GHSA-WM2V-R9V6-53MG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-11 21:31 – Updated: 2026-09-11 21:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: validate sockaddr length per family in listener_set
nfsd_sock_nl_policy declares NFSD_A_SOCK_ADDR as a bare NLA_BINARY attribute with no minimum length. A CAP_NET_ADMIN caller can send a 16-byte NFSD_A_SOCK_ADDR with sa_family=AF_INET6, causing a 12-byte OOB read across three consumers (rpc_cmp_addr_port, svc_find_listener, kernel_bind).
nfsd_nl_listener_set_doit() also parsed and validated each listener entry inline in two separate loops, interleaved with mutating the running listener configuration. The validation was duplicated, used an open-coded "nla_len < sizeof(struct sockaddr)" check that was too short for AF_INET6, and handled a malformed entry inconsistently depending on which loop noticed it.
Add an nfsd_nl_validate_listeners() helper that walks the entire list once and confirms each entry parses, carries both an address and a transport name, and is long enough for its address family (sizeof(struct sockaddr_in) for AF_INET, sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6) for AF_INET6, -EAFNOSUPPORT otherwise). Call it before taking nfsd_mutex or creating the serv, so a malformed request fails cleanly with no side effects.
Since every entry is known valid by the time the two existing loops run, drop the redundant presence and per-family length checks from both, leaving only the nla_parse_nested() call needed to extract the data.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-89700"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-11T20:19:57Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnfsd: validate sockaddr length per family in listener_set\n\nnfsd_sock_nl_policy declares NFSD_A_SOCK_ADDR as a bare NLA_BINARY\nattribute with no minimum length. A CAP_NET_ADMIN caller can send a\n16-byte NFSD_A_SOCK_ADDR with sa_family=AF_INET6, causing a 12-byte\nOOB read across three consumers (rpc_cmp_addr_port, svc_find_listener,\nkernel_bind).\n\nnfsd_nl_listener_set_doit() also parsed and validated each listener\nentry inline in two separate loops, interleaved with mutating the\nrunning listener configuration. The validation was duplicated, used an\nopen-coded \"nla_len \u003c sizeof(struct sockaddr)\" check that was too short\nfor AF_INET6, and handled a malformed entry inconsistently depending on\nwhich loop noticed it.\n\nAdd an nfsd_nl_validate_listeners() helper that walks the entire list\nonce and confirms each entry parses, carries both an address and a\ntransport name, and is long enough for its address family\n(sizeof(struct sockaddr_in) for AF_INET, sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6)\nfor AF_INET6, -EAFNOSUPPORT otherwise). Call it before taking\nnfsd_mutex or creating the serv, so a malformed request fails cleanly\nwith no side effects.\n\nSince every entry is known valid by the time the two existing loops\nrun, drop the redundant presence and per-family length checks from\nboth, leaving only the nla_parse_nested() call needed to extract the\ndata.",
"id": "GHSA-wm2v-r9v6-53mg",
"modified": "2026-09-11T21:31:37Z",
"published": "2026-09-11T21:31:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-89700"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/22d0e4752ca88fd84196d22ebeedc905e6540440"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2aca70c18c5f5d06004122861fb151d5fcc57faf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bdcc85c2b05a9378d8bd2d65f9fc41440a3cf464"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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