GHSA-WPM4-RCR2-X634

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-27 21:31 – Updated: 2026-07-27 21:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net: qualcomm: rmnet: validate MAP frame length before ingress parsing

When ingress deaggregation is disabled, rmnet_map_ingress_handler() passes the skb straight to __rmnet_map_ingress_handler(), skipping the length validation that rmnet_map_deaggregate() performs on the aggregated path. The parser then dereferences the MAP header and csum header/trailer based on the on-wire pkt_len without checking skb->len, so a short frame is read out of bounds:

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in rmnet_map_checksum_downlink_packet Read of size 1 at addr ffff88801118ed00 by task exploit/147 Call Trace: ... rmnet_map_checksum_downlink_packet (drivers/net/ethernet/qualcomm/rmnet/rmnet_map_data.c:413) __rmnet_map_ingress_handler (drivers/net/ethernet/qualcomm/rmnet/rmnet_handlers.c:96) rmnet_rx_handler (drivers/net/ethernet/qualcomm/rmnet/rmnet_handlers.c:129) __netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0 (net/core/dev.c:6089) netif_receive_skb (net/core/dev.c:6460) tun_get_user (drivers/net/tun.c:1955) tun_chr_write_iter (drivers/net/tun.c:2001) vfs_write (fs/read_write.c:688) ksys_write (fs/read_write.c:740) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94) ...

Factor that validation out of rmnet_map_deaggregate() into rmnet_map_validate_packet_len() and run it on the no-aggregation path too. The MAP header is bounds-checked first, since this path can receive a frame shorter than the header.

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-64550"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-27T21:17:07Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: qualcomm: rmnet: validate MAP frame length before ingress parsing\n\nWhen ingress deaggregation is disabled, rmnet_map_ingress_handler() passes\nthe skb straight to __rmnet_map_ingress_handler(), skipping the length\nvalidation that rmnet_map_deaggregate() performs on the aggregated path.\nThe parser then dereferences the MAP header and csum header/trailer based on\nthe on-wire pkt_len without checking skb-\u003elen, so a short frame is read out\nof bounds:\n\n  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in rmnet_map_checksum_downlink_packet\n  Read of size 1 at addr ffff88801118ed00 by task exploit/147\n  Call Trace:\n   ...\n   rmnet_map_checksum_downlink_packet (drivers/net/ethernet/qualcomm/rmnet/rmnet_map_data.c:413)\n   __rmnet_map_ingress_handler (drivers/net/ethernet/qualcomm/rmnet/rmnet_handlers.c:96)\n   rmnet_rx_handler (drivers/net/ethernet/qualcomm/rmnet/rmnet_handlers.c:129)\n   __netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0 (net/core/dev.c:6089)\n   netif_receive_skb (net/core/dev.c:6460)\n   tun_get_user (drivers/net/tun.c:1955)\n   tun_chr_write_iter (drivers/net/tun.c:2001)\n   vfs_write (fs/read_write.c:688)\n   ksys_write (fs/read_write.c:740)\n   do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94)\n   ...\n\nFactor that validation out of rmnet_map_deaggregate() into\nrmnet_map_validate_packet_len() and run it on the no-aggregation path too.\nThe MAP header is bounds-checked first, since this path can receive a frame\nshorter than the header.",
  "id": "GHSA-wpm4-rcr2-x634",
  "modified": "2026-07-27T21:31:27Z",
  "published": "2026-07-27T21:31:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64550"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/00f4c366dbca16a40772c3b7ec2d8cba839e9724"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/14eb0c9491385d5361a292ea4974aec0e6887299"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1b12612c367e4be9b0814c0468e7e687835315b4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/231a8a4b76cb1b1827b3b19d7b3603642f5aaaef"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3868c3244369ab709a90c9aad7534d406009b824"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a54d76d176e50d2fdbd39b7231efe256170339e4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ed25befc8c36f896b5878f9078faddb67fd7e2d0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f0f1887a9e30712a1df03e152dce6fb91344b1f3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



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