ghsa-w9g2-3w7p-72g9
Vulnerability from github
8.7 (High) - CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Background
During the audit of Lido's Gate Seals code statemind team identified a weird behavior of the code that uses raw_call: https://github.com/lidofinance/gate-seals/blob/051593e74df01a4131c485b4fda52e691cd4b7d8/contracts/GateSeal.vy#L164 .
Construction like this:
vyper
success = raw_call(
sealable,
_abi_encode(SEAL_DURATION_SECONDS, method_id=method_id("pauseFor(uint256)")),
revert_on_failure=False
)
was not fully documented: https://docs.vyperlang.org/en/v0.3.7/built-in-functions.html#raw_call .
The documentation says that: if max_outsize=0 it should return nothing and then it says that if revert_on_failure=False it should return a success flag in the tuple of response, but what if max_outsize=0 and revert_on_failure=False.
So the team started researching what exactly happened in that case, after some research we found that the Vyper compiler generates the wrong bytecode in that case, it generates the sequence:
CALL // call
MLOAD // MLOAD is wrong since the CALL result is already stored in the stack
Impact
Example of buggy code:
vyper
@external
def returnSome(calling: address, a: uint256) -> bool:
success: bool = false
success = raw_call(
calling,
_abi_encode(a, method_id=method_id("a(uint256)")),
revert_on_failure=False
)
any contract that uses the raw_call with revert_on_failure=False and max_outsize=0 receives the wrong response from raw_call. Depending on the memory garbage, the result can be either True or False.
Patches
Fix by @charles-cooper https://github.com/vyperlang/vyper/commit/851f7a1b3aa2a36fd041e3d0ed38f9355a58c8ae
Workarounds
The simple workaround is always to put max_outsize>0.
Workaround example https://github.com/lidofinance/gate-seals/pull/5/files
References
Lido's fix: https://github.com/lidofinance/gate-seals/pull/5/files
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "vyper"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.3.1"
},
{
"fixed": "0.3.8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-30629"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-670"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-04-24T22:33:52Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-04-24T22:15:10Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Background\nDuring the audit of [Lido\u0027s Gate Seals](https://github.com/lidofinance/gate-seals) code [statemind](https://statemind.io) team identified a weird behavior of the code that uses `raw_call`: https://github.com/lidofinance/gate-seals/blob/051593e74df01a4131c485b4fda52e691cd4b7d8/contracts/GateSeal.vy#L164 .\n\nConstruction like this:\n```vyper\nsuccess = raw_call(\n sealable,\n _abi_encode(SEAL_DURATION_SECONDS, method_id=method_id(\"pauseFor(uint256)\")),\n revert_on_failure=False\n)\n```\nwas not fully documented: https://docs.vyperlang.org/en/v0.3.7/built-in-functions.html#raw_call .\n\nThe documentation says that: if `max_outsize=0` it should return nothing and then it says that if `revert_on_failure=False` it should return a `success` flag in the tuple of response, but what if `max_outsize=0` and `revert_on_failure=False`.\n\n\u003cimg width=\"715\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/22330612/232125364-d2b3bbac-0b4f-40cb-80ff-f55d8eafef44.png\"\u003e\n\n So the team started researching what exactly happened in that case, after some research we found that the Vyper compiler generates the wrong bytecode in that case, it generates the sequence:\n```\nCALL // call\nMLOAD // MLOAD is wrong since the CALL result is already stored in the stack\n```\n\n### Impact\nExample of buggy code:\n```vyper\n@external\ndef returnSome(calling: address, a: uint256) -\u003e bool:\n success: bool = false\n success = raw_call(\n calling,\n _abi_encode(a, method_id=method_id(\"a(uint256)\")),\n revert_on_failure=False\n )\n```\n\nany contract that uses the `raw_call` with `revert_on_failure=False` and `max_outsize=0` receives the wrong response from `raw_call`. Depending on the memory garbage, the result can be either `True` or `False`.\n\n### Patches\nFix by @charles-cooper https://github.com/vyperlang/vyper/commit/851f7a1b3aa2a36fd041e3d0ed38f9355a58c8ae\n\n### Workarounds\nThe simple workaround is always to put `max_outsize\u003e0`.\nWorkaround example https://github.com/lidofinance/gate-seals/pull/5/files\n\n### References\nLido\u0027s fix: https://github.com/lidofinance/gate-seals/pull/5/files\n",
"id": "GHSA-w9g2-3w7p-72g9",
"modified": "2024-11-19T16:31:34Z",
"published": "2023-04-24T22:33:52Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vyperlang/vyper/security/advisories/GHSA-w9g2-3w7p-72g9"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-30629"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/lidofinance/gate-seals/pull/5/files"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vyperlang/vyper/commit/851f7a1b3aa2a36fd041e3d0ed38f9355a58c8ae"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://docs.vyperlang.org/en/v0.3.7/built-in-functions.html#raw_call"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/lidofinance/gate-seals/blob/051593e74df01a4131c485b4fda52e691cd4b7d8/contracts/GateSeal.vy#L164"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/vyper/PYSEC-2023-131.yaml"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/vyperlang/vyper"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Incorrect success value returned in vyper"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.