GHSA-W7WM-2425-7P2H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-02-04 21:23 – Updated: 2025-02-06 18:04Impact
During recovery, a Coordinator only verifies that a given recovery key decrypts the sealed state, not if this key was provided by a party with access to one of the recovery keys defined in the manifest. This allows an attacker to manually craft a sealed state using their own recovery keys, and a manifest that does not match the rest of the state.
If network traffic is redirected from the legitimate coordinator to the attacker's Coordinator, a remote party is susceptible to impersonation if they verify the Coordinator without comparing the root certificate of the Coordinator against a trusted reference.
Under these circumstances, an attacker can trick a remote party into trusting the malicious Coordinator by presenting a manifest that does not match the actual state of the deployment.
This issue does not affect the following:
- secrets and state of the legitimate Coordinator instances
- integrity of workloads
- certificates chaining back to the legitimate Coordinator root certificate
Patches
The issue has been patched in v1.7.0.
Workarounds
Connections that purely authenticate based on a known Coordinator's root certificate, e.g. the one retrieved when using the marblerun manifest set CLI command, are not affected.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/edgelesssys/marblerun"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.7.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-02-04T21:23:48Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nDuring recovery, a Coordinator only verifies that a given recovery key decrypts the sealed state, not if this key was provided by a party with access to one of the recovery keys defined in the manifest.\nThis allows an attacker to manually craft a sealed state using their own recovery keys, and a manifest that does not match the rest of the state.\n\nIf network traffic is redirected from the legitimate coordinator to the attacker\u0027s Coordinator, a remote party is susceptible to impersonation if they verify the Coordinator without comparing the root certificate of the Coordinator against a trusted reference.\n\nUnder these circumstances, an attacker can trick a remote party into trusting the malicious Coordinator by presenting a manifest that does not match the actual state of the deployment.\n\nThis issue does **not** affect the following:\n\n* secrets and state of the legitimate Coordinator instances\n* integrity of workloads\n* certificates chaining back to the legitimate Coordinator root certificate\n\n### Patches\n\nThe issue has been patched in [`v1.7.0`](https://github.com/edgelesssys/marblerun/releases/tag/v1.7.0).\n\n### Workarounds\n\nConnections that purely authenticate based on a known Coordinator\u0027s root certificate, e.g. the one retrieved when using the `marblerun manifest set` CLI command, are not affected.",
"id": "GHSA-w7wm-2425-7p2h",
"modified": "2025-02-06T18:04:37Z",
"published": "2025-02-04T21:23:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/edgelesssys/marblerun/security/advisories/GHSA-w7wm-2425-7p2h"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/edgelesssys/marblerun/commit/e4864f9f1d0f12a4a7d28514da43bcc75603a5b5"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/edgelesssys/marblerun"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/edgelesssys/marblerun/releases/tag/v1.7.0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2025-3450"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "MarbleRun unauthenticated recovery allows Coordinator impersonation"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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