GHSA-VW4X-93XP-F6F3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-25 03:31 – Updated: 2026-09-25 03:31
VLAI
Details

Lemonldap::NG::Portal versions from 2.23.0 before 2.23.4 for Perl allow a PKCE bypass for public Relying Parties in "PKCE or secret" mode because checkEndPointAuthenticationCredentials does not verify the client secret.

With oidcRPMetaDataOptionsRequirePKCE set to 2, the authorization endpoint issues a code even when the request carries no code_challenge, and token() admits the exchange as long as a challenge was stored or an authentication method was returned for the caller. checkEndPointAuthenticationCredentials() skips the secret comparison for a Relying Party marked public and still returns the method deduced from the request, so any Basic or form credential satisfies the secret branch. validatePKCEChallenge() then passes, because neither a challenge nor a verifier is present.

An attacker who intercepts an authorization code issued to a public Relying Party can exchange it for the user's access, ID and refresh tokens by replaying the client_id with an arbitrary secret, which is the attack PKCE prevents. Dynamic client registration creates every Relying Party in this mode.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-92289"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1390"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-25T01:16:48Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "Lemonldap::NG::Portal versions from 2.23.0 before 2.23.4 for Perl allow a PKCE bypass for public Relying Parties in \"PKCE or secret\" mode because checkEndPointAuthenticationCredentials does not verify the client secret.\n\nWith oidcRPMetaDataOptionsRequirePKCE set to 2, the authorization endpoint issues a code even when the request carries no code_challenge, and token() admits the exchange as long as a challenge was stored or an authentication method was returned for the caller. checkEndPointAuthenticationCredentials() skips the secret comparison for a Relying Party marked public and still returns the method deduced from the request, so any Basic or form credential satisfies the secret branch. validatePKCEChallenge() then passes, because neither a challenge nor a verifier is present.\n\nAn attacker who intercepts an authorization code issued to a public Relying Party can exchange it for the user\u0027s access, ID and refresh tokens by replaying the client_id with an arbitrary secret, which is the attack PKCE prevents. Dynamic client registration creates every Relying Party in this mode.",
  "id": "GHSA-vw4x-93xp-f6f3",
  "modified": "2026-09-25T03:31:00Z",
  "published": "2026-09-25T03:31:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-92289"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://gitlab.ow2.org/lemonldap-ng/lemonldap-ng/-/releases/v2.23.4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://gitlab.ow2.org/lemonldap-ng/lemonldap-ng/-/work_items/3719"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/25/2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



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