth, or /mcp dispatch runs. Non-browser clients that omit Origin remain supported.
Workarounds
Upgrade to 0.225.2 or later. If upgrading is not immediately possible, do not expose the legacy HTTP MCP transport to browser-originated traffic; use the default stdio transport or the Streamable HTTP transport instead.
Credits
Reported privately by Ryan Vonbrubeck (@dodge1218).
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@zenalexa/unicli"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.225.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-346",
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-19T21:43:09Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Impact\n\nUni-CLI versions before 0.225.2 exposed the legacy JSON-RPC-over-HTTP MCP transport on loopback without validating browser Origin headers before routing requests. A malicious web page could send a CORS simple POST request, such as text/plain, to the local /mcp endpoint and deliver a JSON-RPC body to the dispatcher. If the user had started the local MCP HTTP transport, that page could drive tools/call requests against the user\u0027s local Uni-CLI server.\n\nThe Streamable HTTP transport already enforced this browser-to-localhost boundary. The legacy stateless HTTP path did not, so the two HTTP transports had drifted. This issue is about the browser-to-localhost boundary; it does not change Uni-CLI\u0027s local-code-execution trust model.\n\n## Patches\n\nVersion 0.225.2 fixes the issue by moving the Origin policy into a shared guard and applying it before routing in both HTTP transports. Non-loopback browser Origins are rejected with HTTP 403 before health, OAuth, or /mcp dispatch runs. Non-browser clients that omit Origin remain supported.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nUpgrade to 0.225.2 or later. If upgrading is not immediately possible, do not expose the legacy HTTP MCP transport to browser-originated traffic; use the default stdio transport or the Streamable HTTP transport instead.\n\n## Credits\n\nReported privately by Ryan Vonbrubeck ([@dodge1218](https://github.com/dodge1218)).",
"id": "GHSA-v3f4-w7r7-v3hm",
"modified": "2026-06-19T21:43:09Z",
"published": "2026-06-19T21:43:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/olo-dot-io/Uni-CLI/security/advisories/GHSA-v3f4-w7r7-v3hm"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/olo-dot-io/Uni-CLI"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Uni-CLI: Legacy HTTP MCP transport accepted browser-originated localhost requests"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.