Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-W7X5-G22V-XQHR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-22 22:57 – Updated: 2026-07-22 22:57

Summary

Eclipse Jetty: Path parameter traversal

Details

Description (as reported)

Summary

In Jetty 12.1.8, org.eclipse.jetty.util.URIUtil.canonicalPath() may leave dot-dot path segments unnormalized when a semicolon path parameter marker is followed by a slash and a dot segment.

A minimal example is:

/public;/../admin/secret

In my local reproduction, URIUtil.canonicalPath() returns:

/public/../admin/secret

instead of the expected normalized path:

/admin/secret

When Jetty's SecurityHandler.PathMapped is used to protect a path prefix such as /admin/*, the non-normalized canonical path may not match the protected prefix. As a result, an unauthenticated request may bypass the configured path-based security constraint.

Tested Version

Jetty: 12.1.8 JDK: 17.0.18 Maven: 3.9.14

Maven artifacts used:

org.eclipse.jetty:jetty-server:12.1.8 org.eclipse.jetty:jetty-security:12.1.8 org.eclipse.jetty:jetty-session:12.1.8

Only confirmed Jetty 12.1.8 so far.

Minimal Reproduction

Starts a minimal Jetty server with the following security setup:

SecurityHandler.PathMapped security = new SecurityHandler.PathMapped();
security.put("/admin/*", Constraint.from("admin"));
security.put("/*", Constraint.ALLOWED);
security.setAuthenticator(new BasicAuthenticator());

The test then sends requests with no Authorization header.

Observed result:

GET /admin/secret                  -> 401
GET /public;x/../admin/secret      -> 200

The handler receives paths such as:

/public/../admin/secret

This suggests that the /admin/* security constraint is bypassed because PathMapped matching is performed against the non-normalized canonical path.

Suspected Root Cause

The suspected root cause is in URIUtil.canonicalPath().

The relevant logic is approximately:

    for (int i = 0; i < end; i++)
    {
        char c = encodedPath.charAt(i);

        switch (c)
        {
            case ';':
                if (builder == null)
                {
                    builder = new Utf8StringBuilder(encodedPath.length());
                    builder.append(encodedPath, 0, i);
                }

                while (++i < end)
                {
                    if (encodedPath.charAt(i) == '/')
                    {
                        builder.append('/');
                        break;
                    }
                }
                break;

            case '.':
                if (slash)
                    normal = false;
                if (builder != null)
                    builder.append(c);
                break;
        }

        slash = c == '/';
    }

    String canonical = (builder != null)
        ? (onBadUtf8 == null ? builder.toCompleteString() : builder.takeCompleteString(onBadUtf8))
        : encodedPath;
    return normal ? canonical : normalizePath(canonical);

For the input:

/public;/../admin/secret

when the outer loop reaches the semicolon:

    i      = 7
    c      = ';'
    slash  = false
    normal = true

Inside case ';', the while (++i < end) loop advances i to the next character, which is already '/' for the empty path parameter form ";/".

The code then appends '/' to the canonical builder:

builder.append('/');

At this point, the canonical builder ends with '/':

/public/

However, the local variable c is still the old value ';', because c was read before entering the switch and is not updated when the inner loop advances i.

After leaving the switch, the loop updates the slash state using:

slash = c == '/';

Since c is still ';', slash becomes false.

On the next iteration, the scanner reaches '.', which is the first dot in the following "../" segment. Because slash is incorrectly false, this code does not run:

    if (slash)
        normal = false;

Therefore normal remains true, and canonicalPath() returns the canonical string directly instead of calling normalizePath(canonical).

The result is:

/public/../admin/secret

instead of:

/admin/secret

In short:

case ';' advances the scan position i and appends '/' to the canonical builder, but the loop tail still updates slash from the stale character c=';'. As a result, the following dot-dot segment is not detected as a path traversal segment.

More Precise Trigger Condition

The issue is not limited to a non-empty path parameter such as ";x".

The more precise trigger shape is:

;[^/]*/.

Examples:

    /public;/../admin/secret
    /public;x/../admin/secret
    /public;anything/../admin/secret
    /public;/./admin/secret

The minimal form is:

/public;/../admin/secret

because the semicolon is immediately followed by '/', so the inner while loop reaches '/' on its first increment.

Potential Minimal Fix Direction

A minimal fix would be to ensure that, when case ';' consumes input until '/' and appends '/' to the canonical builder, the slash state reflects the last effective character in the canonical path.

For example, conceptually:

    case ';':
        if (builder == null)
        {
            builder = new Utf8StringBuilder(encodedPath.length());
            builder.append(encodedPath, 0, i);
        }

        while (++i < end)
        {
            if (encodedPath.charAt(i) == '/')
            {
                builder.append('/');
                slash = true;
                break;
            }
        }
        continue;

The important part is to avoid the loop tail from overwriting slash using the stale c value:

slash = c == '/';

In other words, slash should represent the last effective character appended to the canonical builder, not the original input character read before case ';' advanced i.

Severity

5.3 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

Show details on source website

JSON

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 12.0.34"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.eclipse.jetty:jetty-util"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "12.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "12.0.35"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 12.1.8"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.eclipse.jetty:jetty-util"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "12.1.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "12.1.9"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-8384"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-647"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-22T22:57:36Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-14T09:16:42Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Description (as reported)\n\n#### Summary\n\nIn Jetty 12.1.8, org.eclipse.jetty.util.URIUtil.canonicalPath() may leave dot-dot path segments unnormalized when a semicolon path parameter marker is followed by a slash and a dot\n  segment.\n\nA minimal example is:\n\n`/public;/../admin/secret`\n\nIn my local reproduction, URIUtil.canonicalPath() returns:\n\n`/public/../admin/secret`\n\ninstead of the expected normalized path:\n\n`/admin/secret`\n\nWhen Jetty\u0027s `SecurityHandler.PathMapped` is used to protect a path prefix such as `/admin/*`, the non-normalized canonical path may not match the protected prefix. As a result, an unauthenticated request may bypass the configured path-based security constraint.\n\n\n\n#### Tested Version\n\nJetty: 12.1.8\nJDK: 17.0.18\nMaven: 3.9.14\n\nMaven artifacts used:\n\n  org.eclipse.jetty:jetty-server:12.1.8\n  org.eclipse.jetty:jetty-security:12.1.8\n  org.eclipse.jetty:jetty-session:12.1.8\n\nOnly confirmed Jetty 12.1.8 so far. \n\n\n#### Minimal Reproduction\n\nStarts a minimal Jetty server with the following security setup:\n\n```java\nSecurityHandler.PathMapped security = new SecurityHandler.PathMapped();\nsecurity.put(\"/admin/*\", Constraint.from(\"admin\"));\nsecurity.put(\"/*\", Constraint.ALLOWED);\nsecurity.setAuthenticator(new BasicAuthenticator());\n```\n\nThe test then sends requests with no `Authorization` header.\n\nObserved result:\n\n```\nGET /admin/secret                  -\u003e 401\nGET /public;x/../admin/secret      -\u003e 200\n```\n\nThe handler receives paths such as:\n\n`/public/../admin/secret`\n\nThis suggests that the `/admin/*` security constraint is bypassed because `PathMapped` matching is performed against the non-normalized canonical path.\n\n\n#### Suspected Root Cause\n\nThe suspected root cause is in `URIUtil.canonicalPath()`.\n\nThe relevant logic is approximately:\n\n```java\n    for (int i = 0; i \u003c end; i++)\n    {\n        char c = encodedPath.charAt(i);\n\n        switch (c)\n        {\n            case \u0027;\u0027:\n                if (builder == null)\n                {\n                    builder = new Utf8StringBuilder(encodedPath.length());\n                    builder.append(encodedPath, 0, i);\n                }\n\n                while (++i \u003c end)\n                {\n                    if (encodedPath.charAt(i) == \u0027/\u0027)\n                    {\n                        builder.append(\u0027/\u0027);\n                        break;\n                    }\n                }\n                break;\n\n            case \u0027.\u0027:\n                if (slash)\n                    normal = false;\n                if (builder != null)\n                    builder.append(c);\n                break;\n        }\n\n        slash = c == \u0027/\u0027;\n    }\n\n    String canonical = (builder != null)\n        ? (onBadUtf8 == null ? builder.toCompleteString() : builder.takeCompleteString(onBadUtf8))\n        : encodedPath;\n    return normal ? canonical : normalizePath(canonical);\n```\n\nFor the input:\n\n`/public;/../admin/secret`\n\nwhen the outer loop reaches the semicolon:\n\n```\n    i      = 7\n    c      = \u0027;\u0027\n    slash  = false\n    normal = true\n```\n\nInside `case \u0027;\u0027`, the `while (++i \u003c end)` loop advances i to the next character, which is already \u0027/\u0027 for the empty path parameter form \";/\".\n\nThe code then appends \u0027/\u0027 to the canonical builder:\n\n`builder.append(\u0027/\u0027);`\n\nAt this point, the canonical builder ends with \u0027/\u0027:\n\n`/public/`\n\nHowever, the local variable `c` is still the old value \u0027;\u0027, because `c` was read before entering the switch and is not updated when the inner loop advances `i`.\n\nAfter leaving the switch, the loop updates the slash state using:\n\n`slash = c == \u0027/\u0027;`\n\nSince `c` is still \u0027;\u0027, slash becomes `false`.\n\nOn the next iteration, the scanner reaches \u0027.\u0027, which is the first dot in the following \"../\" segment. Because slash is incorrectly `false`, this code does not run:\n\n```java\n    if (slash)\n        normal = false;\n```\n\nTherefore `normal` remains `true`, and `canonicalPath()` returns the canonical string directly instead of calling `normalizePath(canonical)`.\n\nThe result is:\n\n`/public/../admin/secret`\n\ninstead of:\n\n`/admin/secret`\n\nIn short:\n\n`case \u0027;\u0027` advances the scan position i and appends \u0027/\u0027 to the canonical builder, but the loop tail still updates slash from the stale character `c=\u0027;\u0027`. As a result, the following dot-dot segment is not detected as a path traversal segment.\n\n####  More Precise Trigger Condition\n\nThe issue is not limited to a non-empty path parameter such as \";x\".\n\nThe more precise trigger shape is:\n\n`;[^/]*/.`\n\nExamples:\n\n```\n    /public;/../admin/secret\n    /public;x/../admin/secret\n    /public;anything/../admin/secret\n    /public;/./admin/secret\n```\n\nThe minimal form is:\n\n`/public;/../admin/secret`\n\nbecause the semicolon is immediately followed by \u0027/\u0027, so the inner while loop reaches \u0027/\u0027 on its first increment.\n\n####  Potential Minimal Fix Direction\n\nA minimal fix would be to ensure that, when case \u0027;\u0027 consumes input until \u0027/\u0027 and appends \u0027/\u0027 to the canonical builder, the slash state reflects the last effective character in the canonical path.\n\nFor example, conceptually:\n\n```java\n    case \u0027;\u0027:\n        if (builder == null)\n        {\n            builder = new Utf8StringBuilder(encodedPath.length());\n            builder.append(encodedPath, 0, i);\n        }\n\n        while (++i \u003c end)\n        {\n            if (encodedPath.charAt(i) == \u0027/\u0027)\n            {\n                builder.append(\u0027/\u0027);\n                slash = true;\n                break;\n            }\n        }\n        continue;\n```\n\nThe important part is to avoid the loop tail from overwriting slash using the stale `c` value:\n\n`slash = c == \u0027/\u0027;`\n\nIn other words, `slash` should represent the last effective character appended to the canonical builder, not the original input character read before case \u0027;\u0027 advanced `i`.",
  "id": "GHSA-w7x5-g22v-xqhr",
  "modified": "2026-07-22T22:57:36Z",
  "published": "2026-07-22T22:57:36Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/jetty/jetty.project/security/advisories/GHSA-w7x5-g22v-xqhr"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-8384"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/jetty/jetty.project/pull/14969"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/jetty/jetty.project/pull/14973"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/jetty/jetty.project/commit/82969c77f6da46e27008b10b3c14840cd31db084"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/jetty/jetty.project/commit/ade27ce93a37c33278720250d85c48601230ae3f"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/jetty/jetty.project"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/jetty/jetty.project/releases/tag/jetty-12.0.35"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/jetty/jetty.project/releases/tag/jetty-12.1.9"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://gitlab.eclipse.org/security/cve-assignment/-/work_items/108"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Eclipse Jetty: Path parameter traversal"
}

CVE-2026-8384 (GCVE-0-2026-8384)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-07-14 08:56 – Updated: 2026-07-14 12:18

Summary

In Eclipse Jetty, an HTTP URI of this form: /public;/../admin/secret.txt results in an unresolved path of: /public/../admin/secret.txt instead of the expected: /admin/secret.txt Jetty itself is not affected, as it will not serve the secret.txt file because it will not pass the alias checker (only resolved resources are served). However, web applications that rely on resolved paths being provided by Jetty may be confused when receiving an unresolved path.

Severity

5.3 (Medium)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

SSVC

Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-07-14 12:18 UTC

CWE

CWE-647

Assigner

eclipse mitre root Scorecard

References

1 reference

URL	Tags
https://gitlab.eclipse.org/security/cve-assignmen…

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
Eclipse Foundation	Eclipse Jetty	Affected: 12.0.0 , ≤ 12.0.34 (semver) Affected: 12.1.0 , ≤ 12.1.8 (semver)

Credits

https://github.com/jweny https://github.com/lworld0x00

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

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  "containers": {
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      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-8384",
                "options": [
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                    "Exploitation": "none"
                  },
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                    "Automatable": "yes"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
                  }
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                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-07-14T12:18:08.648859Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
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          "dateUpdated": "2026-07-14T12:18:29.831Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
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    "cna": {
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          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Eclipse Jetty",
          "repo": "https://github.com/jetty/jetty.project",
          "vendor": "Eclipse Foundation",
          "versions": [
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              "status": "affected",
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          "lang": "en",
          "type": "finder",
          "value": "https://github.com/jweny"
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          "lang": "en",
          "supportingMedia": [
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              "value": "\u003cp\u003eIn Eclipse Jetty, an HTTP URI of this form:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cdiv\u003e\n\u003cpre\u003e\u003ccode\u003e/public;/../admin/secret.txt\u003c/code\u003e\u003c/pre\u003e\n\n\u003c/div\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eresults in an unresolved path of:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cdiv\u003e\n\u003cpre\u003e\u003ccode\u003e/public/../admin/secret.txt\u003c/code\u003e\u003c/pre\u003e\n\n\u003c/div\u003e\n\u003cp\u003einstead of the expected:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cdiv\u003e\n\u003cpre\u003e\u003ccode\u003e/admin/secret.txt\u003c/code\u003e\u003c/pre\u003e\n\n\u003c/div\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eJetty itself is not affected, as it will not serve the \u003ccode\u003esecret.txt\u003c/code\u003e file because it will not pass the alias checker (only resolved resources are served).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eHowever, web applications that rely on resolved paths being provided by Jetty may be confused when receiving an unresolved path.\u003c/p\u003e"
            }
          ],
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        }
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      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
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            "baseScore": 5.3,
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Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

Action not permitted

GHSA-W7X5-G22V-XQHR

Description (as reported)

Summary

Tested Version

Minimal Reproduction

Suspected Root Cause

More Precise Trigger Condition

Potential Minimal Fix Direction

CVE-2026-8384 (GCVE-0-2026-8384)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature

Related by attack behaviour