GHSA-X426-X7CC-3FPC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-11 13:27 – Updated: 2026-06-11 13:27
VLAI
Summary
@hapi/wreck: Sensitive credential headers leak across cross-port and cross-scheme redirects
Details
Impact
Wreck strips credential headers (Authorization, Cookie, Proxy-Authorization) before following a cross-origin redirect, but the origin check compares hostnames only and ignores scheme and port. As a result, credentials are forwarded intact across same-host port changes and HTTPS-to-HTTP downgrades, allowing a co-tenant on an adjacent port or a network-position attacker capable of forging a redirect to capture bearer tokens, session cookies, and proxy credentials and impersonate the victim against the upstream service. The fix replaces the hostname comparison with a full-origin comparison (scheme, host, and port), aligning the behavior with the WHATWG Fetch same-origin definition used by browsers.
Patches
Upgrade to >= 18.1.2.
Workarounds
- Set
redirects: 0(default) and handle redirects manually with a strict origin check. - Use the
beforeRedirecthook to inspect the redirect target and abort or strip sensitive headers before the follow-on request.
Severity
6.5 (Medium)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@hapi/wreck"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "18.1.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-48022"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-319",
"CWE-346",
"CWE-522",
"CWE-940"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-11T13:27:05Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\nWreck strips credential headers (Authorization, Cookie, Proxy-Authorization) before following a cross-origin redirect, but the origin check compares hostnames only and ignores scheme and port. As a result, credentials are forwarded intact across same-host port changes and HTTPS-to-HTTP downgrades, allowing a co-tenant on an adjacent port or a network-position attacker capable of forging a redirect to capture bearer tokens, session cookies, and proxy credentials and impersonate the victim against the upstream service. The fix replaces the hostname comparison with a full-origin comparison (scheme, host, and port), aligning the behavior with the WHATWG Fetch same-origin definition used by browsers.\n\n### Patches\nUpgrade to \u003e= 18.1.2.\n\n### Workarounds\n- Set `redirects: 0` (default) and handle redirects manually with a strict origin check.\n- Use the `beforeRedirect` hook to inspect the redirect target and abort or strip sensitive headers before the follow-on request.",
"id": "GHSA-x426-x7cc-3fpc",
"modified": "2026-06-11T13:27:05Z",
"published": "2026-06-11T13:27:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/hapijs/wreck/security/advisories/GHSA-x426-x7cc-3fpc"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/hapijs/wreck/commit/b93323b63ad3adb14d2b4019d77219182211641e"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/hapijs/wreck"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "@hapi/wreck: Sensitive credential headers leak across cross-port and cross-scheme redirects"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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