GHSA-VFX5-QP78-Q7GW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-25 12:31 – Updated: 2026-09-25 12:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: cap tx_queue_len at S16_MAX to prevent oversized ring allocations
Several subsystems allocate ring buffers sized by dev->tx_queue_len with no upper bound. An unprivileged user (via unshare -Urn) can set a huge tx_queue_len and exhaust global memory with ring allocations:
- pfifo_fast: pfifo_fast_init() and pfifo_fast_change_tx_queue_len() allocate 3 skb_array rings of tx_queue_len entries each.
- tun: tun_queue_resize() and the queue-attach path resize ptr_rings to tx_queue_len on the NETDEV_CHANGE_TX_QUEUE_LEN notifier.
- tap (macvtap/ipvtap): tap_queue_resize() and tap_init() resize/init ptr_rings to tx_queue_len on the same notifier.
netif_change_tx_queue_len() is the single entry point for IFLA_TXQLEN, sysfs, and the SIOCSIFTXQLEN ioctl. Cap new_len at S16_MAX (32767) there so the oversized value is rejected at set time. This takes effect whether the device is up or down, before dev->tx_queue_len is written, before any notifier fires, and before any ring is allocated. The "> S16_MAX" check also subsumes the previous unsigned-long truncation test, and a negative ifr_qlen from the ioctl lands far above the cap after conversion, so both old failure modes are covered by the one comparison.
tx_queue_len is ambigious: both a per-ring sizing multiplier and a default queue-length/limit knob for consumers that allocate nothing at set time (pfifo/bfifo/gred/plug/sfb limits, htb direct_qlen, qfq max_classes, teql). 32767 is chosen as the largest value NLA_POLICY_FULL_RANGE can express for the u32 IFLA_TXQLEN policy in patch 2/3 while staying a legitimate queue length on high-BDP paths; the ring-memory trade-off of a shared knob is disclosed below.
Conditions to recreate the bug: - CONFIG_NET_SCHED=y, CONFIG_VETH=y, CONFIG_USER_NS=y, CONFIG_NET_NS=y. - Unprivileged user in a fresh user+net namespace (unshare -Urn). - pfifo_fast: create veth pairs, set tx_queue_len to 500000, attach mq+pfifo_fast. ~28 iterations OOMs a 2GB guest. - tun: create 50 tun devices with IFF_MULTI_QUEUE, set tx_queue_len to 500000, open 8 queues each. ~1.6GB of ptr_ring allocations OOMs a 512MB guest. - tap: same as tun with IFF_TAP. ~960MB OOMs a 512MB guest. - On the fixed kernel the oversized tx_queue_len is rejected with -ERANGE at set time (all four paths: RTM_SETLINK, RTM_NEWLINK create, sysfs, ioctl - the latter two via this check, the former two via this check and the 2/3 parse policy respectively).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-98022"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-25T11:17:30Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: cap tx_queue_len at S16_MAX to prevent oversized ring allocations\n\nSeveral subsystems allocate ring buffers sized by dev-\u003etx_queue_len\nwith no upper bound. An unprivileged user (via unshare -Urn) can set a\nhuge tx_queue_len and exhaust global memory with ring allocations:\n\n- pfifo_fast: pfifo_fast_init() and pfifo_fast_change_tx_queue_len()\n allocate 3 skb_array rings of tx_queue_len entries each.\n- tun: tun_queue_resize() and the queue-attach path resize ptr_rings\n to tx_queue_len on the NETDEV_CHANGE_TX_QUEUE_LEN notifier.\n- tap (macvtap/ipvtap): tap_queue_resize() and tap_init() resize/init\n ptr_rings to tx_queue_len on the same notifier.\n\nnetif_change_tx_queue_len() is the single entry point for IFLA_TXQLEN,\nsysfs, and the SIOCSIFTXQLEN ioctl. Cap new_len at S16_MAX (32767)\nthere so the oversized value is rejected at set time. This takes\neffect whether the device is up or down, before dev-\u003etx_queue_len is\nwritten, before any notifier fires, and before any ring is allocated.\nThe \"\u003e S16_MAX\" check also subsumes the previous unsigned-long\ntruncation test, and a negative ifr_qlen from the ioctl lands far\nabove the cap after conversion, so both old failure modes are covered\nby the one comparison.\n\ntx_queue_len is ambigious: both a per-ring sizing multiplier and a\ndefault queue-length/limit knob for consumers that allocate\nnothing at set time (pfifo/bfifo/gred/plug/sfb limits, htb\ndirect_qlen, qfq max_classes, teql). 32767 is chosen as the largest\nvalue NLA_POLICY_FULL_RANGE can express for the u32 IFLA_TXQLEN\npolicy in patch 2/3 while staying a legitimate queue length on\nhigh-BDP paths; the ring-memory trade-off of a shared knob is\ndisclosed below.\n\nConditions to recreate the bug:\n- CONFIG_NET_SCHED=y, CONFIG_VETH=y, CONFIG_USER_NS=y, CONFIG_NET_NS=y.\n- Unprivileged user in a fresh user+net namespace (unshare -Urn).\n- pfifo_fast: create veth pairs, set tx_queue_len to 500000, attach\n mq+pfifo_fast. ~28 iterations OOMs a 2GB guest.\n- tun: create 50 tun devices with IFF_MULTI_QUEUE, set tx_queue_len to\n 500000, open 8 queues each. ~1.6GB of ptr_ring allocations OOMs a\n 512MB guest.\n- tap: same as tun with IFF_TAP. ~960MB OOMs a 512MB guest.\n- On the fixed kernel the oversized tx_queue_len is rejected with\n -ERANGE at set time (all four paths: RTM_SETLINK, RTM_NEWLINK\n create, sysfs, ioctl - the latter two via this check, the former\n two via this check and the 2/3 parse policy respectively).",
"id": "GHSA-vfx5-qp78-q7gw",
"modified": "2026-09-25T12:31:33Z",
"published": "2026-09-25T12:31:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98022"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/081340cf70a789b94b4174af54a63ffd49677a4e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/66ab4c59b74db7ab53a1c9083feaaede393a96a0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/81c0e02076989743a603806a5a4f44d2c40dc01f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a03b927bae4af5c23fd5315a237855c17cc8f422"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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