GHSA-WX4M-69M9-GX3M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-22 20:40 – Updated: 2026-09-22 20:40Summary
An authenticated party can add a malicious name to any statistics-capable entity, allowing for Cross-Site Scripting attacks against anyone who views a Statistics Graph card containing that entity, when they hover over any data point on the chart.
Payload
Payload triggering
An alternative, and more impactful scenario, is that the entity gets a malicious name from the provider of the integration (e.g. Tibber, Shelly, or any HACS integration), and is exploited that way through the default name — without requiring any direct access to the Home Assistant instance. This is the same supply-chain vector as CVE-2025-62172.
Details
The Statistics Graph card renders entity names in ECharts tooltips as raw HTML. The offending
line is in src/components/chart/statistics-chart.ts:
https://github.com/home-assistant/frontend/blob/c13a80ce5e7ae39f0262444e2b6295a074a96732/src/components/chart/statistics-chart.ts#L236
Where param.seriesName is interpolated verbatim into the returned HTML string:
return `${time}${param.marker} ${param.seriesName}: ${value}`;
No call to filterXSS() is made — unlike the Energy dashboard chart, which was patched as part
of CVE-2025-62172:
// FIXED in energy-chart-options.ts:268
return `${param.marker} ${filterXSS(param.seriesName!)}: ...`;
The statistics-chart component was not updated when the Energy chart was patched, leaving the
same class of vulnerability in place.
The existing entity and payload used for CVE-2025-62172 is also a valid exploit for this vulnerability:
The name value flows through the following chain:
-
nameis set fromgetStatisticLabel(this.hass, statistic_id, meta): https://github.com/home-assistant/frontend/blob/c13a80ce5e7ae39f0262444e2b6295a074a96732/src/components/chart/statistics-chart.ts#L411 -
getStatisticLabelis defined here and callscomputeStateName(entity): https://github.com/home-assistant/frontend/blob/c13a80ce5e7ae39f0262444e2b6295a074a96732/src/data/recorder.ts#L329-L339 -
computeStateNameis defined here — no HTML encoding is applied: https://github.com/home-assistant/frontend/blob/c13a80ce5e7ae39f0262444e2b6295a074a96732/src/common/entity/compute_state_name.ts
The only transformation applied to the name is replacing underscores with spaces
(computeObjectId(entityId).replace(/_/g, " ")), which does not prevent HTML injection.
NB: Do note that only the fields Mean, State, Sum and Change are vulnerable. The top 3 (Min, Max, Mean) or the bottom 3 (State, Sum, Change) are selected by default though, making it vulnerable by default:
Another requirement is that the Chart Type is of type Line, not Bar, which is also the default:
PoC
-
In Settings → Devices & Services → Helpers, click + Create Helper. (For testing)
-
Choose Template → Template sensor. Fill in the form:
- Name:
test <img src=x onerror=alert(document.domain) /> - State template:
{{0.00000001*as_timestamp(states('sensor.date_time_iso'))}} - Unit of measurement:
kWh - State class:
Measurement - Click Submit.
- Open a dashboard and add a Statistics Graph card targeting the new sensor:
NB: Set time-window to 5 minutes for ease of testing so you see data quickly
-
Hover over any data point on the chart.
-
The
onerrorhandler fires —alert(document.domain)executes in the browser or HTML-injection appears depending on the payload
** Exact helper as described here**
Own sensor
Own sensor 2
Impact
The vulnerability can be exploited remotely via the supply-chain vector: any integration that automatically names entities (e.g. energy providers like Tibber) could deliver the payload without requiring the attacker to have any account on the target Home Assistant instance. This mirrors the exact attack path described in CVE-2025-62172. The most likely exploit is also through energy providers due to them providing multiple entities compatible with statistic graphs.
Compared to CVE-2025-62172, this has the requirement that you add a Statistics Graph to your dashboard (or somehow view the entity in a Statistics Graph through other means, if such a method exists). Otherwise the attack flow is identical. Suggested CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H
The root cause — missing filterXSS() on param.seriesName — is identical to the already-fixed
Energy dashboard. The Statistics Graph card, which uses a shared statistics-chart component,
was not included in the previous fix scope.
Credit: Robin Lunde - https://robinlunde.com
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "homeassistant"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.7.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-91130"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-80"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-22T20:40:55Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Summary\nAn authenticated party can add a malicious name to any statistics-capable entity, allowing for\nCross-Site Scripting attacks against anyone who views a Statistics Graph card containing that\nentity, when they hover over any data point on the chart.\n\n**Payload**\n\u003cimg width=\"1529\" height=\"441\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/6926ce53-75fb-455a-bd4e-0c5281e8bed8\" /\u003e\n\n**Payload triggering**\n\u003cimg width=\"835\" height=\"469\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/0bb9d17a-c123-4d44-8471-35097f65ddd2\" /\u003e\n\nAn alternative, and more impactful scenario, is that the entity gets a malicious name from the\nprovider of the integration (e.g. Tibber, Shelly, or any HACS integration), and is exploited\nthat way through the default name \u2014 without requiring any direct access to the Home Assistant\ninstance. This is the same supply-chain vector as CVE-2025-62172.\n\n\n### Details\n\nThe Statistics Graph card renders entity names in ECharts tooltips as raw HTML. The offending\nline is in `src/components/chart/statistics-chart.ts`:\n\nhttps://github.com/home-assistant/frontend/blob/c13a80ce5e7ae39f0262444e2b6295a074a96732/src/components/chart/statistics-chart.ts#L236\n\nWhere **_`param.seriesName`_** is interpolated verbatim into the returned HTML string:\n\n```\nreturn `${time}${param.marker} ${param.seriesName}: ${value}`;\n```\n\nNo call to `filterXSS()` is made \u2014 unlike the Energy dashboard chart, which was patched as part\nof CVE-2025-62172:\n\n```\n// FIXED in energy-chart-options.ts:268\nreturn `${param.marker} ${filterXSS(param.seriesName!)}: ...`;\n```\n\nThe `statistics-chart` component was not updated when the Energy chart was patched, leaving the\nsame class of vulnerability in place.\n\nThe existing entity and payload used for CVE-2025-62172 is also a valid exploit for this vulnerability:\n\u003cimg width=\"962\" height=\"500\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/35c84dcd-64d4-47b6-8df2-6c8b63cac880\" /\u003e\n\n\nThe name value flows through the following chain:\n\n1. `name` is set from `getStatisticLabel(this.hass, statistic_id, meta)`:\n https://github.com/home-assistant/frontend/blob/c13a80ce5e7ae39f0262444e2b6295a074a96732/src/components/chart/statistics-chart.ts#L411\n\n2. `getStatisticLabel` is defined here and calls `computeStateName(entity)`:\n https://github.com/home-assistant/frontend/blob/c13a80ce5e7ae39f0262444e2b6295a074a96732/src/data/recorder.ts#L329-L339\n\n3. `computeStateName` is defined here \u2014 no HTML encoding is applied:\n https://github.com/home-assistant/frontend/blob/c13a80ce5e7ae39f0262444e2b6295a074a96732/src/common/entity/compute_state_name.ts\n\nThe only transformation applied to the name is replacing underscores with spaces\n(`computeObjectId(entityId).replace(/_/g, \" \")`), which does not prevent HTML injection.\n\n\n**NB:** Do note that only the fields `Mean, State, Sum and Change` are vulnerable. The top 3 (Min, Max, Mean) or the bottom 3 (State, Sum, Change) are selected by default though, making it vulnerable by default:\n\u003cimg width=\"105\" height=\"216\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/7a784c90-cca5-46da-bcb9-6942ad81da0c\" /\u003e\n\nAnother requirement is that the Chart Type is of type Line, not Bar, which is also the default:\n\u003cimg width=\"133\" height=\"91\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4f131495-9000-4a80-808b-bf4be9f7a2f6\" /\u003e\n\n\n\n---\n\n### PoC\n\n1. In **Settings \u2192 Devices \u0026 Services \u2192 Helpers**, click **+ Create Helper**. (For testing)\n\n2. Choose **Template** \u2192 **Template sensor**. Fill in the form:\n - **Name:** `test \u003cimg src=x onerror=alert(document.domain) /\u003e`\n - **State template:** `{{0.00000001*as_timestamp(states(\u0027sensor.date_time_iso\u0027))}}`\n - **Unit of measurement:** `kWh`\n - **State class:** `Measurement`\n - Click **Submit**.\n\n\u003cimg width=\"392\" height=\"741\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/6a9b2c65-93fb-4d20-89b8-5a1f47a2bcb0\" /\u003e\n\n\n3. Open a dashboard and add a **Statistics Graph** card targeting the new sensor:\n\n\n\u003cimg width=\"694\" height=\"720\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/83996d12-d5ba-467a-9ca1-cbc46246ddff\" /\u003e\n\n**NB:** Set time-window to 5 minutes for ease of testing so you see data quickly\n\n\n4. Hover over any data point on the chart.\n\n\n\n\n5. The `onerror` handler fires \u2014 `alert(document.domain)` executes in the browser or HTML-injection appears depending on the payload\n\n\n** Exact helper as described here**\n\u003cimg width=\"802\" height=\"441\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/09284c10-bc39-410a-aff0-307e0bfd0502\" /\u003e\n\n**Own sensor**\n\u003cimg width=\"962\" height=\"500\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/35c84dcd-64d4-47b6-8df2-6c8b63cac880\" /\u003e\n\n**Own sensor 2**\n\u003cimg width=\"835\" height=\"469\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/0bb9d17a-c123-4d44-8471-35097f65ddd2\" /\u003e\n---\n\n### Impact\n\nThe vulnerability can be exploited remotely via the supply-chain vector: any integration that\nautomatically names entities (e.g. energy providers like Tibber) could deliver the payload\nwithout requiring the attacker to have any account on the target Home Assistant instance. This\nmirrors the exact attack path described in CVE-2025-62172. The most likely exploit is also through energy providers due to them providing multiple entities compatible with statistic graphs.\n\nCompared to CVE-2025-62172, this has the requirement that you add a Statistics Graph to your dashboard (or somehow view the entity in a Statistics Graph through other means, if such a method exists). Otherwise the attack flow is identical.\nSuggested CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H\n\nThe root cause \u2014 missing `filterXSS()` on `param.seriesName` \u2014 is identical to the already-fixed\nEnergy dashboard. The Statistics Graph card, which uses a shared `statistics-chart` component,\nwas not included in the previous fix scope.\n\nCredit: Robin Lunde - [https://robinlunde.com](https://robinlunde.com)",
"id": "GHSA-wx4m-69m9-gx3m",
"modified": "2026-09-22T20:40:55Z",
"published": "2026-09-22T20:40:55Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/home-assistant/core/security/advisories/GHSA-wx4m-69m9-gx3m"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/home-assistant/frontend/pull/52235"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/home-assistant/frontend/commit/b8c201b6d34414d30c622797366570185c219614"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/home-assistant/core"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/home-assistant/core/releases/tag/2026.7.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Home Assistant: XSS in Statistics Graph Card"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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