Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-VJFR-FFHR-5G8P

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-19 18:32 – Updated: 2026-09-10 18:31

Details

Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to redeem one confirmed on-chain payment for multiple paid-resource accesses.

The type="hash" credential path in MPP.Methods.Tempo.verify/2 guards against replay with a non-atomic check-then-mark sequence: check_hash_unused/2 reads the dedup store, an eth_getTransactionReceipt round trip verifies the payment on chain, and only then does mark_hash_used/2 write the mark. Concurrent requests carrying the same settled payment hash all pass the read before any of them writes, so each is issued a receipt. The store's atomic check_and_mark/2 primitive is available and used by the type="transaction" path, but the hash path calls plain get and put even when the configured store implements it. Exploitation requires a dedup store to be configured; the default nil store is stateless and documented as offering no replay protection at all.

This issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.6.1.

Severity

3.7 (Low)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

6.3 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-73829"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-367"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-19T18:17:25Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to redeem one confirmed on-chain payment for multiple paid-resource accesses.\n\nThe type=\"hash\" credential path in MPP.Methods.Tempo.verify/2 guards against replay with a non-atomic check-then-mark sequence: check_hash_unused/2 reads the dedup store, an eth_getTransactionReceipt round trip verifies the payment on chain, and only then does mark_hash_used/2 write the mark. Concurrent requests carrying the same settled payment hash all pass the read before any of them writes, so each is issued a receipt. The store\u0027s atomic check_and_mark/2 primitive is available and used by the type=\"transaction\" path, but the hash path calls plain get and put even when the configured store implements it. Exploitation requires a dedup store to be configured; the default nil store is stateless and documented as offering no replay protection at all.\n\nThis issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.6.1.",
  "id": "GHSA-vjfr-ffhr-5g8p",
  "modified": "2026-09-10T18:31:22Z",
  "published": "2026-08-19T18:32:54Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/security/advisories/GHSA-w8j7-7qc3-5f24"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-73829"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/commit/46c5b0e1311da7d92190dc7d9ea89027a1d365e9"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-73829.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-73829"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

CVE-2026-73829 (GCVE-0-2026-73829)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-19 17:19 – Updated: 2026-08-19 18:58

Title

Non-atomic hash-credential dedup in mpp Tempo allows replay of a confirmed payment under a concurrent race

Summary

Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to redeem one confirmed on-chain payment for multiple paid-resource accesses. The type="hash" credential path in MPP.Methods.Tempo.verify/2 guards against replay with a non-atomic check-then-mark sequence: check_hash_unused/2 reads the dedup store, an eth_getTransactionReceipt round trip verifies the payment on chain, and only then does mark_hash_used/2 write the mark. Concurrent requests carrying the same settled payment hash all pass the read before any of them writes, so each is issued a receipt. The store's atomic check_and_mark/2 primitive is available and used by the type="transaction" path, but the hash path calls plain get and put even when the configured store implements it. Exploitation requires a dedup store to be configured; the default nil store is stateless and documented as offering no replay protection at all. This issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.6.1.

Severity

6.3 (Medium)


                        
                          CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

SSVC

Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-08-19 18:55 UTC

CWE

CWE-367 - Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition

Assigner

EEF mitre root

References

4 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/security/advisorie…	vendor-advisoryrelated
https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-73829.html	related
https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-73829	related
https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/commit/46c5b0e1311…	patch

Impacted products

2 products

Vendor	Product	Version
ZenHive	mpp	Affected: 0.2.0 , < 0.6.1 (semver) cpe:2.3:a:ZenHive:mpp::::::::
ZenHive	mpp	Affected: f8904666061fbab695874856d8fcd02c471dfe1b , < 46c5b0e1311da7d92190dc7d9ea89027a1d365e9 (git) cpe:2.3:a:ZenHive:mpp::::::::

Date Public

2026-06-29 00:00

Credits

Jonatan Männchen / EEF E.FU E.FU

Show details on NVD website

JSON

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Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.