GHSA-X426-X7CC-3FPC

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-11 13:27 – Updated: 2026-06-11 13:27
VLAI
Summary
@hapi/wreck: Sensitive credential headers leak across cross-port and cross-scheme redirects
Details

Impact

Wreck strips credential headers (Authorization, Cookie, Proxy-Authorization) before following a cross-origin redirect, but the origin check compares hostnames only and ignores scheme and port. As a result, credentials are forwarded intact across same-host port changes and HTTPS-to-HTTP downgrades, allowing a co-tenant on an adjacent port or a network-position attacker capable of forging a redirect to capture bearer tokens, session cookies, and proxy credentials and impersonate the victim against the upstream service. The fix replaces the hostname comparison with a full-origin comparison (scheme, host, and port), aligning the behavior with the WHATWG Fetch same-origin definition used by browsers.

Patches

Upgrade to >= 18.1.2.

Workarounds

  • Set redirects: 0 (default) and handle redirects manually with a strict origin check.
  • Use the beforeRedirect hook to inspect the redirect target and abort or strip sensitive headers before the follow-on request.
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@hapi/wreck"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "18.1.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-48022"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200",
      "CWE-319",
      "CWE-346",
      "CWE-522",
      "CWE-940"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-11T13:27:05Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nWreck strips credential headers (Authorization, Cookie, Proxy-Authorization) before following a cross-origin redirect, but the origin check compares hostnames only and ignores scheme and port. As a result, credentials are forwarded intact across same-host port changes and HTTPS-to-HTTP downgrades, allowing a co-tenant on an adjacent port or a network-position attacker capable of forging a redirect to capture bearer tokens, session cookies, and proxy credentials and impersonate the victim against the upstream service. The fix replaces the hostname comparison with a full-origin comparison (scheme, host, and port), aligning the behavior with the WHATWG Fetch same-origin definition used by browsers.\n\n### Patches\nUpgrade to \u003e= 18.1.2.\n\n### Workarounds\n- Set `redirects: 0` (default) and handle redirects manually with a strict origin check.\n- Use the `beforeRedirect` hook to inspect the redirect target and abort or strip sensitive headers before the follow-on request.",
  "id": "GHSA-x426-x7cc-3fpc",
  "modified": "2026-06-11T13:27:05Z",
  "published": "2026-06-11T13:27:05Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/hapijs/wreck/security/advisories/GHSA-x426-x7cc-3fpc"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/hapijs/wreck/commit/b93323b63ad3adb14d2b4019d77219182211641e"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/hapijs/wreck"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "@hapi/wreck: Sensitive credential headers leak across cross-port and cross-scheme redirects"
}



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