GHSA-WM8R-W8PF-2V6W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-02 22:14 – Updated: 2026-03-20 21:36Summary
In OpenClaw 2026.2.25, Signal group authorization under groupPolicy=allowlist could accept sender identities sourced from DM pairing-store approvals. This allowed DM pairing approvals to leak into group allowlist evaluation.
Impact
This is an authorization-boundary weakness between DM pairing and group allowlist controls. A sender approved for DM pairing could pass group checks without explicit group allowlisting.
Affected Packages / Versions
- Package:
openclaw(npm) - Latest published version affected:
2026.2.25 - Vulnerable range:
<= 2026.2.25 - Patched version (planned next release):
>= 2026.2.26
Fix
OpenClaw now keeps DM pairing-store entries DM-only and enforces explicit group allowlist boundaries in shared DM/group policy resolution used by Signal and other channels.
Fix Commit(s)
8bdda7a651c21e98faccdbbd73081e79cffe8be064de4b6d6ae81e269ceb4ca16f53cda99ced967a
Release Process Note
patched_versions is pre-set to the planned next release (2026.2.26). After npm publish of that version, this advisory is ready to publish without further content edits.
Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "openclaw"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.2.26"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-31991"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-02T22:14:56Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "### Summary\nIn OpenClaw `2026.2.25`, Signal group authorization under `groupPolicy=allowlist` could accept sender identities sourced from DM pairing-store approvals. This allowed DM pairing approvals to leak into group allowlist evaluation.\n\n### Impact\nThis is an authorization-boundary weakness between DM pairing and group allowlist controls. A sender approved for DM pairing could pass group checks without explicit group allowlisting.\n\n### Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Latest published version affected: `2026.2.25`\n- Vulnerable range: `\u003c= 2026.2.25`\n- Patched version (planned next release): `\u003e= 2026.2.26`\n\n### Fix\nOpenClaw now keeps DM pairing-store entries DM-only and enforces explicit group allowlist boundaries in shared DM/group policy resolution used by Signal and other channels.\n\n### Fix Commit(s)\n- `8bdda7a651c21e98faccdbbd73081e79cffe8be0`\n- `64de4b6d6ae81e269ceb4ca16f53cda99ced967a`\n\n### Release Process Note\n`patched_versions` is pre-set to the planned next release (`2026.2.26`). After npm publish of that version, this advisory is ready to publish without further content edits.\n\nThanks @tdjackey for reporting.",
"id": "GHSA-wm8r-w8pf-2v6w",
"modified": "2026-03-20T21:36:10Z",
"published": "2026-03-02T22:14:56Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-wm8r-w8pf-2v6w"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31991"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/64de4b6d6ae81e269ceb4ca16f53cda99ced967a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/8bdda7a651c21e98faccdbbd73081e79cffe8be0"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-authorization-bypass-via-dm-pairing-store-leakage-in-signal-group-allowlist"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw has Signal group allowlist authorization bypass via DM pairing-store leakage"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.