GHSA-W9G9-VHWV-W598
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-24 18:31 – Updated: 2026-09-24 18:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: iwlwifi: mvm: fix P2P-Device binding handling
Our binding handling for P2P-Device can run into the following scenario, as observed by our testing:
- a station interface is connected on some channel
- the P2P-Device does a remain-on-channel (ROC) on that channel
- the ROC ends, and the P2P-Device is removed from the binding, but the phy_ctxt pointer is left around as a PHY cache so we don't need to recalibrate to the channel again and again in case it's not shared
- a binding update by the station interface, even a removal, will re-add the P2P-Device to the binding
- the P2P-Device is removed, which removes the PHY context, but it's still in the binding so the firmware crashes
Since the P2P device is removed from the binding and only re- added by unrelated code, but we want to keep the phy_ctxt around as a cache for future ROC usage, fix it by adding a boolean that indicates whether or not the P2P-Device should be added to the binding, and handle that in the binding iterator. That way, the station interface cannot re-add the P2P-Device to the binding when that isn't active.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-97432"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-24T17:17:21Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nwifi: iwlwifi: mvm: fix P2P-Device binding handling\n\nOur binding handling for P2P-Device can run into the following\nscenario, as observed by our testing:\n\n - a station interface is connected on some channel\n - the P2P-Device does a remain-on-channel (ROC) on that channel\n - the ROC ends, and the P2P-Device is removed from the binding,\n but the phy_ctxt pointer is left around as a PHY cache so we\n don\u0027t need to recalibrate to the channel again and again in\n case it\u0027s not shared\n - a binding update by the station interface, even a removal,\n will re-add the P2P-Device to the binding\n - the P2P-Device is removed, which removes the PHY context, but\n it\u0027s still in the binding so the firmware crashes\n\nSince the P2P device is removed from the binding and only re-\nadded by unrelated code, but we want to keep the phy_ctxt around\nas a cache for future ROC usage, fix it by adding a boolean that\nindicates whether or not the P2P-Device should be added to the\nbinding, and handle that in the binding iterator. That way, the\nstation interface cannot re-add the P2P-Device to the binding\nwhen that isn\u0027t active.",
"id": "GHSA-w9g9-vhwv-w598",
"modified": "2026-09-24T18:31:32Z",
"published": "2026-09-24T18:31:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-97432"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7be2fc679c8f657868988e41c0bb15bf5a454620"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b74e377cad9271950c57472867c469e4b5b2ff0c"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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