{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.55.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "kimai/kimai"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.56.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-693"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-06T18:42:30Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nKimai\u0027s Twig sandbox (`StrictPolicy`, used for admin-uploaded invoice and export templates) allow-lists the `config()` Twig function with no key filtering. `config(name)` delegates to `App\\Configuration\\SystemConfiguration::find($name)`, which returns arbitrary entries from the flattened `kimai.config` container parameter built in `App\\DependencyInjection\\AppExtension::loadInternal()`. Any admin who can upload a Twig template can therefore render server-wide secrets - the LDAP bind password, the SAML SP private key, and any other dotted configuration key populated from `kimai.yaml` - into the invoice or export output, which is then delivered to whoever generates an invoice or export from that template (including lower-privileged users such as teamleads with invoice permissions). This is a second, uncovered class of the same defense-in-depth issue patched in GHSA-rh42-6rj2-xwmc: the previous fix added a User-method blocklist but left the `config()` function unrestricted.\n\n### Details\n\n`src/Twig/SecurityPolicy/StrictPolicy.php:40-55` explicitly allow-lists `\u0027config\u0027`:\n\n```php\nprivate array $allowedFunctions = [\n    \u0027max\u0027, \u0027min\u0027, \u0027range\u0027, \u0027constant\u0027, \u0027cycle\u0027, \u0027random\u0027, \u0027date\u0027,\n    \u0027t\u0027,\n    \u0027encore_entry_css_source\u0027, \u0027encore_entry_link_tags\u0027, \u0027encore_entry_script_tags\u0027,\n    \u0027is_granted\u0027,\n    \u0027qr_code_data_uri\u0027,\n    \u0027config\u0027,                       // \u003c-- sink, no key filter\n    \u0027create_date\u0027, \u0027month_names\u0027, \u0027locale_format\u0027,\n    \u0027class_name\u0027\n];\n```\n\n`src/Twig/Configuration.php:22-45` is the Twig function implementation:\n\n```php\npublic function getFunctions(): array\n{\n    return [new TwigFunction(\u0027config\u0027, [$this, \u0027get\u0027])];\n}\n\npublic function get(string $name)\n{\n    switch ($name) {\n        case \u0027chart-class\u0027:                     return \u0027\u0027;\n        case \u0027theme.chart.background_color\u0027:    return \u0027#3c8dbc\u0027;\n        // ... 4 more theme constants\n    }\n    return $this-\u003econfiguration-\u003efind($name);   // \u003c-- arbitrary key lookup\n}\n```\n\n`App\\Configuration\\SystemConfiguration::find()` at `src/Configuration/SystemConfiguration.php:54-62` is a direct dictionary lookup. The dictionary `$this-\u003esettings` is initialised from the `kimai.config` container parameter, which the `AppExtension` flattens from `kimai.yaml` into dotted-notation keys.\n```\n\nThe LDAP and SAML schemas declared in `src/DependencyInjection/Configuration.php` define secret-valued scalar nodes that survive the flattening and become reachable keys:\n\n```php\n// getLdapNode()\n-\u003earrayNode(\u0027connection\u0027)\n    -\u003echildren()\n        -\u003escalarNode(\u0027host\u0027)-\u003edefaultNull()-\u003eend()\n        -\u003escalarNode(\u0027username\u0027)-\u003eend()\n        -\u003escalarNode(\u0027password\u0027)-\u003eend()       // -\u003e settings[\u0027ldap.connection.password\u0027]\n        ...\n\n// getSamlNode()\n-\u003earrayNode(\u0027sp\u0027)\n    -\u003echildren()\n        -\u003escalarNode(\u0027x509cert\u0027)-\u003eend()\n        -\u003escalarNode(\u0027privateKey\u0027)-\u003eend()     // -\u003e settings[\u0027saml.connection.sp.privateKey\u0027]\n        ...\n```\n\nThe invoice and export renderers both enable the sandbox against `StrictPolicy` and pass the shared Twig environment - the one with the `config` function registered - into sandboxed rendering: `src/Invoice/Renderer/AbstractTwigRenderer.php:66-74` and `src/Export/Base/{PDFRenderer,HtmlRenderer}.php`. An admin who uploads a malicious invoice or export template therefore gets an unrestricted read primitive against `kimai.config`.\n\nIn a real deployment the attacker template is uploaded through the admin UI (ROLE_SUPER_ADMIN, permission `upload_invoice_template`), saved by `src/Invoice/InvoiceTemplate*` and later rendered by whoever generates an invoice or export for that template. The rendering user is typically a teamlead or admin with invoice permission (`INVOICE` permission set: `[\u0027view_invoice\u0027,\u0027create_invoice\u0027,\u0027manage_invoice_template\u0027]`, granted to ROLE_ADMIN and ROLE_TEAMLEAD in `config/packages/kimai.yaml`). The rendered output is returned as the invoice PDF/HTML or as a CSV/XLSX export, so the secrets land in a document that is routinely downloaded and emailed.\n\n### Impact\n\nAny Kimai deployment that (a) has SAML or LDAP configured in `kimai.yaml`, and (b) has at least one user (other than the current SUPER_ADMIN) who will render a template-based invoice or export in the future, is affected. A malicious or compromised SUPER_ADMIN can upload a template once, leave, and subsequent invoice or export generations by teamleads or other admins silently exfiltrate `ldap.connection.password`, `saml.connection.sp.privateKey`, `saml.connection.sp.x509cert`, and any other dotted configuration key into an attacker-readable artifact. The LDAP bind password gives domain-credential access to the company directory and often to every downstream system that trusts the same directory; the SAML SP private key allows an attacker to forge signed SAML assertions to any service provider that trusts the same key pair. This is the same class of defense-in-depth leak that GHSA-rh42-6rj2-xwmc patched for user-level secrets, at a broader impact because the keys leaked here are system-wide rather than per-user, and the current StrictPolicy does not intercept the `config()` call path. \n\n### Solution\n\nThe `config()` function was patched to only return a pre-configured list of settings in sandboxed mode. \n\nAdditional checks were added to prevent access to configs that start with `saml.` or `ldap.`.\n\nKimai will not issue a CVE, because this requires a SUPER_ADMIN account and it only affects system with activated LDAP or SAML, which also uses the invoice system.",
  "id": "GHSA-vrqv-52x7-rm4v",
  "modified": "2026-05-06T18:42:30Z",
  "published": "2026-05-06T18:42:30Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kimai/kimai/security/advisories/GHSA-vrqv-52x7-rm4v"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/kimai/kimai"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Kimai\u0027s Twig function config() leaks server-wide secrets (LDAP bind password, SAML SP private key) via invoice/export templates"
}