GHSA-VXVV-CH48-4FVP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-22 18:30 – Updated: 2026-08-25 06:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: (pmbus) Fix type confusion in notification logic
Sashiko reports:
At the start of the loop in pmbus_notify(), the code unconditionally casts every attribute to a struct sensor_device_attribute:
drivers/hwmon/pmbus/pmbus_core.c:pmbus_notify() { for (i = 0; i < data->num_attributes; i++) { struct device_attribute da = to_dev_attr(data->group.attrs[i]); struct sensor_device_attribute attr = to_sensor_dev_attr(da); int index = attr->index; ... }
However, data->group.attrs can contain other types like struct pmbus_samples_reg or struct pmbus_sensor, which only embed a base struct device_attribute.
If da is a struct pmbus_samples_reg, dev_attr is the last member. Casting it to struct sensor_device_attribute and reading the index field appears to access memory past the end of the allocation, which might trigger a slab-out-of-bounds read.
Additionally, if da is a struct pmbus_sensor, casting it causes the index field to overlap with the page, phase, and reg fields. Could this produce a garbage mask on little-endian systems that spuriously matches the target reg, page, and flags during an alert?
Fix the problem by using struct sensor_device_attr in struct pmbus_sensor and struct pmbus_label. Since those attributes never trigger a notification, set the value of attr->index to -1 for them. Use this value to distinguish from boolean attributes which can trigger a notification and use the index field to encode mask, page, and register values.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-74711"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-22T16:16:45Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nhwmon: (pmbus) Fix type confusion in notification logic\n\nSashiko reports:\n\nAt the start of the loop in pmbus_notify(), the code unconditionally casts\nevery attribute to a struct sensor_device_attribute:\n\ndrivers/hwmon/pmbus/pmbus_core.c:pmbus_notify() {\n for (i = 0; i \u003c data-\u003enum_attributes; i++) {\n struct device_attribute *da = to_dev_attr(data-\u003egroup.attrs[i]);\n struct sensor_device_attribute *attr = to_sensor_dev_attr(da);\n int index = attr-\u003eindex;\n...\n}\n\nHowever, data-\u003egroup.attrs can contain other types like struct\npmbus_samples_reg or struct pmbus_sensor, which only embed a base\nstruct device_attribute.\n\nIf da is a struct pmbus_samples_reg, dev_attr is the last member. Casting\nit to struct sensor_device_attribute and reading the index field appears\nto access memory past the end of the allocation, which might trigger a\nslab-out-of-bounds read.\n\nAdditionally, if da is a struct pmbus_sensor, casting it causes the index\nfield to overlap with the page, phase, and reg fields. Could this produce\na garbage mask on little-endian systems that spuriously matches the target\nreg, page, and flags during an alert?\n\nFix the problem by using struct sensor_device_attr in struct pmbus_sensor\nand struct pmbus_label. Since those attributes never trigger a\nnotification, set the value of attr-\u003eindex to -1 for them. Use this value\nto distinguish from boolean attributes which _can_ trigger a notification\nand use the index field to encode mask, page, and register values.",
"id": "GHSA-vxvv-ch48-4fvp",
"modified": "2026-08-25T06:31:29Z",
"published": "2026-08-22T18:30:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74711"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0b121de89a99c54bcf516999b04e8531c84f08d5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/59bd68ab05a8f9c9a60b6ec44682084184803ff4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/821f6416e69782fa662aff94b5ea52c943042790"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.