GHSA-W65F-8RHV-GQVR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-17 18:32 – Updated: 2026-09-17 18:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: meson: Keep link pointers valid on realloc failure
meson_card_reallocate_links() grows the DAI link and private data arrays with two consecutive krealloc() calls and updates the owner pointers only after both calls have succeeded.
A successful krealloc() may move the data: it frees the old block and returns a new one. When that happens for the link array and the second krealloc() then fails, card->dai_link still points to the block that krealloc() already freed, and the error path frees the new block too. The probe error path then calls meson_card_clean_references(), which dereferences card->dai_link and kfree()s it again, resulting in a use-after-free and a double free.
Commit card->dai_link and card->num_links right after the first krealloc() succeeds, so the pointer always refers to a valid allocation that meson_card_clean_references() can walk and free. krealloc() with __GFP_ZERO zero-initializes the added entries, so walking them on the error path is safe. With both failure paths reduced to a plain return, drop the goto labels and the error message.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-93039"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-17T17:17:56Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nASoC: meson: Keep link pointers valid on realloc failure\n\nmeson_card_reallocate_links() grows the DAI link and private data\narrays with two consecutive krealloc() calls and updates the owner\npointers only after both calls have succeeded.\n\nA successful krealloc() may move the data: it frees the old block and\nreturns a new one. When that happens for the link array and the second\nkrealloc() then fails, card-\u003edai_link still points to the block that\nkrealloc() already freed, and the error path frees the new block too.\nThe probe error path then calls meson_card_clean_references(), which\ndereferences card-\u003edai_link and kfree()s it again, resulting in a\nuse-after-free and a double free.\n\nCommit card-\u003edai_link and card-\u003enum_links right after the first\nkrealloc() succeeds, so the pointer always refers to a valid allocation\nthat meson_card_clean_references() can walk and free. krealloc() with\n__GFP_ZERO zero-initializes the added entries, so walking them on the\nerror path is safe. With both failure paths reduced to a plain return,\ndrop the goto labels and the error message.",
"id": "GHSA-w65f-8rhv-gqvr",
"modified": "2026-09-17T18:32:08Z",
"published": "2026-09-17T18:32:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-93039"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0b30fbe6bf7cf6499b19dd886f466e7c9e820089"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1c1485343b7c1c39dab7ecb9cd16ba49fd0ce642"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2aaa41cf974f83a6fb105422bac4e2f107150774"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/41e92e0caa1fe3df2efaca346bfcaeb7fb9826ab"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5ed1b048527bebe4529eb6e01c34dcc5d97ba5fe"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8db0a0fc84e80aa9924e0833aef6cc95df94e5a7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8fec16898f184e5f8f8fdd09ff1ced2bd7ffc13d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/de33afc57f24538186bccf4c4f6c65dd38634fd8"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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