GHSA-VW4X-93XP-F6F3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-25 03:31 – Updated: 2026-09-25 03:31Lemonldap::NG::Portal versions from 2.23.0 before 2.23.4 for Perl allow a PKCE bypass for public Relying Parties in "PKCE or secret" mode because checkEndPointAuthenticationCredentials does not verify the client secret.
With oidcRPMetaDataOptionsRequirePKCE set to 2, the authorization endpoint issues a code even when the request carries no code_challenge, and token() admits the exchange as long as a challenge was stored or an authentication method was returned for the caller. checkEndPointAuthenticationCredentials() skips the secret comparison for a Relying Party marked public and still returns the method deduced from the request, so any Basic or form credential satisfies the secret branch. validatePKCEChallenge() then passes, because neither a challenge nor a verifier is present.
An attacker who intercepts an authorization code issued to a public Relying Party can exchange it for the user's access, ID and refresh tokens by replaying the client_id with an arbitrary secret, which is the attack PKCE prevents. Dynamic client registration creates every Relying Party in this mode.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-92289"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1390"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-25T01:16:48Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "Lemonldap::NG::Portal versions from 2.23.0 before 2.23.4 for Perl allow a PKCE bypass for public Relying Parties in \"PKCE or secret\" mode because checkEndPointAuthenticationCredentials does not verify the client secret.\n\nWith oidcRPMetaDataOptionsRequirePKCE set to 2, the authorization endpoint issues a code even when the request carries no code_challenge, and token() admits the exchange as long as a challenge was stored or an authentication method was returned for the caller. checkEndPointAuthenticationCredentials() skips the secret comparison for a Relying Party marked public and still returns the method deduced from the request, so any Basic or form credential satisfies the secret branch. validatePKCEChallenge() then passes, because neither a challenge nor a verifier is present.\n\nAn attacker who intercepts an authorization code issued to a public Relying Party can exchange it for the user\u0027s access, ID and refresh tokens by replaying the client_id with an arbitrary secret, which is the attack PKCE prevents. Dynamic client registration creates every Relying Party in this mode.",
"id": "GHSA-vw4x-93xp-f6f3",
"modified": "2026-09-25T03:31:00Z",
"published": "2026-09-25T03:31:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-92289"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gitlab.ow2.org/lemonldap-ng/lemonldap-ng/-/releases/v2.23.4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gitlab.ow2.org/lemonldap-ng/lemonldap-ng/-/work_items/3719"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/25/2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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