GHSA-VQXW-79F6-P4WM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-24 18:31 – Updated: 2026-09-24 18:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
clk: eswin: Zero-initialize stack-allocated clk_init_data
eswin_clk_register_pll() and eswin_register_clkdiv() declare a struct clk_init_data on the stack and only initialize some of its fields (parent_data respectively parent_hws). clk_core_populate_parent_map() checks parent_names first and parent_data second before falling back to parent_hws, so leftover stack garbage in the uninitialized fields hijacks parent resolution and the clk core dereferences a bogus pointer:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 000000000000000c Oops [#1] epc : __clk_register+0x31a/0x7f0 [] __clk_register+0x31a/0x7f0 [] devm_clk_hw_register+0x2a/0x94 [] eswin_register_clkdiv+0x80/0xd0 [] eswin_clk_register_clks+0x162/0x1a0 [] eic7700_clk_probe+0x146/0x180 [] platform_probe+0x3c/0x7a
Observed on EIC7700 hardware (with the driver backported to a 6.17 tree); whether the bug triggers depends entirely on what the stack happens to contain when the registration helpers run.
Zero-initialize both structures.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-93263"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-24T16:17:23Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nclk: eswin: Zero-initialize stack-allocated clk_init_data\n\neswin_clk_register_pll() and eswin_register_clkdiv() declare a struct\nclk_init_data on the stack and only initialize some of its fields\n(parent_data respectively parent_hws). clk_core_populate_parent_map()\nchecks parent_names first and parent_data second before falling back\nto parent_hws, so leftover stack garbage in the uninitialized fields\nhijacks parent resolution and the clk core dereferences a bogus\npointer:\n\n Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 000000000000000c\n Oops [#1]\n epc : __clk_register+0x31a/0x7f0\n [\u003cffffffff805dc774\u003e] __clk_register+0x31a/0x7f0\n [\u003cffffffff805dcd76\u003e] devm_clk_hw_register+0x2a/0x94\n [\u003cffffffff805e319a\u003e] eswin_register_clkdiv+0x80/0xd0\n [\u003cffffffff805e34a0\u003e] eswin_clk_register_clks+0x162/0x1a0\n [\u003cffffffff805e3736\u003e] eic7700_clk_probe+0x146/0x180\n [\u003cffffffff8065d23c\u003e] platform_probe+0x3c/0x7a\n\nObserved on EIC7700 hardware (with the driver backported to a 6.17\ntree); whether the bug triggers depends entirely on what the stack\nhappens to contain when the registration helpers run.\n\nZero-initialize both structures.",
"id": "GHSA-vqxw-79f6-p4wm",
"modified": "2026-09-24T18:31:24Z",
"published": "2026-09-24T18:31:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-93263"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/011d8de504bc84402aabc1dda1cf0552fe9a5af2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1183dc2450a268a536a15da8b106ec520cdbd19f"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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