GHSA-V4QQ-9XC6-V286
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-08 03:31 – Updated: 2026-07-30 06:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
orangefs: fix xattr related buffer overflow...
Willy Tarreau w@1wt.eu forwarded me a message from Disclosure disclosure@aisle.com with the following warning:
The helper
xattr_key()uses the pointer variable in the loop condition rather than dereferencing it. Askeyis incremented, it remains non-NULL (until it runs into unmapped memory), so the loop does not terminate on valid C strings and will walk memory indefinitely, consuming CPU or hanging the thread.
I easily reproduced this with setfattr and getfattr, causing a kernel oops, hung user processes and corrupted orangefs files. Disclosure sent along a diff (not a patch) with a suggested fix, which I based this patch on.
After xattr_key started working right, xfstest generic/069 exposed an xattr related memory leak that lead to OOM. xattr_key returns a hashed key. When adding xattrs to the orangefs xattr cache, orangefs used hash_add, a kernel hashing macro. hash_add also hashes the key using hash_log which resulted in additions to the xattr cache going to the wrong hash bucket. generic/069 tortures a single file and orangefs does a getattr for the xattr "security.capability" every time. Orangefs negative caches on xattrs which includes a kmalloc. Since adds to the xattr cache were going to the wrong bucket, every getattr for "security.capability" resulted in another kmalloc, none of which were ever freed.
I changed the two uses of hash_add to hlist_add_head instead and the memory leak ceased and generic/069 quit throwing furniture.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-40306"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-08T01:16:02Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\norangefs: fix xattr related buffer overflow...\n\nWilly Tarreau \u003cw@1wt.eu\u003e forwarded me a message from\nDisclosure \u003cdisclosure@aisle.com\u003e with the following\nwarning:\n\n\u003e The helper `xattr_key()` uses the pointer variable in the loop condition\n\u003e rather than dereferencing it. As `key` is incremented, it remains non-NULL\n\u003e (until it runs into unmapped memory), so the loop does not terminate on\n\u003e valid C strings and will walk memory indefinitely, consuming CPU or hanging\n\u003e the thread.\n\nI easily reproduced this with setfattr and getfattr, causing a kernel\noops, hung user processes and corrupted orangefs files. Disclosure\nsent along a diff (not a patch) with a suggested fix, which I based\nthis patch on.\n\nAfter xattr_key started working right, xfstest generic/069 exposed an\nxattr related memory leak that lead to OOM. xattr_key returns\na hashed key. When adding xattrs to the orangefs xattr cache, orangefs\nused hash_add, a kernel hashing macro. hash_add also hashes the key using\nhash_log which resulted in additions to the xattr cache going to the wrong\nhash bucket. generic/069 tortures a single file and orangefs does a\ngetattr for the xattr \"security.capability\" every time. Orangefs\nnegative caches on xattrs which includes a kmalloc. Since adds to the\nxattr cache were going to the wrong bucket, every getattr for\n\"security.capability\" resulted in another kmalloc, none of which were\never freed.\n\nI changed the two uses of hash_add to hlist_add_head instead\nand the memory leak ceased and generic/069 quit throwing furniture.",
"id": "GHSA-v4qq-9xc6-v286",
"modified": "2026-07-30T06:32:22Z",
"published": "2025-12-08T03:31:01Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40306"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/025e880759c279ec64d0f754fe65bf45961da864"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/15afebb9597449c444801d1ff0b8d8b311f950ab"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9127d1e90c90e5960c8bc72a4ce2c209691a7021"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bc812574de633cf9a9ad6974490e45f6a4bb5126"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c2ca015ac109fd743fdde27933d59dc5ad46658e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c6564ff6b53c9a8dc786b6f1c51ae7688273f931"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e09a096104fc65859422817fb2211f35855983fe"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ef892d2bf4f3fa2c8de1677dd307e678bdd3d865"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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