GHSA-W336-HGQX-WC5G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-11 21:31 – Updated: 2026-09-13 09:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: intel-thc-hid: intel-quickspi: validate report size before copy
write_cmd_to_txdma() builds an output report in qsdev->report_buf, a heap buffer allocated in quickspi_alloc_report_buf() to the device-descriptor derived max_report_len (a few hundred bytes for a touch controller). It copies the caller-supplied report into that buffer:
memcpy(write_buf->content, report_buf, report_buf_len);
The HID core caps a report at HID_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE (16384) by default, and quickspi_hid_ll_driver does not set max_buffer_size, so the length reaches the driver unbounded. A hidraw SET_REPORT/SET_FEATURE ioctl carrying a report larger than max_report_len therefore overflows report_buf with attacker-controlled length and content.
Record the report_buf allocation size and reject reports that do not fit before copying, matching the equivalent guard in the intel-quicki2c sibling (quicki2c_init_write_buf()) and the hid-goodix-spi fix.
write_cmd_to_txdma() writes the output report header ahead of the content in the same buffer, so size the allocation to cover the header as well. That keeps the added bound from rejecting a maximum-sized report.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-89620"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-11T20:19:47Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nHID: intel-thc-hid: intel-quickspi: validate report size before copy\n\nwrite_cmd_to_txdma() builds an output report in qsdev-\u003ereport_buf, a heap\nbuffer allocated in quickspi_alloc_report_buf() to the device-descriptor\nderived max_report_len (a few hundred bytes for a touch controller). It\ncopies the caller-supplied report into that buffer:\n\n memcpy(write_buf-\u003econtent, report_buf, report_buf_len);\n\nThe HID core caps a report at HID_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE (16384) by default, and\nquickspi_hid_ll_driver does not set max_buffer_size, so the length reaches\nthe driver unbounded. A hidraw SET_REPORT/SET_FEATURE ioctl carrying a\nreport larger than max_report_len therefore overflows report_buf with\nattacker-controlled length and content.\n\nRecord the report_buf allocation size and reject reports that do not fit\nbefore copying, matching the equivalent guard in the intel-quicki2c\nsibling (quicki2c_init_write_buf()) and the hid-goodix-spi fix.\n\nwrite_cmd_to_txdma() writes the output report header ahead of the content\nin the same buffer, so size the allocation to cover the header as well.\nThat keeps the added bound from rejecting a maximum-sized report.",
"id": "GHSA-w336-hgqx-wc5g",
"modified": "2026-09-13T09:32:24Z",
"published": "2026-09-11T21:31:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-89620"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6fcefe71aeb524f6e77fe586fe85d873745e917c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a59cf84441f9a17323c89452cec2bf16724c48a9"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ee8ad1bb1e96164d51089b1182f1bd5f187e7baa"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.