GHSA-V626-428R-43P8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-15 12:32 – Updated: 2026-09-17 14:53
Withdrawn 2026-09-17 VLAI
Summary
Duplicate Advisory: Grav: Decompression-bomb size cap bypassed by forged ZIP size in ZipArchiver/Installer
Details

Duplicate Advisory

This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-8h9x-89f2-m7x3. This link is maintained to preserve external references.

Original Description

Grav 2.0.1 contains a decompression-bomb size-cap bypass in ZipArchiver and GPM\Installer. The size bound introduced in 2.0.1 sums the uncompressed size declared in each entry's ZIP central-directory header (ZipArchive::statIndex()['size']) and rejects archives exceeding system.gpm.archive.max_uncompressed_size before extraction. Because this declared size is attacker-forgeable and is not cross-checked against the actual inflated stream, a crafted archive declaring tiny per-entry sizes passes the cap while extractTo() writes the real, much larger content, filling disk or exhausting inodes. The archive must be supplied by a package source or admin upload (admin/operator trust). Fixed in 2.0.2. This is an incomplete fix for GHSA-928x-9mpw-8h56.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "getgrav/grav"
      },
      "versions": [
        "2.0.1"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-409"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-17T14:53:18Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-15T12:18:19Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Duplicate Advisory\nThis advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-8h9x-89f2-m7x3. This link is maintained to preserve external references.\n\n### Original Description\nGrav 2.0.1 contains a decompression-bomb size-cap bypass in ZipArchiver and GPM\\Installer. The size bound introduced in 2.0.1 sums the uncompressed size declared in each entry\u0027s ZIP central-directory header (ZipArchive::statIndex()[\u0027size\u0027]) and rejects archives exceeding system.gpm.archive.max_uncompressed_size before extraction. Because this declared size is attacker-forgeable and is not cross-checked against the actual inflated stream, a crafted archive declaring tiny per-entry sizes passes the cap while extractTo() writes the real, much larger content, filling disk or exhausting inodes. The archive must be supplied by a package source or admin upload (admin/operator trust). Fixed in 2.0.2. This is an incomplete fix for GHSA-928x-9mpw-8h56.",
  "id": "GHSA-v626-428r-43p8",
  "modified": "2026-09-17T14:53:18Z",
  "published": "2026-07-15T12:32:04Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-8h9x-89f2-m7x3"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61449"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/grav-before-decompression-bomb-via-forged-zip-size"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Duplicate Advisory: Grav: Decompression-bomb size cap bypassed by forged ZIP size in ZipArchiver/Installer",
  "withdrawn": "2026-09-17T14:53:18Z"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.


Loading…