GHSA-V99P-5H33-35P9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-11 21:31 – Updated: 2026-09-13 09:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFSD: check truncate permission under inode lock
nfsd_setattr() checks whether a size update needs NFSD_MAY_TRUNC before it takes inode_lock(). The comparison uses the file size sampled by that unlocked read, but the actual ATTR_SIZE update is applied later under inode_lock() by notify_change().
This leaves a TOCTOU window for append-only files. If a client sends a SETATTR that does not shrink the file at the time of the unlocked sample, a concurrent append can extend the file before nfsd_setattr() takes inode_lock(). notify_change() then applies a real truncation without the NFSD_MAY_TRUNC check that rejects IS_APPEND(inode). The VFS truncate syscall paths perform their own append-only checks before calling notify_change(), so NFSD must make this decision against the locked size it is about to change.
Split the write-count acquisition from the truncation permission check. Keep get_write_access() before the locked setattr work, then recheck whether the requested size is below i_size_read(inode) after inode_lock() has been acquired and before notify_change(ATTR_SIZE). This also avoids the plain unlocked inode->i_size load.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-89713"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-11T20:19:58Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nNFSD: check truncate permission under inode lock\n\nnfsd_setattr() checks whether a size update needs NFSD_MAY_TRUNC\nbefore it takes inode_lock(). The comparison uses the file size sampled\nby that unlocked read, but the actual ATTR_SIZE update is applied later\nunder inode_lock() by notify_change().\n\nThis leaves a TOCTOU window for append-only files. If a client sends a\nSETATTR that does not shrink the file at the time of the unlocked\nsample, a concurrent append can extend the file before nfsd_setattr()\ntakes inode_lock(). notify_change() then applies a real truncation\nwithout the NFSD_MAY_TRUNC check that rejects IS_APPEND(inode). The VFS\ntruncate syscall paths perform their own append-only checks before\ncalling notify_change(), so NFSD must make this decision against the\nlocked size it is about to change.\n\nSplit the write-count acquisition from the truncation permission check.\nKeep get_write_access() before the locked setattr work, then recheck\nwhether the requested size is below i_size_read(inode) after inode_lock()\nhas been acquired and before notify_change(ATTR_SIZE). This also avoids\nthe plain unlocked inode-\u003ei_size load.",
"id": "GHSA-v99p-5h33-35p9",
"modified": "2026-09-13T09:32:28Z",
"published": "2026-09-11T21:31:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-89713"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3afa17d93ba8c925f49370c816c6dae5112d8c24"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/44086254479035de42ca3d286ecf25521d4e6325"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b778e0e0a16759f22a70579c3cf8d254a40d4a7f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d8352da196349182e1afd5a93308256cddc0a97d"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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