GHSA-VPC5-6PMJ-Q288
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-06 12:30 – Updated: 2026-05-06 12:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/buddy: Prevent BUG_ON by validating rounded allocation
When DRM_BUDDY_CONTIGUOUS_ALLOCATION is set, the requested size is rounded up to the next power-of-two via roundup_pow_of_two(). Similarly, for non-contiguous allocations with large min_block_size, the size is aligned up via round_up(). Both operations can produce a rounded size that exceeds mm->size, which later triggers BUG_ON(order > mm->max_order).
Example scenarios: - 9G CONTIGUOUS allocation on 10G VRAM memory: roundup_pow_of_two(9G) = 16G > 10G - 9G allocation with 8G min_block_size on 10G VRAM memory: round_up(9G, 8G) = 16G > 10G
Fix this by checking the rounded size against mm->size. For non-contiguous or range allocations where size > mm->size is invalid, return -EINVAL immediately. For contiguous allocations without range restrictions, allow the request to fall through to the existing __alloc_contig_try_harder() fallback.
This ensures invalid user input returns an error or uses the fallback path instead of hitting BUG_ON.
v2: (Matt A) - Add Fixes, Cc stable, and Closes tags for context
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-43169"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-06T12:16:35Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/buddy: Prevent BUG_ON by validating rounded allocation\n\nWhen DRM_BUDDY_CONTIGUOUS_ALLOCATION is set, the requested size is\nrounded up to the next power-of-two via roundup_pow_of_two().\nSimilarly, for non-contiguous allocations with large min_block_size,\nthe size is aligned up via round_up(). Both operations can produce a\nrounded size that exceeds mm-\u003esize, which later triggers\nBUG_ON(order \u003e mm-\u003emax_order).\n\nExample scenarios:\n- 9G CONTIGUOUS allocation on 10G VRAM memory:\n roundup_pow_of_two(9G) = 16G \u003e 10G\n- 9G allocation with 8G min_block_size on 10G VRAM memory:\n round_up(9G, 8G) = 16G \u003e 10G\n\nFix this by checking the rounded size against mm-\u003esize. For\nnon-contiguous or range allocations where size \u003e mm-\u003esize is invalid,\nreturn -EINVAL immediately. For contiguous allocations without range\nrestrictions, allow the request to fall through to the existing\n__alloc_contig_try_harder() fallback.\n\nThis ensures invalid user input returns an error or uses the fallback\npath instead of hitting BUG_ON.\n\nv2: (Matt A)\n- Add Fixes, Cc stable, and Closes tags for context",
"id": "GHSA-vpc5-6pmj-q288",
"modified": "2026-05-06T12:30:31Z",
"published": "2026-05-06T12:30:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43169"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5488a29596cdba93a60a79398dc9b69d5bdadf92"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6236c1cd9fdf433d39ed28b2491ccdfe7ae95061"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d764b8dd420098a4d253b8a5b27568c897edb2cf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ecb32c60d8cbed2ee9ce9f343b6aa2f32babc727"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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