GHSA-WXWR-F2WF-HX2X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-11 21:31 – Updated: 2026-09-14 15:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ceph: bound num_export_targets array for mds info v2/v3
ceph_mdsmap_decode() in fs/ceph/mdsmap.c reads num_export_targets from each per-mds info record and advances the decode cursor by num_export_targets * sizeof(u32) without first checking that many bytes remain. The only upper-bound check that catches a runaway cursor (*p > info_end) is gated on info_v >= 4, because info_end is left NULL for info_v 2 and 3. When the monitor sends an MDS map whose per-mds info version is 2 or 3 with an oversized num_export_targets, the cursor moves past the message front buffer and the later export-targets loop calls the unchecked ceph_decode_32() on out-of-bounds memory.
A kernel client processes CEPH_MSG_MDS_MAP from its monitor session (net/ceph/mon_client.c dispatches it; fs/ceph/super.c routes it to ceph_mdsc_handle_mdsmap(), which sets end to the front buffer bound and calls ceph_mdsmap_decode()). A malicious or compromised monitor, or an on-path attacker on an unsigned/unencrypted messenger session, can therefore drive an out-of-bounds read in the client kernel; on x86_64 with KASAN it is reported as a slab-out-of-bounds read in ceph_mdsmap_decode(). The decoded values land in the internal info->export_targets[] array, so the consequence is a kernel out-of-bounds read, not an information leak to the attacker.
Impact: a malicious or compromised Ceph monitor sending an MDS map with a per-mds info version of 2 or 3 and an oversized num_export_targets field triggers an out-of-bounds read in the CephFS client kernel.
Add a ceph_decode_need() for the export-targets array before advancing the cursor, so the bound is enforced for every info_v >= 2, not only info_v >= 4. This mirrors the count-then-need idiom already used for m_data_pg_pools later in the same function.
Compute the export-targets byte count with size_mul() and reuse that checked length when advancing the cursor, so the attacker-controlled num_export_targets multiplication fails closed on overflow rather than relying on the later kcalloc() guard.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-89650"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-11T20:19:51Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nceph: bound num_export_targets array for mds info v2/v3\n\nceph_mdsmap_decode() in fs/ceph/mdsmap.c reads num_export_targets from\neach per-mds info record and advances the decode cursor by\nnum_export_targets * sizeof(u32) without first checking that many bytes\nremain. The only upper-bound check that catches a runaway cursor\n(*p \u003e info_end) is gated on info_v \u003e= 4, because info_end is left NULL\nfor info_v 2 and 3. When the monitor sends an MDS map whose per-mds\ninfo version is 2 or 3 with an oversized num_export_targets, the cursor\nmoves past the message front buffer and the later export-targets loop\ncalls the unchecked ceph_decode_32() on out-of-bounds memory.\n\nA kernel client processes CEPH_MSG_MDS_MAP from its monitor session\n(net/ceph/mon_client.c dispatches it; fs/ceph/super.c routes it to\nceph_mdsc_handle_mdsmap(), which sets end to the front buffer bound and\ncalls ceph_mdsmap_decode()). A malicious or compromised monitor, or an\non-path attacker on an unsigned/unencrypted messenger session, can\ntherefore drive an out-of-bounds read in the client kernel; on x86_64\nwith KASAN it is reported as a slab-out-of-bounds read in\nceph_mdsmap_decode(). The decoded values land in the internal\ninfo-\u003eexport_targets[] array, so the consequence is a kernel\nout-of-bounds read, not an information leak to the attacker.\n\nImpact: a malicious or compromised Ceph monitor sending an MDS map with\na per-mds info version of 2 or 3 and an oversized num_export_targets\nfield triggers an out-of-bounds read in the CephFS client kernel.\n\nAdd a ceph_decode_need() for the export-targets array before advancing\nthe cursor, so the bound is enforced for every info_v \u003e= 2, not only\ninfo_v \u003e= 4. This mirrors the count-then-need idiom already used for\nm_data_pg_pools later in the same function.\n\nCompute the export-targets byte count with size_mul() and reuse that\nchecked length when advancing the cursor, so the attacker-controlled\nnum_export_targets multiplication fails closed on overflow rather than\nrelying on the later kcalloc() guard.",
"id": "GHSA-wxwr-f2wf-hx2x",
"modified": "2026-09-14T15:32:33Z",
"published": "2026-09-11T21:31:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-89650"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0c4bcc3ba7291d383b82ce1c2fe324f69a42da2d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/332c444f4dc6fa1e8b8637c9e82d29e97f768656"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3bf7dba8dba9a05774b846affec61a3624ddba38"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/55a06b32438c222765138727d0a8164b103e8f0d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/58c2d3e954c13694ef6e820a5e9456461bb9e7df"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a3eb169ee297aa99670ba927c659990bd1e453f3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/eb3e1a1cb1634c76d59c5a9cb1a026fc69d40911"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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