GHSA-VQXV-6XRH-49CP

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-24 21:09 – Updated: 2026-07-24 21:09
VLAI
Summary
OpenAM Reflected XSS in the OAuth2/OIDC `wap` consent page
Details

Description

The OAuth2/OIDC consent page rendered for display=wap authorize requests reflected several request-derived values into the HTML response without escaping. An attacker who induces a user with an active OpenAM session to follow a crafted authorize link can execute arbitrary JavaScript in the OpenAM origin.

This is the same vulnerability class as CVE-2026-44203; that fix did not cover this code path.

Impact

Arbitrary JavaScript execution in the OpenAM origin in the victim's authenticated context — enabling session/cookie theft, CSRF-token exfiltration, and actions on behalf of the victim, up to administrative takeover if the victim is an administrator. Reachable on any deployment with at least one registered OAuth2 client; no attacker-controlled client and no special configuration required.

Mitigation

  • Upgrade to 16.1.2 (or later).
  • Until then, restrict/limit access to the OAuth2 authorize endpoint and treat unsolicited display=wap authorize links as untrusted.
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 16.1.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.openidentityplatform.openam:openam-oauth2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "13.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "16.1.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-62280"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-79"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-24T21:09:36Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Description\nThe OAuth2/OIDC consent page rendered for `display=wap` authorize requests reflected several request-derived values into the HTML response without escaping. An attacker who induces a user with an active OpenAM session to follow a crafted authorize link can execute arbitrary JavaScript in the OpenAM origin.\n\nThis is the same vulnerability class as CVE-2026-44203; that fix did not cover this code path.\n\n### Impact\nArbitrary JavaScript execution in the OpenAM origin in the victim\u0027s authenticated context \u2014 enabling session/cookie theft, CSRF-token exfiltration, and actions on behalf of the victim, up to administrative takeover if the victim is an administrator. Reachable on any deployment with at least one registered OAuth2 client; no attacker-controlled client and no special configuration required.\n\n### Mitigation\n- Upgrade to 16.1.2 (or later).\n- Until then, restrict/limit access to the OAuth2 authorize endpoint and treat unsolicited `display=wap` authorize links as untrusted.",
  "id": "GHSA-vqxv-6xrh-49cp",
  "modified": "2026-07-24T21:09:36Z",
  "published": "2026-07-24T21:09:36Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/OpenIdentityPlatform/OpenAM/security/advisories/GHSA-vqxv-6xrh-49cp"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/OpenIdentityPlatform/OpenAM/commit/98cee2dfe701c2e16e5bcee34e6fd9d913925118"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/OpenIdentityPlatform/OpenAM"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/OpenIdentityPlatform/OpenAM/releases/tag/16.1.2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenAM Reflected XSS in the OAuth2/OIDC `wap` consent page"
}



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