{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.41.2"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@auth/core"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.41.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.0.0-beta.31"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "next-auth"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "5.0.0-beta.1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.0.0-beta.32"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.24.14"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "next-auth"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.24.15"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345",
      "CWE-346",
      "CWE-940"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-23T14:31:51Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nAuth.js stores the OAuth/OIDC anti-CSRF checks (`state`, `nonce`, and the PKCE verifier) in global cookies that are not bound to the provider that created them. On callback, a check value minted during a sign-in started with one provider can satisfy the callback for a different provider, because the stored cookie is not verified against the callback provider\u0027s identity (provider id, issuer, client id, or redirect URI). In a multi-provider app that allows account linking while logged in, this provider-confusion / mix-up condition can let an attacker link their account at a second provider to a victim\u0027s user.\n\n## Am I affected?\n\nYou may be affected if **all** of the following hold:\n\n- You use `next-auth` `\u003c= 4.24.14` or `\u003e= 5.0.0-beta.1, \u003c= 5.0.0-beta.31`, or `@auth/core` `\u003c= 0.41.2`.\n- You configure multiple OAuth/OIDC providers.\n- You allow users to link additional providers while logged in.\n- At least one configured provider\u0027s authorization request is observable by an attacker, and at least one target provider\u0027s callback can be satisfied without a PKCE verifier (i.e. it relies only on `state` or only on `nonce`).\n\nYou are **not** affected if you use a single OAuth provider, do not allow logged-in account linking, or all providers enforce PKCE.\n\n## Impact\n\n- Account-linking confusion: an attacker can get their account at a target provider linked to the victim\u0027s Auth.js user, granting the attacker persistent sign-in to the victim\u0027s account through that linked provider.\n- Exploitation requires luring the victim into starting a legitimate same-origin flow; it cannot be performed by cross-site request forgery alone, which reduces practical likelihood.\n\n## Patched version\n\nThe fix binds the OAuth check cookies to the provider/authorization flow that created them, so a callback cannot consume a check value minted for a different provider. Upgrade to the first releases containing this fix (pending; this advisory will be updated with exact patched versions before publication).\n\n## Workarounds\n\nIf you cannot upgrade immediately:\n\n- Enable PKCE (`checks: [\"pkce\"]`, in addition to `state`/`nonce`) on every provider that supports it; PKCE blocks the practical code-swap variant because the attacker cannot observe the relying party\u0027s verifier.\n- Avoid offering logged-in account linking across multiple providers where one provider is lower-trust or attacker-observable.\n- Treat `events.linkAccount` as sensitive: add audit logging, user notification, or out-of-band confirmation so that any unexpected link is visible (defense-in-depth, not a root-cause fix).\n\n## Credit\n\nReported by @Nadav0077. Thank you for the responsible disclosure.",
  "id": "GHSA-x445-f3h2-j279",
  "modified": "2026-07-23T14:31:51Z",
  "published": "2026-07-23T14:31:51Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nextauthjs/next-auth/security/advisories/GHSA-x445-f3h2-j279"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nextauthjs/next-auth/pull/13469"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nextauthjs/next-auth/commit/5bca2399a79ba8d116ca5179b4b1ebcd152e7f05"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nextauthjs/next-auth/commit/9f7a97fade9b1319bb9ac19fc9828d62e0a2a852"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/nextauthjs/next-auth"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nextauthjs/next-auth/releases/tag/@auth/core@0.41.3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nextauthjs/next-auth/releases/tag/next-auth@4.24.15"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nextauthjs/next-auth/releases/tag/next-auth@5.0.0-beta.32"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Auth.js: OAuth state, nonce, and PKCE check cookies are not bound to the provider that created them"
}