GHSA-WP5F-6Q39-Q2F4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-25 15:32 – Updated: 2026-08-25 15:32
VLAI
Details

Issue summary: OpenSSL CMS decryption sizes the key-unwrap output buffer based on querying the unwrapped key size, but the AES-WRAP-PAD unwrap primitive can write and cleanse more bytes than that query reports, causing an 8-byte out-of-bounds heap write.

Impact summary: An attacker who supplies a crafted CMS message can trigger a deterministic 8-byte out-of-bounds heap write when the victim decrypts it with CMS_decrypt(), corrupting the heap and typically resulting in a Denial of Service.

CWE: CWE-787: Out-of-bounds Write

Description: The key-wrap OID is potentially attacker-controlled on the wire. CMS unwrapping allows both id-aesNNN-wrap-pad and id-aesNNN-wrap ciphers. An attacker can take a legitimate message and change a single OID byte to select the padded variant while leaving the message otherwise valid. Since the unwrap key is derived from the recipient's private operation (ECDH key agreement or ML-KEM decapsulation), the RFC 5649 integrity check cannot pass, and the decryption fails with integrity failure.

The write is a fixed-size (8-byte), fixed-value (zero) heap overflow immediately past the allocation, requires no special configuration, and is reachable from the public CMS_decrypt() function. The consequence is a heap corruption leading to a Denial of Service. The fix in the CMS code sizes the unwrap output buffer for the worst case so a failed unwrap cannot write past the allocation.

FIPS impact: no

As the CMS code lives outside the FIPS module boundary, no FIPS modules are affected by this CVE.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-63072"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-787"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-25T13:19:26Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Issue summary: OpenSSL CMS decryption sizes the key-unwrap output buffer based\non querying the unwrapped key size, but the AES-WRAP-PAD unwrap primitive\ncan write and cleanse more bytes than that query reports, causing an 8-byte\nout-of-bounds heap write.\n\nImpact summary: An attacker who supplies a crafted CMS message can trigger a\ndeterministic 8-byte out-of-bounds heap write when the victim decrypts it\nwith CMS_decrypt(), corrupting the heap and typically resulting in a Denial\nof Service.\n\nCWE: CWE-787: Out-of-bounds Write\n\nDescription: The key-wrap OID is potentially attacker-controlled on the wire.\nCMS unwrapping allows both id-aesNNN-wrap-pad and id-aesNNN-wrap ciphers.\nAn attacker can take a legitimate message and change a single OID byte to\nselect the padded variant while leaving the message otherwise valid. Since\nthe unwrap key is derived from the recipient\u0027s private operation (ECDH key\nagreement or ML-KEM decapsulation), the RFC 5649 integrity check cannot\npass, and the decryption fails with integrity failure.\n\nThe write is a fixed-size (8-byte), fixed-value (zero) heap overflow\nimmediately past the allocation, requires no special configuration, and is\nreachable from the public CMS_decrypt() function. The consequence is\na heap corruption leading to a Denial of Service. The fix in the CMS code\nsizes the unwrap output buffer for the worst case so a failed unwrap cannot\nwrite past the allocation.\n\nFIPS impact: no\n\nAs the CMS code lives outside the FIPS module boundary, no FIPS\nmodules are affected by this CVE.",
  "id": "GHSA-wp5f-6q39-q2f4",
  "modified": "2026-08-25T15:32:59Z",
  "published": "2026-08-25T15:32:58Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63072"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/2a3dac874c8057c1f0186849bf1ede1ae7b6b756"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/87784ad619af36b8807c2044b3940006fccc1e42"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/9530a5fd1aacaeccdced4478ea2340a480613335"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/9ec2f6d2ae2bcad907cf7ee38584855bafe4979a"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/a0c8ec557d9cac078f032d76cdf684fe743eb382"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://openssl-library.org/news/secadv/20260825.txt"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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