GHSA-V773-R54F-Q32W

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-18 00:51 – Updated: 2026-02-18 00:51
VLAI?
Summary
OpenClaw Slack: dmPolicy=open allowed any DM sender to run privileged slash commands
Details

Summary

When Slack DMs are configured with dmPolicy=open, the Slack slash-command handler incorrectly treated any DM sender as command-authorized. This allowed any Slack user who could DM the bot to execute privileged slash commands via DM, bypassing intended allowlist/access-group restrictions.

Affected Packages / Versions

  • Package: openclaw (npm)
  • Affected versions: <= 2026.2.13
  • Affected configuration: Slack DMs enabled with channels.slack.dm.policy: open (aka dmPolicy=open)

Impact

Any Slack user in the workspace who can DM the bot could invoke privileged slash commands via DM.

Fix

The slash-command path now computes CommandAuthorized for DMs using the same allowlist/access-group gating logic as other inbound paths.

Fix commit(s): - f19eabee54c49e9a2e264b4965edf28a2f92e657

Release Process Note

patched_versions is set to the planned next release (2026.2.14). Once that npm release is published, this advisory should be published.

Thanks @christos-eth for reporting.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openclaw"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.2.14"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-285"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-18T00:51:03Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nWhen Slack DMs are configured with `dmPolicy=open`, the Slack slash-command handler incorrectly treated any DM sender as command-authorized. This allowed any Slack user who could DM the bot to execute privileged slash commands via DM, bypassing intended allowlist/access-group restrictions.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected versions: `\u003c= 2026.2.13`\n- Affected configuration: Slack DMs enabled with `channels.slack.dm.policy: open` (aka `dmPolicy=open`)\n\n## Impact\n\nAny Slack user in the workspace who can DM the bot could invoke privileged slash commands via DM.\n\n## Fix\n\nThe slash-command path now computes `CommandAuthorized` for DMs using the same allowlist/access-group gating logic as other inbound paths.\n\nFix commit(s):\n- f19eabee54c49e9a2e264b4965edf28a2f92e657\n\n## Release Process Note\n\n`patched_versions` is set to the planned next release (`2026.2.14`). Once that npm release is published, this advisory should be published.\n\nThanks @christos-eth for reporting.",
  "id": "GHSA-v773-r54f-q32w",
  "modified": "2026-02-18T00:51:03Z",
  "published": "2026-02-18T00:51:03Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-v773-r54f-q32w"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/f19eabee54c49e9a2e264b4965edf28a2f92e657"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/tag/v2026.2.14"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw Slack: dmPolicy=open allowed any DM sender to run privileged slash commands"
}


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