GHSA-WPM4-RCR2-X634
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-27 21:31 – Updated: 2026-07-30 06:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: qualcomm: rmnet: validate MAP frame length before ingress parsing
When ingress deaggregation is disabled, rmnet_map_ingress_handler() passes the skb straight to __rmnet_map_ingress_handler(), skipping the length validation that rmnet_map_deaggregate() performs on the aggregated path. The parser then dereferences the MAP header and csum header/trailer based on the on-wire pkt_len without checking skb->len, so a short frame is read out of bounds:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in rmnet_map_checksum_downlink_packet Read of size 1 at addr ffff88801118ed00 by task exploit/147 Call Trace: ... rmnet_map_checksum_downlink_packet (drivers/net/ethernet/qualcomm/rmnet/rmnet_map_data.c:413) __rmnet_map_ingress_handler (drivers/net/ethernet/qualcomm/rmnet/rmnet_handlers.c:96) rmnet_rx_handler (drivers/net/ethernet/qualcomm/rmnet/rmnet_handlers.c:129) __netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0 (net/core/dev.c:6089) netif_receive_skb (net/core/dev.c:6460) tun_get_user (drivers/net/tun.c:1955) tun_chr_write_iter (drivers/net/tun.c:2001) vfs_write (fs/read_write.c:688) ksys_write (fs/read_write.c:740) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94) ...
Factor that validation out of rmnet_map_deaggregate() into rmnet_map_validate_packet_len() and run it on the no-aggregation path too. The MAP header is bounds-checked first, since this path can receive a frame shorter than the header.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-64550"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-27T21:17:07Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: qualcomm: rmnet: validate MAP frame length before ingress parsing\n\nWhen ingress deaggregation is disabled, rmnet_map_ingress_handler() passes\nthe skb straight to __rmnet_map_ingress_handler(), skipping the length\nvalidation that rmnet_map_deaggregate() performs on the aggregated path.\nThe parser then dereferences the MAP header and csum header/trailer based on\nthe on-wire pkt_len without checking skb-\u003elen, so a short frame is read out\nof bounds:\n\n BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in rmnet_map_checksum_downlink_packet\n Read of size 1 at addr ffff88801118ed00 by task exploit/147\n Call Trace:\n ...\n rmnet_map_checksum_downlink_packet (drivers/net/ethernet/qualcomm/rmnet/rmnet_map_data.c:413)\n __rmnet_map_ingress_handler (drivers/net/ethernet/qualcomm/rmnet/rmnet_handlers.c:96)\n rmnet_rx_handler (drivers/net/ethernet/qualcomm/rmnet/rmnet_handlers.c:129)\n __netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0 (net/core/dev.c:6089)\n netif_receive_skb (net/core/dev.c:6460)\n tun_get_user (drivers/net/tun.c:1955)\n tun_chr_write_iter (drivers/net/tun.c:2001)\n vfs_write (fs/read_write.c:688)\n ksys_write (fs/read_write.c:740)\n do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94)\n ...\n\nFactor that validation out of rmnet_map_deaggregate() into\nrmnet_map_validate_packet_len() and run it on the no-aggregation path too.\nThe MAP header is bounds-checked first, since this path can receive a frame\nshorter than the header.",
"id": "GHSA-wpm4-rcr2-x634",
"modified": "2026-07-30T06:32:34Z",
"published": "2026-07-27T21:31:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64550"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/00f4c366dbca16a40772c3b7ec2d8cba839e9724"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/14eb0c9491385d5361a292ea4974aec0e6887299"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1b12612c367e4be9b0814c0468e7e687835315b4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/231a8a4b76cb1b1827b3b19d7b3603642f5aaaef"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3868c3244369ab709a90c9aad7534d406009b824"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a54d76d176e50d2fdbd39b7231efe256170339e4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ed25befc8c36f896b5878f9078faddb67fd7e2d0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f0f1887a9e30712a1df03e152dce6fb91344b1f3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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