GHSA-W9G9-VHWV-W598

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-24 18:31 – Updated: 2026-09-24 18:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

wifi: iwlwifi: mvm: fix P2P-Device binding handling

Our binding handling for P2P-Device can run into the following scenario, as observed by our testing:

  • a station interface is connected on some channel
  • the P2P-Device does a remain-on-channel (ROC) on that channel
  • the ROC ends, and the P2P-Device is removed from the binding, but the phy_ctxt pointer is left around as a PHY cache so we don't need to recalibrate to the channel again and again in case it's not shared
  • a binding update by the station interface, even a removal, will re-add the P2P-Device to the binding
  • the P2P-Device is removed, which removes the PHY context, but it's still in the binding so the firmware crashes

Since the P2P device is removed from the binding and only re- added by unrelated code, but we want to keep the phy_ctxt around as a cache for future ROC usage, fix it by adding a boolean that indicates whether or not the P2P-Device should be added to the binding, and handle that in the binding iterator. That way, the station interface cannot re-add the P2P-Device to the binding when that isn't active.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-97432"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-24T17:17:21Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nwifi: iwlwifi: mvm: fix P2P-Device binding handling\n\nOur binding handling for P2P-Device can run into the following\nscenario, as observed by our testing:\n\n - a station interface is connected on some channel\n - the P2P-Device does a remain-on-channel (ROC) on that channel\n - the ROC ends, and the P2P-Device is removed from the binding,\n   but the phy_ctxt pointer is left around as a PHY cache so we\n   don\u0027t need to recalibrate to the channel again and again in\n   case it\u0027s not shared\n - a binding update by the station interface, even a removal,\n   will re-add the P2P-Device to the binding\n - the P2P-Device is removed, which removes the PHY context, but\n   it\u0027s still in the binding so the firmware crashes\n\nSince the P2P device is removed from the binding and only re-\nadded by unrelated code, but we want to keep the phy_ctxt around\nas a cache for future ROC usage, fix it by adding a boolean that\nindicates whether or not the P2P-Device should be added to the\nbinding, and handle that in the binding iterator. That way, the\nstation interface cannot re-add the P2P-Device to the binding\nwhen that isn\u0027t active.",
  "id": "GHSA-w9g9-vhwv-w598",
  "modified": "2026-09-24T18:31:32Z",
  "published": "2026-09-24T18:31:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-97432"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7be2fc679c8f657868988e41c0bb15bf5a454620"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b74e377cad9271950c57472867c469e4b5b2ff0c"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



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