GHSA-X4FP-GJPV-C6R5

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-01 12:30 – Updated: 2025-12-01 15:30
VLAI?
Details

Uncontrolled recursion in the json2pb component in Apache bRPC (version < 1.15.0) on all platforms allows remote attackers to make the server crash via sending deep recursive json data.

Root Cause: The bRPC json2pb component uses rapidjson to parse json data from the network. The rapidjson parser uses a recursive parsing method by default. If the input json has a large depth of recursive structure, the parser function may run into stack overflow.

Affected Scenarios: Use bRPC server with protobuf message to serve http+json requests from untrusted network. Or directly use JsonToProtoMessage to convert json from untrusted input.

How to Fix: (Choose one of the following options)  1. Upgrade bRPC to version 1.15.0, which fixes this issue. 2. Apply this patch: https://github.com/apache/brpc/pull/3099

Note: No matter which option

you choose, you should know that the fix introduces a recursion depth limit with default value 100. It affects these functions: 

ProtoMessageToJson, ProtoMessageToProtoJson, JsonToProtoMessage, and ProtoJsonToProtoMessage.

If your requests contain json or protobuf messages that have a depth exceeding the limit, the request will be failed after applying the fix. You can modify the gflag json2pb_max_recursion_depth to change the limit.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-59789"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-674"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-12-01T11:15:48Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Uncontrolled recursion in the json2pb component in Apache bRPC (version \u003c 1.15.0) on all platforms allows remote attackers to make the server crash via sending deep recursive json data.\n\nRoot Cause:\nThe bRPC\u00a0json2pb component uses rapidjson to parse json data from the network. The rapidjson parser uses a recursive parsing method by default. If the input json has a large depth of recursive structure, the parser function may run into stack overflow.\n\nAffected Scenarios:\nUse bRPC server with protobuf message to serve http+json requests from untrusted network. Or directly use\u00a0JsonToProtoMessage to convert json from\u00a0untrusted input.\n\n\n\nHow to Fix: \n(Choose one of the following options)\u00a0\n1. Upgrade bRPC to version 1.15.0, which fixes this issue.\n2. Apply this patch:  https://github.com/apache/brpc/pull/3099 \n\n\n\nNote:\nNo matter which option \n\nyou choose, you should know that the fix introduces a recursion depth limit with default value 100. It affects these functions:\u00a0\n\nProtoMessageToJson, ProtoMessageToProtoJson, JsonToProtoMessage, and ProtoJsonToProtoMessage.\n\n If your requests contain json or protobuf messages that have a depth exceeding the limit, the request will be failed after applying the fix. You can modify the gflag json2pb_max_recursion_depth to change the limit.",
  "id": "GHSA-x4fp-gjpv-c6r5",
  "modified": "2025-12-01T15:30:17Z",
  "published": "2025-12-01T12:30:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-59789"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/ozmcsztcpxn61jxod8jo8q46jo0oc1zx"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2025/12/01/1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}


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